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YOUTHFUL DREAMS AND UNCERTAIN FUTURES IN KURDISTAN 
 
This dissertation examines how Kurdistani young people experience contests of 
values in a state shaped by sectarian political cultures during a time of trial and transition 
for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The dissertation is based on approximately 20 
months of ethnographic fieldwork (September 2015 - June 2017) spent among Kurdistani 
youth, broadly defined as 12 to 30 years old, in secondary schools and fitness centers. 
The ethnography presents interlocutors as co-theorists in conceptualizing the society and 
state in which they live, through the use of descriptive vignettes, transcripts of 
discussions, and lengthy interview quotes. Kurdistani interlocutors describe the push and 
pull of living suspended in a “captivating state” in two senses of the phrase: One sense 
refers to a state of feeling trapped for a variety of reasons, including displacement or 
lacking resources to emigrate. The other sense of “captivating state” refers to the Iraqi 
and Kurdistani states and the power they hold over the imaginations and affections of 
their citizens. Throughout the ethnography, Kurdistani people negotiate the ethics of 
staying or emigrating; debate descriptions of and prescriptions for state and civic order; 
and express doubts and hopes for uncertain futures. By attending to interlocutors’ 
assessments of the “state of things” and strategies for generating hope, the ethnography 
provides a view of ethical life in Kurdistan that centers young people and their moral 
striving at the intersections of “sectarianism,” the “state,” and “values.” 
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This dissertation represents the culmination of many things, difficult and 
wonderful, and the dedication and generosity of many good people, without whose 
contributions I would not be where I am today. For the content of the dissertation, I take 
full responsibility, and all errors are my own. For its completion, I want to thank the 
following individuals and institutions. 
This ethnography represents the past decade of my life immersed in graduate 
study under the guidance of my adviser, Dr. Diane E. King. She believed in me and in 
this project from the beginning and has supported me professionally and personally 
throughout. Dr. King’s example in carrying out research in an incredibly challenging 
field site, her commitment to advancing knowledge, and her dedication to the people of 
Kurdistan and of Iraq have been a source of inspiration for me since I first met her. 
Relative to other parts of the world, few anthropologists have conducted extended 
fieldwork in Iraq throughout their career, and I am grateful to have worked with one of 
them. I am deeply thankful for all I have learned from her.   
Upon arriving in Kurdistan, officials at Salahaddin University-Erbil welcomed 
me, helped obtain my legal residency, and coordinated my stay on campus while looking 
for more permanent housing. Thank you especially to University President Dr. Ahmed 
Dezaye and to the Director of the International Office, Dr. Mohammed Azeez Saeed, for 
their hospitality. I also am grateful to the University of Kurdistan Hewlȇr for its 
generosity in extending a “Visiting Doctoral Researcher” position to me. Dr. Anwar 
Anaid, Dean of the School of Social Sciences, graciously provided an office space for me 
to work in when I visited the campus, where I enjoyed meeting faculty and students. 
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Thank you to Dr. Sarbaz Najib Othman for inviting me to share my research in a faculty 
seminar series, in which I received valuable feedback.    
This project would not have been possible without the support and participation of 
numerous people in Kurdistan. I am indebted to the many schools and businesses who 
permitted me to conduct research on their premises and with their staff. These 
organizations and individuals appear throughout the dissertation under pseudonyms in 
order to protect their identities. I am deeply appreciative of the kindness and generosity 
offered to me by people like “Ashti” and “Sara” and many others. They gave me so much 
of their time and trusted me with their words. I refer to such individuals not as 
“informants” but as “interlocutors,” a term that reflects the collaborative and ongoing 
dialogue between researcher and research “subjects.” Many people graciously included 
me in conversations about their lives and country, and I center their observations and 
analysis as much as possible; they are insightful co-theorists observing themselves, their 
society, and their state. The friendships I enjoyed with my closest interlocutors mean 
more to me than perhaps they know. I think of them often, miss them, and wish them the 
best.   
I also wish to extend thanks to the many individuals not related to my research, 
but who offered their assistance and friendship during our 20 months in Kurdistan, 
including Jeremy, Lana, Janet, Joe, Andie, Kirsten, Nyi, Ife, and Almas. They helped us 
persevere during tough times, and our time in the field would not have been successful 
without their help and thoughtfulness.  
At the University of Kentucky, I received additional guidance from my committee 
members, Drs. Mark Whitaker, Kristin Monroe, and Phil Harling. It seems that hardly 
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anyone does “grand theory” anymore in anthropology. I appreciate Mark Whitaker’s 
encouragement to not shy away from engaging with theorists or ideas that may now seem 
“dated” to some but are nonetheless central concerns of our discipline and remain 
productive ground for thinking about human experience. Kristin Monroe provided critical 
feedback that helped me sharpen my thinking at many turns and directed me toward 
rigorous theory and ethnography in anthropology of the Middle East. Phil Harling 
brought an historian’s perspective on the state and liberal self-governance to my project. 
During my graduate coursework, he also rather fortuitously suggested that I take up some 
physical activity to help manage stress. His advice led me to participate in, and later 
coach, indoor cycling group fitness classes, which became central to my fieldwork in 
Kurdistan. I also thank Dr. Jane Jensen for her contributions as an anthropologist of 
education and for her service as an outside reader for my dissertation.  
Also at the University of Kentucky, fellow writing group members Lydia Roll, 
Dr. Anahid Matossian, and Erfan Saidi Moqadam provided encouragement and helpful 
feedback on drafts. Their words and work, in addition to the fine work of other students 
in my department, helped me not feel “alone” in the ups and downs of a Ph.D. program, 
especially during the dissertation writing stage. I am also grateful to Dr. Katie Founds for 
her friendship, thoughtful conversation, and encouragement throughout graduate school. 
Research funding for this dissertation was provided through a Dissertation 
Enhancement Award with the Graduate School at the University of Kentucky. Support 
also came through a Scholar Award with P.E.O. International, by nomination of Chapter 
AO of P.E.O. International. When most American funding agencies would not support a 
research project in Iraq because of the conflict with the Islamic State, the organization 
vi 
P.E.O. International stood behind me and funded my second year in Kurdistan. I was 
especially touched by Carolyn Looff and the AO Chapter members who asked to meet 
with me via Skype halfway through my fieldwork to learn about my research and to hear 
how I was doing.  
Before going to the field, I had the good fortune to participate in the first Sorani 
Kurdish intensive language program at Indiana University’s Summer Language 
Workshop (2015). Upon returning to the United States after my fieldwork, I had the 
opportunity to enroll in another summer of Sorani study made possible by a Foreign 
Language and Area Studies (FLAS) grant through Indiana University, where I was able 
to begin translating my research interviews. I thank Dr. Haidar Khezri for all that he has 
done by creating Kurdish language learning content, teaching me Sorani and preparing 
me for fieldwork, helping me with translation, and his encouragement in the years since. I 
fondly remember my fellow participants in the Sorani Kurdish program for their 
camaraderie and commitment. 
While writing this dissertation, I had the pleasure of teaching multiple years at the 
University of the South, in Sewanee, Tennessee. Faculty members of the Department of 
Anthropology and the International and Global Studies Program at Sewanee welcomed 
me as their colleague and invited me to present my research. Drs. Donna Murdock, 
Richard O’Connor, and Celeste Ray first introduced me to anthropology in my 
undergraduate days, and I appreciate their continuing support throughout my graduate 
studies and early career. I am tremendously grateful for Richard O’Connor’s mentorship 
over the years. His wisdom and guidance have been invaluable in shaping my thinking 
and teaching, and I am humbled by his confidence in me and in my work. Thanks also go 
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teaching. I am grateful for how my Sewanee colleagues encouraged me to develop and to 
teach courses related to my research, topical interests, and geographic specialization in 
the Middle East. The opportunity to teach these seminars and to engage with students 
while writing stimulated my thinking and motivated me to complete my dissertation. 
Thank you to all the wonderful students who have made teaching at Sewanee delightful.  
My friends and colleagues, Drs. Margaret Day Elsner and Camille Westmont, 
offered helpful advice and pep talks throughout dissertation writing. Our coworking 
sessions on Zoom made COVID quarantine tolerable. Speaking of the coronavirus 
pandemic, I owe a special thank you to all the people who supported me during 2020 and 
2021. What an especially difficult time to be completing a dissertation. Thanks also to my 
good friend Emily Nielsen for her continued love and affirmation. We both worked on 
projects that took far longer and were far more difficult than we anticipated, and I am 
glad we were able to help each other through those years.  
My family has supported me in so many ways throughout my education; I cannot 
thank them enough. My grandparents, Ann Hardin, and Tom and Nell Sherer, have been 
an unfailing source of love and encouragement, cheering me on each step of the way. As 
a first-generation college student and first Ph.D. in the family, I could not have made it 
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“Brother, don’t build your city of dreams. Help the people of this city to escape 
even more sadness. We fantasise to forget our suffering. Imagination acts as a 




In many ways, the Kurdistan Region Iraq (KRI) has a dreamlike quality about it. 
It is not an independent state, but is, rather, an autonomous region subject to federal Iraq. 
And yet it very much behaves like a state, increasingly so in the past couple decades. 
Many people have desired an independent Kurdistani state, especially in the period which 
this dissertation covers. And yet some of my interlocutors observed that an independent 
Kurdistani state would be untenable because it would require more resources than the 
Kurdistan Region could marshal. Some said independence would necessitate more 
transparent and democratic governance than the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
is prepared, or willing, to undertake. For those skeptical of the KRG’s integrity or 
political ambitions, Kurdish nationalism and talk of independence are illusions with 
which the Kurdistani government continually captivates its subjects. Thus, the Kurdistan 
Region is both always becoming and never becoming an independent state.    
It is not enough to dream of statehood. To be received into the international fold 
of states, that is, to receive the international political and financial support it would need 
to survive as an independent state, the Kurdistan Region must demonstrate before an 
international audience that it is “deserving” of statehood by Western or neoliberal 
standards. When I first visited Kurdistan in 2012, it already had many markers of a 
“successful” state. Cultural signs of the state, like a national anthem and flag, had existed 
in Kurdistan since the early 20th century. More recent developments included political 
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stability, increased sovereignty over its land and resources, and economic growth. In 
2012, people pointed out to me all the new homes, schools, and businesses dotting the 
landscape. In the Kurdistani capital city of Erbil, also called Hewlȇr, people talked about 
luxury residential communities like “Dream City,” shopping malls, and restaurants, all 
made possible by political stability and the flow of international capital into and out of 
the KRI. For people with resources, this interwar period (2011 – 2014) in the Kurdistan 
Region was a dream come true. The dream evaporated in 2014 when the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS or IS, also known as “Daesh” after the Arabic acronym) invaded 
territories across Iraq and Syria, plunging the country into another cycle of war and 
economic stagnation. It was during this difficult time that I carried out 20 months of 
fieldwork in Kurdistan, from September 2015 to July 2017. 
Although the conflict with the Islamic State devastated much of Iraq, it presented 
the Kurdistan Region with further opportunities for enacting statehood. It temporarily 
brought rival Kurdistani political parties together in a unified effort against the enemy 
Islamic State. The Islamic State represented all the ways a majority Muslim polity could 
go wrong, but which the Kurdistan Regional Government could make right. Whereas 
ISIS was condemned for its massacres of minorities, the Kurdistan Regional Government 
welcomed minorities and was praised as their protector. The KRI absorbed hundreds of 
thousands of internally displaced Iraqis and refugees from Syria and supported them at 
great expense. As Iraqi military forces fled, the Kurdish military, or peshmerga, occupied 
territories long disputed by the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments. At the height of 
Kurdish nationalistic fervor, approximately 92% of voters in a September 2017 
government referendum supported Kurdistani independence.  
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 For many of my interlocutors, however, dreams of Kurdistani statehood were met 
with dread. Some of my closest acquaintances were neither Kurdish nor Muslim, but 
rather members of minority populations, like Assyrian or Chaldean Christians. Many 
were born and raised in Kurdistan, where their families had lived for generations. Others 
had settled recently in the KRI, after they were displaced by violence elsewhere in Iraq or 
in Syria. Some had led prosperous lives in urban centers with rich cultural and 
intellectual heritages, like Baghdad or Damascus; they found Kurdistan stifling. While 
many displaced people expressed gratitude for their refuge in the KRI, they also worried 
about their minority status and lack of opportunities. How would the Kurdistani 
government and the majority Kurdish society treat non-Kurdish and non-Muslim 
residents?  
A common topic of discussion among minority or displaced people I knew was 
how to make sense of their lives in Kurdistan. Renewed violence had crushed many 
individual dreams about possible futures, as well as hopes for a unified and peaceful Iraq. 
For some, their sense of belonging and purpose owed much to a shared Iraqi national 
identity. An independent Kurdistani state, however, would be the last nail in the coffin of 
a unified Iraq. Exiled interlocutors often compared their present hardships with their past 
ones. Their observations were tinged with nostalgia and sadness. They lamented the loss 
of stability and national unity of the old Iraq that fell with former President Saddam 
Hussein and his Baath regime. Although war and sanctions led to economic shortages, 
displaced interlocutors recalled no shortage of good neighbors and friends in their former 
homes. In the past, they enjoyed relationships enriched by ethnic and religious difference 
and dignified by a shared Iraqi national identity. Their present interactions in Kurdistan, 
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however, were thin in comparison. There was tolerance of diversity, but not flourishing. 
Although some people recounted warm interactions and friendships formed across ethnic 
or religious lines, others described microaggressions or humiliations in the allegedly 
“pluralistic” environments in which they worked or lived. The prospect of an independent 
Kurdistani state did not excite them, as it was not likely to be qualitatively better than 
their present lives in the Kurdistan Region. 
  The people appearing in this dissertation are suspended in a “captivating state” in 
two senses of the phrase. One sense refers to a state of feeling trapped for a variety of 
reasons, including displacement or lacking resources to emigrate. The other sense of 
“captivating state” refers to the Iraqi and Kurdistani states and the power they hold over 
the imaginations and affections of their citizens. Whether interlocutors consider their 
“country” to be “Kurdistan” or “Iraq,” many described a sense of feeling both pulled 
away and drawn back into their country. Some people who expressed a desire to leave 
simply did not have the resources or the ability to emigrate. Other interlocutors possessed 
the resources but not the will; they chose to remain in their country and to work for a 
better life for themselves and their families. Many people, however, inhabited a space 
between, desiring to leave and desiring to stay. They speak of forces which constrain and 
compel. They talk about dashed dreams, fragile hopes, and uncertain futures. 
My interlocutors comprise two groups, or cohorts. The first cohort includes 
teenagers, most of whom I knew through my research in their schools. The second cohort 
includes young adults, people in their 20s and early 30s, ambitious “emerging adults” 
who held university degrees and were focused on building their careers, and in some 
cases delaying marriage. Members of both cohorts are positioned well-enough by wealth 
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and status to entertain hopes of pursuing their dreams in Kurdistan, like opening a 
business, or becoming a doctor or an engineer. But they also are experienced enough – 
having lived variously through the First Gulf War, the sanctions era, the 2003 – 2011 
war, and now the conflict with the Islamic State – to know that realizing their dreams 
depends upon many factors beyond their control. War and politics foreclose many 
possibilities, and social and family pressures pull people in different directions. In 
contemporary Kurdistan, young people are presented with competing “ethical positions,” 
with future-oriented narratives that instruct people to live in accordance with certain 
values and goals. The cross-pressuring of different ethical positions is greater upon some 
people than upon others. Many of my interlocutors were engaged in a struggle to meet the 
demands of various ethical regimes while also pursuing individual dreams. Some lost 
hope in dreaming altogether. 
I use the language of “dreaming” when discussing both personal and national or 
state aspirations because “dreaming” reflects the imaginative and ephemeral nature of 
envisioning a future amid violence, precarity, and uncertainty. Dreams that occur while 
sleeping and dreams formulated as conscious goals have much in common in present-day 
Kurdistan. In waking life, just as in dream life, people find that they have little control 
over the directions their dream takes. Although I am describing people who are engaged 
to some extent in self-cultivation through envisioning futures, their ability to act can be 
quite limited due to factors beyond their control. Because so much lies beyond the 
individual’s control, there is a melding of the “fantasy” and the “real” in narratives about 
nationalism, religion, or modernization.  
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My discussion of “dreams” also takes inspiration from the magical realism of 
Kurdish writer Bakhtiyar Ali, whose novel Ghezelnus u Baxekani Xeyal (Ghazalnus and 
the Gardens of Imagination) I quote at the beginning of each chapter. Quotes are drawn 
from Kareem Abdulrahman’s (2016) English language translation of the novel with a 
different title, I Stared at the Night of the City. In his novel, Ali describes an expensive 
neighborhood called “Nwemiran” (literally “New Princes” or “New Royalty”), which 
resembles many of the luxury residential communities in Kurdistan, most famously one 
called “Dream City.” The novel takes place in an unnamed city in the Kurdistan Region 
that is dusty, crowded, violent, and morally corrupt. His protagonists – hardened 
politicians, conniving middlemen, abused women, lovestruck poets, and naïve teachers – 
wander the city in search of relief from material and existential hardships. Those who 
find some peace do so through the imagination and enter a parallel dream world. 
Although this dream world has profound effects on individual lives, the novelist suggests 
that dreamers have little impact on the “real” world, whose politicians and city planners 
can build only soulless approximations of the dream.   
 Like the characters of Ali’s novel, some people I knew in Kurdistan imagined 
possible futures others criticized as “fantasy.” Many of my adult interlocutors had the 
resources to emigrate and leave Iraq behind them, though few of them did so during the 
time of my fieldwork. Some of my teenage interlocutors anticipated pursuing higher 
education abroad and perhaps staying after finishing their degree, while others indicated 
that they would probably return to Kurdistan. There was a sense of determination, even 
desperation, not to give up on their country entirely. For some people, the “futures” 
promoted by nationalist, religious, or secular ideologies turned out to be illusory, perhaps 
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impossible. Nevertheless, people still desire “liveable” lives, to find what “good” remains 
and to be “good” people. To skeptics, the efforts of many of my interlocutors may seem 
like escapism, or living in privileged, parallel worlds: privileged to live one kind of life in 
spaces like the university or the gym, and to live another with their family or religious 
community. I suggest, however, that the sense of “living between” is a condition of living 
in a transitional moment in Kurdistan, fraught with dreams and dread about possible 
futures. It is also a condition of living in an increasingly value pluralistic society, as war 
and displacement, migration, and diaspora returnees have exploded the diversity already 
present in Kurdistan. By “value pluralism,” I refer to a context in which multiple values 
circulate and compete; some values may be equally “moral,” but impossible to realize at 
the same time. Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin refers to the moral dilemmas that result 
from the fragmentation and incommensurability of values as “tragic” choices. We might 
say they are “doubly tragic” in a time of war and deprivation when such choices are 
painfully limited. 
In this dissertation, I focus on interactions between Kurdistani people with 
different orientations toward religion, nationalism, and modernization. These interactions 
occur in the context of what is often described as “sectarian cultures” within a “failed” or 
“failing” state. However, to attribute to “sectarianism” the myriad “failures” and 
disappointments people suffer does not account for the other domains of life with 
considerable power to shape individual values. I am referring to the “ethical” dimensions 
of daily life, the mundane ways in which people respond to failure and disappointment. In 
the encounters with state and sect described in this dissertation, we see a messy web of 
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belief and doubt. We also witness interlocutors’ gradations of assent or dissent to identity 
categories assigned by the state and by society.  
I argue that we need a way of interpreting these kinds of encounters that focuses, 
not on “sectarianism” as it has been conceptualized within anthropology of the Middle 
East, but on the contests of values that occur when people desire different kinds of 
political institutions and cultures that push back against the “sectarian” state. When 
people pursue different “goods,” they bump up against not mere “ethnic” or “religious” 
difference but “ethical difference,” signifying different values and value systems. 
Contested “goods” are not merely theoretical, but, as anthropologists of “the good” 
contend, central to many people’s lives. Throughout this dissertation, interlocutors 
grapple with finding an acceptable, or one might say “ethical,” way of realizing certain 
values and attaining certain goods despite enormous pressures toward other values and 
other goods.  
At the same time, anthropologists have critiqued the limits of concepts like “the 
good” and “ethics,” especially in contexts of conflict and state collapse (Das et al. 2015). 
It is true that one response to outward failures and disappointments is a turning inward, or 
“cultivation of the self,” (Schielke 2010a; Al-Mohammad and Peluso 2012) which 
Samuli Scheilke argues has dominated the study of Muslim worlds since the “ethical 
turn” exemplified by Saba Mahmood’s (2005) work on “piety.”  In striving to understand 
moral life beyond the “grand schemes of Islam” (Schielke 2010a) and the “trope” of 
“self-cultivation,” I center interlocutors’ own words, their articulations of the many 
problems plaguing contemporary Iraq. People appearing in this dissertation are very 
reflective about the failures of state and sect and about the power these institutions exert 
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over their lives. I have organized the chapters according to repeated sayings I heard 
throughout my field work. Unsurprisingly, the sayings reflect the generally negative 
commentary so pervasive in Kurdistan at the time. They include phrases like “ma’sh 
nȋya,” (“there is no salary”), a reference not only to the Kurdistan Regional 
Government’s freeze on salaries owed to some 60% of the population, but also to the 
general dysfunction of state and society.  
One might ask, as some interlocutors do, what people are “going to do” or 
“should do” about said dysfunction. Throughout the ethnography, interlocutors discuss 
this problem, and I center their conversations as they are insightful co-theorists observing 
themselves, their society, and their state. Failures, of course, do not obligate everyone to 
act, as if people must “resist” in readily discernable, and romanticized, ways. Rather, this 
dissertation is largely about “listening” to people speak about their disappointments, and 
sometimes their hopes, while they wait for an uncertain “future,” or tragically, for “no 
future”. My closest interlocutors at times expressed something like hopefulness that 
resided in what might be called an “inner life,” whose content they shared only with their 
closest friends and family, if they shared it at all. It would be “romanticizing resistance” 
(Abu-Lughod 1990) for me to assert that these “inner lives,” in so far as they were shared 
with me in fragments and moments, were “rich” in the sense of consciously formulating 
alternatives to ineffective and oppressive systems of power. For this reason, I direct the 
reader’s attention to my interlocutors’ words, often in the form of lengthy quotes or 
transcripts of conversations, because it their own assessments about the state, hope, and 
futures that comprise the ethical life with which this dissertation is concerned. 
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As in Bakhtiyar Ali’s magical realist novel, some people effectively draw upon 
the imagination, enabling them to be “hopeful.” Certainly, people with more material 
resources and political connections seemed more optimistic about their future. They 
responded to failures and disappointments by working with charitable organizations, or 
they joined communities organized around self-improvement, like gym-goers and 
bodybuilders. Some dreamed about improving their country, while others were looking 
for temporary escape. But, for the many people lacking resources, it appears they are 
“resigned” to doing “nothing.” Their “resignation” comprises much of the dialogue 
appearing in this dissertation. Occasionally, through dialogue, study, and self-reflection, 
people discover “bits of hope that nobody thought of,” as one thoughtful teenager named 
Ashur observes at the end of his academic year.  
Initially, I thought “alternative” practices and spaces, such as the private schools 
and fitness centers in which I conducted research, were “pluralistic,” especially when 
their founders or participants said so, often glossed in speech as “modern.” Rather, they 
are spaces in which people were living “as if” – as if they could eliminate, or at least 
minimize, the powers of state, sect, or family. Although contests of values occurred in 
“pluralistic” spaces and influenced individual value-formation, the “winner” of such 
contests was predetermined. In these allegedly pluralistic spaces, the hegemonic values of 
a majority-Muslim society tended to prevail over attempts to introduce alternative values 
or practices. For example, an attempt to teach a religious text in a more “neutral” way 
that was deemed appropriate for a religiously diverse student body nevertheless 
reinforced Islamic majoritarian values. Or a “modern” gym in which men and women 
exercised together, and in which political party, ethnoreligious identity, or gender “didn’t 
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matter,” nevertheless policed behaviors in the gym in familiar ways. To be clear, I am not 
questioning sincerity of motives or evaluating the “success” or “failure” of anyone or 
anything; I leave those assessments to my interlocutors.   
In the following chapters, the degree to which individuals participate in ethical 
self-formation and subscribe to any particular vision for a future Kurdistan varies greatly: 
Some people find personal satisfaction through advancing a cause, while others suffer 
failure and disillusionment. My interlocutors have faced incredible difficulties, and it is 
remarkable that many of them have summoned the strength and courage to continue 
striving for a good life for themselves, their families, and their country. Considering their 
example, the dissertation’s conclusion contemplates how the cultivation of hope also may 
benefit anthropologists. In her most recent “state of the discipline” article, Sherry Ortner 
characterizes the anthropological work of the past couple decades as “dark anthropology” 
due to its focus on “the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination, inequality, 
and oppression)” (2016:47). An unintended result of hyperattention to dark themes is that 
anthropologists have neglected other aspects of human experience, such as the formation 
and contestation of values, or conceptualizing and pursuing the “good” life. Even in 
contexts of violence and suffering, such as “war-torn” Iraq, we find people engaged in the 
daily, and often mundane, tasks which comprise “ethical life.” We even find people 
cultivating hope. In an era of deepening inequalities and injustices and our preoccupation 
with them, an anthropology of hope may guide us back to one of the central commitments 
of our discipline: “the moral obligation to hope” (Geertz 2000) that our efforts can 
contribute to better understanding, and thus, to a better world. 
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Ch. 1: Ethical life in Iraqi Kurdistan 
 
“If there is a dream city on this planet, it’s the one we are travelling 




In the shadow of Dream City   
 
In the city of Erbil, also known as “Hewlêr,” the capital of the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq, there is a gated luxury residential community called “Dream City.” Many Dream 
City homes, with their palatial structures and eccentric architecture, are visible from the 
adjacent, busy streets. Each new house strives to outdo the rest, with hodge-podge styles 
ranging from terracotta Italian villas, to stark modernist mansions, to the extravagant 
“White House,” which, as its name suggests, boasts a facade modeled after the official 
residence of the President of the United States. Nearby, four- and five-star hotels tower 
over the flat, arid city. These hotels host foreign dignitaries, international conferences, 
and regional beauty pageants. People enjoy novelties available only in the newest, most 
expensive establishments in Erbil, such as sushi, cocktails, and co-ed pool parties.  
Across the street from these hotels, the sprawling Sami Abdulrahman Park offers 
a cool, green escape from the dusty city. In Sami Park, men and women jog together on 
the running paths, picnic in the gardens, and play sports. Anyone who visited Kurdistan 
in its boom years (2011-2014) might have believed the hype: Erbil would be the “next 
Dubai,” a phrase I first heard in 2012 when I visited the Kurdistan Region to conduct 
preliminary dissertation fieldwork. And Erbil might have become the “next Dubai” had 
the Islamic State (IS) not invaded Mosul in June 2014 and plunged Iraq into another 
cycle of conflict, halting Erbil’s building frenzy.  
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 The many unfinished construction sites around Erbil remind people of what Erbil 
might have been. Their skeletal frames and sun-faded signs with architects’ mockups also 
bitterly remind people of the ways the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments have failed 
them, as Umut Kuruüzüm (2018)  has documented. Just around the corner from the 
luxury hotels is one such abandoned construction site. Large signs announcing the project 
cover the entire perimeter fence, hiding the site itself from view. Perhaps it was this 
privacy which appealed to the displaced Yezidi families who lived inside the perimeter.  
Yezidi people are among Iraq’s dwindling ethnoreligious minority populations. 
Throughout their history, Yezidi people have been maligned for their little-understood 
religious practices. By their own count, Yezidis have suffered 74 genocides, including the 
most recent one perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). When the 
Islamic State attacked Sinjar in 2014, tens of thousands of Yezidis fled north to the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. While thousands of families settled in camps, other families 
settled in the host community. Some of the Yezidis who fled to Erbil ended up in the 
abandoned building site, squatting illegally in lean-to shelters made of construction litter. 
Their camp lay in the shadow of an unfinished building. 
 “They need to know that there is someone caring about them, someone that loves 
them,” Sara said to me as we drove to visit the Yezidi camp in June 2017. “Sara” was an 
Iraqi Christian woman in her early twenties, displaced from the Christian village of 
Qaraqosh. At university in Mosul, Sara had majored in English and aspired to earn a 
master’s degree in English Literature. When the Islamic State invaded in 2014, Sara and 
her extended family escaped to Erbil, taking only what they could fit in their vehicles. 
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They lost their homes, land, and livelihood. The expensive agricultural equipment which 
the family used in large-scale farming was destroyed by ISIS.  
In Erbil, Sara was overworked.  She taught all day at a private school, and in the 
evenings, she earned extra money giving private lessons. She also responded to text 
requests from her students when they wanted help with their homework, even late at 
night. Sara helped her family with household chores whenever she could. She often 
worried about her younger sister, who was pregnant with her second child. Sara, her 
mother, father, sister, brother-in-law and their children rented a house together in the 
increasingly crowded Ainkawa township. Ainkawa is home to generations of indigenous 
Iraqi Christians, as well as recently arrived refugees and internally displaced people. Sara 
and her father, also a teacher, supported their family with meagre salaries. When she 
heard about the Yezidi camp, she asked herself, “How could I turn this opportunity 
down?”   
Despite being exhausted, Sara visited the Yezidi squatters camp on Fridays, the 
first day of the weekend in Kurdistan (and in many other Muslim majority countries). In a 
lengthy interview toward the end of my fieldwork, Sara told me, 
I go [to the camp] and try my best, because I understand what it is to be in their 
situation - not really, fully, because I did not lose family members, which is the 
most important thing. I was thinking I would not be able to see them and not cry. 
But when I went there, God gave me strength, and I felt joy. It is amazing how 
they have these pure hearts. Being with them makes you feel more human. I try, I 
try to treat them well and make sure they know I love them so much.  
 
Along with a couple other volunteers, including her father, Sara taught the camp children 
English and Arabic. (Yezidi people typically speak a variety of Kurmanji Kurdish, which 
was not a language of instruction in any Erbil school.) Most of the children had missed 
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multiple school years, and the volunteers hoped the students could learn enough to be 
admitted to a government school for displaced youth.  
Friday lessons were held in a large tent inside the camp. When we opened the tent 
flap to enter, the escaping air felt hotter than the summer air outside. A lone mubarida 
(water cooler) gurgled and spurted on generator power. Volunteers divided the students 
into groups based on their abilities. A couple easels were used for teaching. One easel 
displayed a hand-drawn map of Iraq, on which someone had located and written “Sinjar,” 
the homeland these displaced families left behind. The territory is disputed, claimed at 
times by both the central Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. On 
the hand-drawn map, the territory encompassing Sinjar was labeled “Kurdistan.”  
 Despite their best efforts, 16 out of 18 Yezidi students failed their government 
school exams. Sara explained that her volunteer work was not just about helping students 
continue with their education. “We want them to be socialized,” she said. Some of the 
Yezidi camp youth told Sara they were upset by their treatment in government schools: 
They told me when they had religion class, [the teachers] made them stay. I told 
them if this happens again, let me know. I would talk to the person in charge of 
the program. So it did not happen again. The rule is “Anyone who is not Muslim 
go out” [from the Islam religion class] but [the teachers] did not let them out. The 
problem about people here is they don’t have respect, especially about Yezidis 
because they have misconceptions about what they believe in. But they are people 
just like you, so treat them well.  
 
Although a male volunteer sometimes took the male youth on excursions to Sami Park, 
the girls rarely left the camp. “They are kind of buried in here,” Sara observed. She 
complained that the teenagers, especially girls, married too young. “I want them to know 
they can do something,” Sara told me. “It’s not only get married and that’s it. Also 
education is important. Even if they get married, you have to teach your kids, you have to 
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know things. I think they have been accepting the idea more.” Sara herself was reluctant 
to marry because she did not want marriage responsibilities to interfere with her 
volunteer work and teaching job.  
While Sara felt comfortable encouraging the Yezidi youth about education, she 
made it clear that she did not go to the camp to convert anyone to her religion. One day, a 
Yezidi teenage boy wore a cross necklace to Friday lessons. Sara said to me,  
Maybe they think that we are teaching them to change them, you know what I 
mean? I would never do that. I will show them God’s love, and they can choose. 
One of the Kurdish Muslim volunteers asked the boy, “Where did you get this? 
Why are you wearing this? This is for Christians.” The boy said, “I know. I 
bought it because I love Christians.” And we told him, “We love you too.” I think 
we are both peaceful people who don’t want a fight. Even the other day they were 
talking about marriage. If a Yezidi boy married a Muslim girl, his punishment is 
death. But there is a possibility of marrying a Christian. 
  
Sara said that the Kurdish male volunteer then offered to share an Islamic view of 
Christianity with the Yezidi boy. She surmised that, while both Christians and Muslims 
recognize Jesus as an important religious figure, perhaps Yezidis are not respected 
because they do not have enough religious beliefs or practices in common with 
neighboring religious communities. The most important thing for her was that the 
displaced Yezidis knew they were loved. Her large, expressive eyes brimming with tears, 
Sara concluded that her volunteer work had become central to her life:  
They have struggled a lot and been through a lot. And this is the only thing I can 
give: my love to them. And I think they appreciate it. They love me back, and I 
feel like they are now an important part of my life. I don’t know how I will 
survive without them now. Seeing them gives me hope. 
 
When I last talked with Sara in 2017, she was struggling to hold onto hope: Her family 
visited their hometown for the first time in almost three years. Seeing the rubble of homes 
and churches pained Sara and her family, and they decided they could not bear resettling 
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there. She also unsuccessfully applied for a scholarship to study in the United States. 
Meanwhile, many of her foreign friends, myself included, returned to their home 
countries. Her best friend and fellow teacher, Shams, moved to Turkey to earn a master’s 
degree, leaving Sara feeling abandoned.  
Eventually, Sara left her teaching job and joined a non-governmental organization 
working with internally displaced Iraqis living in the Mosul area. She rarely shares 
anything on social media, and her infrequent posts typically consist of inspirational 
quotes like, “Don’t be afraid to fail at things that mean something. Be afraid to succeed at 
things that mean nothing.” Or she posts about her NGO work: photos of Sara laughing 
and running with a pack of children; videos of the countryside rushing past as she travels 
between work sites; a photo of ruined buildings from the recent conflict with the Islamic 
State; a photo of street scene in her home town - no people, just a lonely, wooden cross 
with a small Iraqi flag attached.  
 
Cultivating hope amid chaos  
 
In the following chapters, I introduce the reader to many Kurdistani people, who, 
like Sara, are striving to cultivate hope through practices of ethical self-formation during 
a chaotic, transitional era for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In this section, I offer a brief 
review of recent Iraqi history, particularly the events which have made cultivating hope 
so difficult. Cyclical violence, tenuous political alliances, betrayals, and failed uprisings 
characterize Kurdistani history of the past 50 years (and the past couple centuries, but 
events of the past 50 years occurred within living memory of my older interlocutors). 
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime (1979-2003) destroyed 
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thousands of villages, displacing tens of thousands of Kurdish people, and resettled those 
villages with ethnic Arabs as part of an Iraqi Arabization campaign. Near the end of a 
grueling eight-year war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), the Iraqi government also 
waged war internally against its citizens: Tens of thousands of Kurdistani people were 
killed in the Anfal (Spoils of War) genocide, most infamously in the chemical attack on 
the Kurdish town of Halabja.  
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting an international coalition, led by the 
United States, to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait and in Iraq (the 1991 Gulf War). For 
Kurdistani people, an important outcome of this conflict was the coalition’s establishment 
of a no-fly zone (NFZ) that banned Iraqi aircraft from entering the airspace over the 
Kurdistan Region. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the NFZ protected the 
Kurdistan Region from Iraqi forces (though not from internal conflict, as rival Kurdistani 
political parties waged civil war in the mid-1990s and involved the Iraqi military at the 
height of the conflict). Also in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United 
Nations Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, which remained in place 
(in various forms) until the 2003 invasion.  
Many Kurdistani people welcomed the 2003 United States-led invasion, as it 
deposed their enemy, Saddam Hussein, and dismantled the Baath Party. While the 2003-
2011 Iraq War destroyed much of the country, the Kurdistan Region emerged from the 
war in a stronger position, largely due to its Coalition allyship and protection. From 2011 
to 2014, the KRI enjoyed a period of stability and rapid economic growth and anticipated 
becoming “the next Dubai.” I first visited Iraqi Kurdistan in 2012 during this hopeful 
boom era, when construction sites for new businesses, schools, shopping centers, and 
8 
residential communities multiplied like mushrooms popping up across the landscape. 
People spoke optimistically about their future plans, not imagining that the country would 
soon be devastated by yet another war.       
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria invaded the city of Mosul and 
surrounding territory of Nineveh province. Tens of thousands of people fled, including 
Iraqi military forces. Many of the displaced people went to the north, to the Kurdistan 
Region. In August, Daesh attacked the Sinjar area, home to a large Yezidi community, an 
ethnoreligious minority whom Daesh branded “devil worshippers.” ISIS killed thousands 
of civilians and abducted hundreds of Yezidi women, forcing them into marriages and 
sex slavery. Thousands of people fled into the nearby mountains, where they were 
besieged for days without food or water before U.S. airstrikes and various Kurdish militia 
forces helped most of the stranded escape.  
Kurdistani military forces (peshmerga) remobilized against Daesh and occupied 
long-disputed territories claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the 
central Iraqi government. With territorial expansion came hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as thousands of refugees from the war in 
neighboring Syria. Before the conflict with Daesh, the population of the Kurdistan 
Region was around 5 million people. During my fieldwork, that number increased to 7 
million. Water and electricity shortages intensified. A protracted sovereignty dispute over 
oil sales between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal Iraqi 
government in Baghdad led to the cessation of government salaries which supported an 
estimated 60% of its residents (Joseph and Sümer 2019). Economic stagnation followed, 
and a widespread sense of despair settled over the KRI. Since the war against Daesh 
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ended in late 2017, economic hardship and political disputes between the KRG and Iraq 
have continued to plague the country. 
 
 
Figure 1. Retired members of the Kurdish peshmerga at an informal reunion. Photo by 
the author. 2012.  
I carried out 20 months of fieldwork during this difficult and uncertain time. In 
my last months in the field, I witnessed the buildup of anticipation for a Kurdistani 
independence referendum. Political leaders said the referendum’s purpose was to gauge 
support for establishing an independent Kurdistan. In September 2017, an overwhelming 
majority of Kurdistani residents voted in favor of independence from Iraq, but the 
international community did not support the referendum. In October 2017, Iraqi forces 
invaded the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, retaking it and other disputed territories the Kurdish 
peshmerga had gained during the war. Due to political infighting, the Kurdish forces 
withdrew from the city. Days later, the Iraqi government announced it had reclaimed all 
territories it held before 2014. The lack of international support for the Kurdistani 
independence referendum, the subsequent invasion, and the loss of territory, particularly 
10 
Kirkuk, humiliated the Kurdistan Region. One of my Kurdistani friends posted on 
Facebook that she was glad that her father, who had died a few months prior, did not live 
to see these events.  
Some of the most disappointed Kurdistani people I met were youth, broadly 
defined as ages 12 to 30. The generations born in the 1990s and 2000s were born into 
conflict. Their childhoods were impacted by the First Gulf War (1990 - 1991); the 
sanctions era (1990 - 2003); civil conflict between Kurdish political parties (1994 -1996); 
and the Second Gulf War (2003 - 2011). It seemed that the recent period of stability 
(2011 - 2014) had inspired hope in many people. When it all came crashing down in June 
2014, some people’s lives were devastated suddenly, like Sara’s family or the Yezidi 
squatters described earlier in the chapter. Others felt their hope slowly burning out.  
 
Sites, methods, and positions 
 Before proceeding, I should explain further about my research sites, methods, and 
positionality in the field. I spent almost two years living in the Kurdistan Region, from 
September 2015 to July 2017, with the exception of five weeks in the summer of 2016, 
during which time I traveled to Europe and took a “break” from fieldwork. Those five 
weeks coincided with the month of Ramadan. Based on my previous experience, I did not 
anticipate getting much research done during the long, hot days of fasting, and many of 
my key interlocutors also traveled. During my “break,” I presented my preliminary 
findings at two anthropology conferences in Europe, which proved helpful in rethinking 
my research plan for the second half of my field work. In Kurdistan, I conducted field 
work for approximately 20 months, including four months focused on learning Sorani 
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Kurdish. My field work during these 20 months was challenging largely for two reasons: 
The first is that I had less access to certain schools than I anticipated before going to the 
field, which ultimately prompted me to reframe my research project. The second reason 
is that my data collection occurred in fits and starts because I was sick frequently 
throughout my fieldwork, with a (then) undiagnosed chronic health condition, in addition 
to the usual illnesses one might expect during international field work. 
Additional difficulties during fieldwork often concerned my researcher status and 
my gender. When my husband and I moved to Kurdistan, we found housing with a 
Kurdish family interested in renting out the top floor of their two-story home in “Kaysha 
Nȋya,” a poor urban neighborhood allegedly settled by illegal squatters. Kaysha Nȋya 
seemed like a traditional Kurdish village dropped into the middle of a city, with chickens 
and children roaming the streets and tins of chunky, homemade yogurt for sale in an 
elderly couple’s corner shop. To celebrate Jezhnȋ Qurban (the Feast of Sacrifice, ‘Eid al-
Adha in Arabic), our neighbors slaughtered a cow in front of their house. An endless 
stream of visitors and reciprocal visits to see neighbors grounded me in the cultural 
practices shared by many people in my field site: Intense socializing characterized by 
hospitality, warmth, and humor. It seemed like an ideal place for language learning. 
Nevertheless, one local university I sought a research affiliation with did not 
approve of our decision to live in this area, perhaps owing to its “low” reputation. Taxi 
drivers and new acquaintances reacted with surprise or laughter upon hearing where I 
was living. The Kurdish security police (asayȋsh) seemed very reluctant to allow two 
American citizens to live in this “backward” area. When we met with local security 
officials to register our new residence, people questioned whether my husband and I 
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might have ulterior motives. They expressed disbelief that my husband had “followed” 
me to Kurdistan because I was pursuing a Ph.D. (and not the other way around). After 
our meeting with the security police, our landlords confronted us about being “spies,” 
saying they feared getting into trouble with the government. Why did I ask so many 
questions? What did my husband “really” do? And how did I already know some 
Kurdish? It was unusual for people to hear a foreigner like me conversant in Kurdish (at a 
basic conversational level, acquired through an intense summer language program), 
which says more about the paucity of Kurdish language learning resources in the United 
States than my linguistic abilities. Instead, Kurdistani people were accustomed to 
foreigners who worked in oil or natural resources industries or did humanitarian work, 
and who lived in wealthier areas and did not interact much with local people. They rarely 
learned more Kurdish or Arabic than a few greetings and basic phrases for transportation 
and shopping.  
In Kaysha Nȋya, our neighbors worried aloud about my being “alone” in the house 
when my husband was away at his job teaching English. They asked me often about my 
daily activities and who was present in the house. People also expressed disapproval 
about my going to and from home unaccompanied and using taxis, especially in the 
evenings when I worked at a fitness center across the city. I understood these were 
concerns not just about my safety, but also about the potentially illicit relationships that 
people feared our (male) landlords might form with me, which would scandalize the 
extended family and the neighborhood. After two difficult months of disputes with 
landlords and neighbors and some sexual harassment, it became clear to me that these 
concerns were not unfounded; we decided to move to another area.  
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For a few months, we shared a house and living expenses with an Assyrian 
Christian Iraqi family in a newly constructed, gated residential community called 
“International Village.” It was at the far outskirts of the city, where sections of the 
roadway still had not been paved. International Village introduced me to another side of 
life in Iraq: experiences of religious minorities, some of whom were native to the 
Kurdistan Region and others who moved there after being displaced by war. We knew 
little about our new neighbors, a diverse mix of busy professionals from inside and 
outside Iraq, who lived quietly in their spacious homes removed from urban noise and 
crowding. Some walked pet dogs, a novelty in an Islamic society in which dogs were 
considered haram (forbidden). A small grocery store and cafe within the compound 
offered imported foods and the convenience of not having to drive back into the city. 
Residents of our new neighborhood did not socialize like in Kaysha Nȋya; living in 
International Village was lonely compared to Kaysha Nȋya. 
For the latter half of my fieldwork, we lived in an area called “Rapareen,” closer 
to the city center. We rented the upstairs floor of an organization whose operations had 
slowed as the conflict with the Islamic State deepened and foreign organizations recalled 
their employees. Rapareen represented an older era, as some of my interlocutors 
commented approvingly upon hearing that I had moved there. Rapareen’s population had 
grown in the past decade through rural to urban migration and as people displaced from 
elsewhere in Iraq resettled in the Kurdistan Region. A new, multi-story shopping mall 
reflected the area’s development. Our neighbors were a mix of Kurdish Muslims, 
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, an Azeri Iranian family, and a Turkmani family; they 
could attend a church or a mosque, both of which were located on our street.  
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In Rapareen, Christian and Muslim neighbors visited during each other’s religious 
holidays. Neighbors demonstrated necessary skills like washing debris and litter along the 
gutter, how to (re)connect our home’s electrical wires to the giant pole we all shared, and 
how to pay our water, electricity, and generator bills. People occasionally invited us into 
their homes for a meal or party; they seemed to understand that our social visits were 
limited because of our jobs and American lifestyle. At the risk of romanticizing, I 
consider Rapareen and its residents as representative of the “pluralistic” and “tolerant” 
Kurdistan I and many other people appearing in this dissertation wanted to see.  
Living in three different types of areas in Kurdistan made encounters with 
“pluralism” central to my research. Like many of my interlocutors, I daily crossed 
“boundaries” between different frameworks for living in Kurdistan. Toward the end of 
my fieldwork, when I thought I finally had a working map of the city and its possibilities, 
a new acquaintance would invite me into their world, unchartered territory where the 
field was suddenly new again. Anyone who has conducted fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
or any place with a high degree of sociality, knows how an ethnographer’s best-laid plans 
can be redirected by others’ hospitality, sometimes fortuitously and sometimes 
frustratingly. While moving frequently between wildly different spaces felt disorienting 
at times, my specific research project would not have emerged without a willingness to 
be carried along. The resulting project reflects my being carried along and encountering 
different visions for the future of the Kurdistan Region and of Iraq. As the project took 
shape, I focused on a narrower category of people defined by their common interest in 
ethical self-formation and encounters with “ethical difference.”  
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Before I discuss “ethical difference” and my theoretical framework, I need to 
explain my research permissions, how my research unfolded, what data it yielded, and 
what limitations it presented. My approved research protocol with the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at the University of Kentucky permitted me to collect data 
according to the following conditions: I was allowed to observe, informally converse 
with, and conduct formal interviews with children aged 12 and older. Obtaining informed 
consent with children involved reading an approved script and obtaining their verbal 
assent. The script made clear that I would not share information they provided me with 
anyone else, including their teachers and parents, unless that information concerned their 
safety (e.g., self-harm); thankfully, the need to alert an adult to such a situation never 
arose. Interviews with children typically occurred in their schools, where I also already 
had research permission. I was careful not to allow my research to interfere with 
educational lessons and objectives, requesting to interview students and teachers when 
they had “free” time. 
 In my IRB protocol, I had a specific category of adults called “officials, inside 
and outside Iraq,” that the IRB required me to obtain informed consent via a signed 
approved form. This category included school principals or government officials, for 
example. The majority of the adults who participated in my research did not belong in the 
“officials” category, and with these adults, I had IRB permission to obtain informed 
consent verbally with an approved IRB script. I requested of the IRB that I be allowed to 
obtain informed consent verbally in most cases because many people in Kurdistan and 
Iraq are hesitant to sign “official” documents that might identify them. I believe this is 
largely owing to histories of state-sponsored violence against certain populations.   
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After my initial four months in the field focused on language learning, I 
approached a private school I call “Kurdistan Civilizational School,” or “KCS,” which 
has multiple campuses across Kurdistan. I met with the school’s principal to request 
permission to conduct observation and interviews for a semester, as I had planned in my 
dissertation research proposal. The principal stated her concerns about the potentially 
sensitive nature of my research interest in religious, ethnic, and national identities. The 
school had received some negative publicity after an incident on one of the school 
campuses a few years prior, which some people said resulted from an alleged religious 
“conversion.” The religious nature of KCS is unique compared to other schools in 
Kurdistan: Although the majority of KCS students identified as Muslim and Kurdish, 
many of the schools’ founders and teachers were Christians. KCS was founded to provide 
Kurdistani youth with an education based in “classical Christian education,” which takes 
inspiration from the classical Trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, taught under the 
umbrella of a “Christian ethic.”  
Because of the incident and negative publicity, the principal would not grant 
access to anyone who might write an “exposé” about the school. I assured her that was 
not my intention. Rather, I explained that, as a practicing or “believing” Christian, I 
shared some interest in the religious nature of KCS. Second, I was familiar with the 
curriculum, and I was known to the American NGO that provided some of the textbooks 
and teaching staff. Furthermore, although I might not agree with everything in the school 
(in fact, I was uncomfortable with many things I observed), as an anthropologist, I 
17 
assured the principal that I was trained and committed to being careful to protect the 
identities of research participants. 
Undoubtedly, my shared religious identity and sympathetic attitude toward the 
school helped me gain access, and not only through the principal’s official permission. I 
told anyone who asked about my religious identity, which is a common question in 
Kurdistan, that I was a “practicing” Christian, or a “believer.” Other Americans who 
identified as Christian had worked in KCS over the years, and initially people thought I 
was a newly arrived teacher. Students and teachers seemed pleased to meet me. Many 
told me about their American friends or teachers who had worked at the school, and how 
I reminded them of their beloved former coworkers or teachers. It was clear to me that 
many of these American teachers had been well-liked and that they were missed. Due to 
my open religious identity, my being an American, and my shared enthusiasm about 
education, I developed a closeness with many teachers and students that I might not have 
enjoyed if my identity and positionality had been otherwise. While English was the 
lingua franca and the language of instruction for most courses at KCS, I understood 
enough Sorani Kurdish to observe classes taught in Kurdish, such as komalayatȋ (social 
studies). Relative to another of my research sites, a government school for Kurdish 
speakers in the town of “Betala,” collecting data at KCS was easier linguistically and 
relationally. There were far more instructional hours at KCS than at government schools, 
allowing me more time to develop rapport with teachers and students. 
In KCS, I formally interviewed 7 teachers and had countless conversations with 
teachers in their break room. I conducted numerous individual and group interviews with 
an estimated 100 students. This number is an estimation because group interviews with 
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students were open to any student and were fluid as students joined and left throughout 
an interview. I selected Grade 10 as the cohort I would focus on while at KCS. Grade 10 
included about 25 students, and I interacted with them daily by attending their classes, 
socializing with them on the school bus and during breaks, and occasionally joining 
social outings. My inclusion in social events and some confidences was significant 
because teachers typically were not invited to student-organized gatherings. I, however, 
inhabited a liminal position between adult authority figure and peer. At the time of my 
fieldwork, I was in my late 20s, but with my smaller stature, blue jeans, and ponytail, I 
regularly passed as much younger: On my first day in KCS, for example, a Kurdish 
language teacher mistook me for a new international high school student and called on 
me while I sat in a student desk at the back of the classroom. As someone still occupying 
the “student” subject position, some administrators and teachers treated me as their 
subordinate, even when we were close in age. Not wanting to be perceived as pushy or 
uppity, I readily deferred to their authority. Other adults, especially the younger teachers, 
seemed to consider me a peer.  
 My fieldwork in KCS followed the rhythms of the school day: riding the bus in 
the morning, attending classes, eating lunch in the small cafeteria, attending more classes 
or hanging out with teachers in their break room, and wrapping up the day around 3pm. 
At that time, tired students, teachers, and staff quickly dispersed, and rarely did anyone 
invite me to join them after the school day. Occasionally, a student’s parent or driver 
might offer to drive me to my next location, which usually was the gym where I taught an 
evening fitness class. Although I felt that I enjoyed generally good rapport while on the 
school campus, I also perceived that students and teachers kept me at arm’s length and 
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mostly out of their domestic lives by using the physical and temporal boundaries of the 
school campus and the official end of the school day.  
Although many students and some teachers were willing, even eager, to talk with 
me about certain subjects, rapport only went so far. After “letting their guard down” by 
saying something that might get them into trouble, students would suddenly remember I 
was there and ask me not to say anything to their teachers. Despite my frequent 
reassurances that I did not share information about students with their parents or teachers 
and vice versa, I found that people assumed I did anyway. I did not attempt to collect any 
data via surveys or questionnaires, although I wanted to do so, because I worried that 
systematically recording potentially sensitive data (like ethnic and religious 
demographics) might be perceived as threatening. I once asked to see the school’s 
demographic data about students, but the evasive and uncomfortable response I received 
convinced me that I had better not push my luck. To that end, I also did not interview the 
school principal, most administrators, and certain teachers, for fear of asking “too many” 
or the “wrong” questions that might compromise my research permission. Additionally, 
earning students’ and some teachers’ confidences necessitated distancing myself from the 
school’s administration.  
As we neared the end of my semester in KCS, students asked if I could stay and 
be their teacher. One faculty member suggested I remain at KCS and work (voluntarily) 
as a “college counselor” while continuing my research there. The school needed someone 
to help students navigate the college application and decision-making process.  I 
seriously considered changing my research plan. Rather than proceeding to a government 
school, I could produce a more in-depth exploration of KCS, resulting in a dissertation 
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that would more closely resemble a classic school ethnography. After weighing my 
options, I decided that I would proceed with my original plan of carrying out research in 
three types of schools in Kurdistan. When the semester ended, I was sad to leave all the 
people I had come to know at KCS. Some I stayed in touch with during the rest of my 
field work and after I returned to the United States. Dozens of students and teachers 
connected with me on social media, and I have followed their lives at a distance. It has 
been bittersweet for me to see KCS students grow up, and to see my friends who were 
teachers leave the school for other opportunities.  
 Gaining access to a government school proved more difficult than I anticipated. 
My Sorani language tutor and key interlocutor, Ashti, suggested I carry out research in 
her school. She agreed that it was important that I observe a “typical” government high 
school to have a more holistic understanding of education and youth in Kurdistan. Ashti 
taught English language and literature to Kurdish high school girls in “Betala,” a rural 
area about a 30-minute drive outside the city. Ashti and I could ride together to and from 
the school, giving us more time together to discuss my observations or to speak as 
friends. This plan was acceptable to the school’s principal, so I began visiting Betala with 
Ashti and observing classes. Not many days had passed when a government official 
happened to visit the school and spotted me in the courtyard – a pale, blonde wearing 
blue jeans in a sea of Kurdish girls with dark hair and uniformly wearing white, long 
sleeve shirts and ankle length, dark blue skirts.  
Summoned to the principal’s office, I felt every bit the guilty student while this 
apoplectic official lectured the school’s principal, who meekly explained why I was in the 
school. With a scathing glance in my direction, she declared I could not be much older 
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than the high school students, and that there was no way I was a Ph.D. student. Hearing 
this, I offered her my business card and started to explain my research. Perhaps alarmed 
that I had understood her Kurdish words not intended for my ears, she turned back to the 
principal and continued her tirade: It was not enough that he had granted me permission; 
I had to go to the Ministry of Education. I was not to return to the school until I had a 
signed letter. I spent the next couple weeks going from one government office to another, 
where each official insisted that some other official was the correct person to provide a 
letter of permission.  
Ashti taught lessons only certain days of the week, so if I wanted to travel to 
Betala on those days, I had to find other transportation. Taking public transportation – a 
taxi to the bus station, waiting until the bus filled up, arriving at another bus station, then 
taking another taxi to the school – took hours. Paying a private taxi was expedient but 
costly. Ashti also was suffering from stomach ulcers, causing her to miss her lessons. I 
spent weeks sporadically attempting to carry out fieldwork in Betala, but it was often 
fruitless: I arrived to learn that it was a government holiday. Or, the schedule had 
changed unexpectedly, and classes had been in the morning and not the afternoon as 
usual, and they forgot to tell me. At that time, the Kurdistani government was not paying 
salaries, so some days there were no lessons, and I sat in the break room sipping tea 
awkwardly with teachers I barely knew. Then, we entered the month-long exam 
preparation period, in which the girls I had been trying to get to know were allowed to 
stay home and study. The little data I gathered in Betala appears in Chapter 5 in which I 
describe Ashti and other adults who had become deeply discouraged with the situation in 
Kurdistan and Iraq and were reflecting on emigrating in the face of uncertain futures.  
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 I began seeking permission to carry out fieldwork in a third school. The schools 
for displaced Arabic speaking youth, I was told, fell under another jurisdiction, not the 
Erbil Governorate. What about a school for Kurdish speakers displaced from Syria, now 
living in Iraqi Kurdistan? I asked. In Chapter 2, I describe my attempt to access one of 
these schools inside a refugee camp. With shortened fieldwork in the Betala school, and 
no forthcoming permission to observe a Syrian Kurdish refugee school, I realized my 
original research plan would not work. Although my limited time spent in the Betala 
school was disappointing, I experienced some significant exchanges there, which I 
recount in Chapter 5. I have described my struggles accessing and collecting data at 
Betala and in the refugee camp because they exemplify the bureaucracy and state-making 
processes that I encountered throughout my field work. It was not just bureaucracy and 
reluctance that sent me from one government office to another, or that barred my access 
to certain spaces; it was also a manifestation of the unclear and shifting relationship 
between the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments. I explore that relationship more in 
Chapter 2.  
With the Betala school behind me, I turned my attention to the one site I had 
enjoyed consistent access and good rapport since the beginning of my time in the field: 
the gym where I worked a part-time job teaching indoor cycling group fitness classes. 
The global fitness industry had come to Kurdistan only in the past decade, and many 
fitness centers were seeking instructors and personal trainers. Initially, I approached a 
gym manager about teaching indoor cycling simply as a source of income to support my 
field expenses and to give me access to a space for exercising and socializing. Gradually, 
I realized that the schools and the gym shared an overlapping population sharing an 
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interest in ethical self-formation. I began considering my place of employment as a site 
for data collection, not just a part time gig. The gym manager, staff, and members all 
knew that I was conducting research, and with the rapport I had established already, 
obtaining informed consent went smoothly. I went to the gym most evenings, where I 
spent at least 2 hours, and sometimes as many as 5 hours. I conducted 16 formal semi-
structured interviews with my gym acquaintances, including the gym manager, personal 
trainers and instructors, and gym members. I conducted many of the interviews in the 
gym lobby during quiet hours, or if it was during a busy period, I asked the gym 
management if I could one of their offices for interviewing. In other cases, interviewees 
asked that I visit them in their home, a café, or their workplace, so they would not be 
overheard and could speak more freely.  
The gym where I taught cycling classes was divided into three spaces: a “mixed” 
gender space, for men and women to exercise together; a women’s only section; and a 
group fitness studio that was used for both “mixed gender” and “women-only” (female-
presenting socially) classes. I had countless informal conversations with gym staff and 
members, especially in the women’s only section of the gym. The gym was busiest 
during the 6pm to 9pm window. During those hours, I typically joined in group 
discussions in the lobby or the women’s section and attended group fitness classes. 
During the slower times of the day, such as the early or midafternoon, few women would 
use the women’s section. One useful strategy I developed was to hop onto the treadmill 
or elliptical beside a woman and ask if I could talk with her while we exercised. Often, it 
was during these off-peak hours that women who did not speak English visited the gym, 
so many of my conversations with this subset of women were entirely in Sorani Kurdish.  
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I also used the off-peak hours at the gym to type up field notes or interview notes. 
People became accustomed to seeing me sitting in the gym lobby and typing notes, and 
the regulars would stop by “my” table in the lobby to talk. I would shut my laptop while 
we chatted, and resume typing when they left, sometimes immediately typing up what I 
had just learned from our exchange. Staff and regular gym members knew me as both a 
researcher and as a fitness instructor. Some of the gym regulars knew me from their 
university, where I had a research affiliation and visited once or twice a week for 
university-related events or to work in my office (generously provided by the university).  
At my gym, I cultivated friendships with a diverse group of university-educated 
and career-driven women in their 20s and early 30s, and my similar focus on education 
and career made connecting with them easier. My cycling classes also attracted a small 
group of regular attendees, including a young Kurdish university professor who shared 
my research interests and became a key interlocutor. I also persuaded the gym manager to 
permit me to create a new female-only cycling class, through which I grew to know 
women who did not participate in mixed-gender group fitness, were often shy, and 
typically spoke little English.  
Issues of class permeated the gym in which I worked. Membership in private, 
urban gyms was expensive, anywhere from 50 to 200 US dollars per month. Membership 
fees were on the higher end at the gym where I worked, so the members typically were 
wealthy, socially and politically well-connected elites. Once I was chatting with one of 
the gym staff members, a middle-class university student, who complained that some 
gym members treated the staff poorly because they were rich and from important 
families. When I asked how he knew this, the staff member explained that the 
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demographic information the gym collects on new members’ forms, such as family name 
or occupation, reveals a lot in a society that is intensely interested in ascertaining and 
“ranking” one’s kinship, class, or status. “And you can just look out the window there,” 
he said, “and see all the [luxury] cars.” Indeed, most nights luxury vehicles and sportscars 
occupied the prime parking spots outside the gym.  
I also encountered class and political tensions in the gym, which I discuss in 
Chapter 4. For example, when I asked a young man to dismount from the stationary 
bicycle he was using because I needed the bike to teach my class, he refused. I tried 
another approach, introducing myself in a pleasant tone. He curtly told me his name, 
revealing he was probably related to some of the highest political leaders in the country. I 
barely concealed my irritation, saying, “Nice to meet you Kak Sirwan,1 but I still need 
that bicycle.” My gym acquaintances tended to express assumptions that I also must be 
wealthy and thus had plenty of disposable income. As I mentioned before, Kurdistani 
people had become accustomed to foreigners from Europe and the United States who 
held high paying and high-status jobs in the Kurdistan Region. It was in the company of 
these ambitious and affluent women that I visited some of the chic restaurants and cafes I 
described in the opening of this chapter.  
When I decided to expand my research concerning the fitness industry, the 
relationships I had formed at my gym helped me make connections with other gym 
owners, managers, and trainers. In the last couple months in the field, I visited 5 other 
fitness centers, and I conducted formal interviews with 6 individuals who taught classes 
or worked at the gym. My work experience as a group fitness instructor in the U.S. and in 
 
1  A pseudonym. “Kak” or “kaka” is generally used as a term of respect for men, akin to “sir” in English. 
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Kurdistan usually interested people, especially when I visited other fitness centers. 
During our conversations, people often asked how much membership cost at my gym, 
what “type” of people the gym attracted, and if men and women exercised together 
(tȇkala). Women in my gym and some I met outside my gym seemed to regard me as an 
expert in fitness and nutrition. I explained, usually to no avail, that I merely coached 
indoor cycling classes as a hobby. Often people did not accept this answer, pointing out 
that my slender and toned body evidenced otherwise. Although I sometimes attempted to 
explain that I owed much of that to genetics and not necessarily to diet and exercise, 
genetic inheritance did not seem to interest many people. It seemed to me that, for my 
interlocutors, I embodied “global fitness culture” (Andreasson and Johansson 2014) and 
was thus regarded as its emissary. In the words of some of my interlocutors, my body was 
an “ideal” type of female fit body that circulates through global fitness culture. Although 
I found it uncomfortable to have my body discussed so frequently, frankly, and openly, it 
did help my research, as women often approached me eagerly rather than me having to 
approach them and inquire hesitantly if they were interested to talk. 
The result of my revised research plan was that I left the field with two data sets 
(schools and fitness centers) concerning two cohorts (teenagers and young adults). I also 
had taken other opportunities, especially when invited, such as visiting refugee and IDP 
camps, touring the Kurdistan region, and attending events like conferences and lectures. 
Data from those events, interviews, and conversations appears throughout the 
dissertation, but the majority of the text concerns people in schools and fitness centers. 
Over 20 months, I had traversed a variety of spaces and conversed with a remarkable 
range of people. My daily schedules varied, sometimes drastically: I might spend the 
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morning in a poor, rural school and share a meager meal with a local family; accompany 
NGO acquaintances during an afternoon visit to a refugee camp; and in the evening find 
myself chatting with one of my gym friends at a chic restaurant in a wealthy quarter of 
Erbil. Moving between vastly different spaces and with different cohorts throughout my 
field work brought encounters with pluralism to the fore in my analysis. 
 
Ethnography of value pluralism 
In this section, I outline how this dissertation proceeds analytically from my 
ethnographic data. My theoretical framework is grounded in an observation about value 
pluralism in Kurdistan: The contests of values recounted in this dissertation run deeper 
than “identity politics” or “sectarianism,” although these forces and their various 
conceptualizations are at play in my interlocutors’ experiences. Their encounters with 
value pluralism are not determined by or limited to familiar analytical categories within 
anthropologies of the Middle East and Muslim worlds, such as tribe, kinship, Islam, sect, 
or nation. Rather, these same analytical categories are in flux as interlocutors 
conceptualize and reconceptualize them through their everyday, moral negotiations with 
people “belonging” to different identity categories. Ontologically speaking, what does it 
“mean” to be identified as “Kurdish” or “Iraqi”? As “Muslim” or “Christian”? What 
obligations do these categories entail, and for whom? What are the ethical ramifications 
for realizing, or not realizing, one’s identity categories to the fullest? I speak of identity 
categories being “realized” in the sense of people manifesting values based in religious, 
cultural, social, and political frameworks in their everyday lives. Put another way, can 
one still be a “good” [identity category, i.e., fill in the blank] if not satisfying the 
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ontological and ethical demands of kin group, religious community, political party, 
nation, or state?  
 This line of questioning about being a “good” person of a particular identity 
category presents both ontological and ethical problems. On the one hand, these are not 
new problems, but are based in the histories of imperial and state formations and they 
ways in which they have regulated ethnic and religious difference, such as through the 
Ottoman millet system. Additionally, enduring social practices related to patrilineal 
kinship reproduce the boundedness of ethnic and religious identity categories. Modern 
states in the Middle East conceptualize citizenship and govern family life with reference 
to patrilineal kinship (King 2018). Thus, both social and state formulations of identity 
have been mutually constitutive, reinforcing the boundedness of identity categories in 
legal codes and in social practice.  
On the other hand, some ontological and ethical problems arising from religious 
difference, or more broadly, from value pluralism, are “new” in Kurdistan. Rapid 
globalization of the Kurdistan Region and the expansion of “secular” spaces and 
discourses have increased the frequency and varieties of encounters with value pluralism. 
More than ever before in Kurdistan, people have access to information through the 
expansion of technology. Censorship exists for certain topics, like the private lives of 
political leaders, and freedom of expression is limited, but people in Kurdistan have 
access to many sources of information with a range of viewpoints.  
During the relatively prosperous interwar period of 2011 to 2014, many 
Kurdistani people who had been living in diaspora, such as in Europe or the United 
States, returned to Kurdistan. Some sought to recreate in Kurdistan aspects of their 
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former lives abroad, such as by opening new businesses, schools, residential 
communities, and entertainment services. When I first visited Kurdistan in 2012, I 
observed that many people were optimistic about Kurdistan’s future. There was a sense 
of anticipation about possibilities for Kurdistani independence and for collective and 
individual freedoms. People were grappling with how to realize their goals within certain 
state and social structures. While the conflict with the Islamic State (2014-2017) halted 
many projects, it also had the effect of accelerating the circulation of discourses about 
religion and nationalism. What did it mean to be a “Muslim” in the era of the Islamic 
State? How was Kurdistan’s government and society different from the rest of Iraq or 
from surrounding majority Muslim countries?  
As my interlocutors grappled with questions of identity, they also were exploring 
the limits of individual and collective freedoms in Kurdistan. In this ethnography, 
“freedoms” take many forms: They can appear mundane or low stake, such as gym-goers 
and bodybuilders who spend more time away from their family of origin, eat a non-
traditional diet, and follow different rhythms of social life. Higher stake freedoms include 
choices like (de)converting, “dating” in romantic relationships, or emigrating. I 
conceptualize “freedoms” in a context of value pluralism by bringing together 
anthropological theorizations of “modernity,” “sovereignty,” and “morality.” I ask to 
what extent these theorizations can account for the forces pushing and pulling my 
Kurdistani interlocutors toward different Kurdistani “futures.” 
To understand how encounters with value pluralism influence ethical self-
formation, I draw upon a philosophical line of inquiry about “ethical life” and the so 
called “ethical turn” in anthropology (Mattingly and Throop 2018). My purpose in 
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contextualizing the ethnography in the “ethical turn” is not to “weigh in” on debates 
about ethics or freedoms, as that would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I 
focus on how people experience moral life and identity formation in contexts of value 
pluralism within a majority Muslim state. I hope that approaching moral experience 
through ethnography of value pluralism will help us understand the formation of 
identities from the “bottom-up” of everyday encounters with ethical difference, in 




Encounters with “ethical difference,” not “Islam” 
Violence, displacement, encounters with religious difference, nationalism, 
emigration, and hope: these were common discussion topics among my Kurdistani 
interlocutors, who come from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. In some cases, I 
was present and witnessed exchanges in which people discussed their different 
orientations to religion and politics. In other cases, people told me about significant past 
encounters with what I call “ethical difference” which continue to inform how they 
manage their relationships with others. In speaking of “others,” I refer to two kinds of 
“otherness”: The first kind of otherness emerges through identity politics, in which group 
identity, or perceived group identity, is the key variable. There is a large body of 
literature on the politicization of identities, often referred to as “sectarianism,” in the 
Middle East, particularly as it pertains to governance (e.g., Makdisi 2000; Davis 2008; 
Mikdashi 2014). While the politicization of identities is relevant to my interlocutors’ 
lives, I focus on another aspect of “otherness.” This second kind of “otherness” hinges 
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upon different sets of values, rather than different identity categories, coming into play. I 
refer to this kind of “otherness” as “ethical difference.” 
In speaking of “ethical difference,” I refer to encounters that occur in contexts of 
value pluralism and between people holding contrasting opinions or beliefs, not just 
about common moral subjects, but also about the ethical dimensions of nationalism and 
state-making. About the first kind of “ethical difference,” or “common moral subjects,” 
ethnographic work abounds. Anthropologists of the Middle East and Muslim worlds have 
documented how people navigate religious rules, particularly pertaining to “Islam” as a 
“discursive tradition.” For example, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) have found in 
Lebanon that religious difference characterizes relationships between people who hold 
different views on the consumption of alcohol, listening to music, or dancing. Lebanese 
young people draw upon various “moral rubrics” to navigate religious difference as it 
intersects with class and gender. While moral rubrics are helpful for understanding how 
people navigate everyday experiences of religious difference in a majority Muslim 
society, they have little to no bearing on how the state governs its subjects.  
The state makes certain kinds of difference “legible” (Scott 1998) and thus subject 
to governance, such as collective identity categories like nationality, ethnicity, or 
religion. For example, we can examine how the Iraqi state has regulated relations 
between ethnoreligious groups and contributed to the politicization of identities as an 
expression of state “legibility.” Examinations of the Iraqi state abound, though they 
typically approach the regulation of religious difference as “sectarianism” and through 
the lenses of political economy or international relations. There are far fewer 
anthropological studies, not just of Iraq but of Middle Eastern states in general, which 
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illuminate the state’s contributions to how people navigate religious, or ethical, difference 
in daily life.  
Patrilineal kinship is central to making populations “legible” in Iraq and in many 
other states across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Patrilineal kinship is a 
type of unilineal descent by which a person’s ancestry is traced through the father’s line; 
at birth, a person inherits the religious and ethnic identity of his or her father. So, if a 
person has a Christian mother and a Muslim father, they will be considered “Muslim” by 
the state and society.  “Patriliny,” the set of ideas and practices concerning patrilineal 
kinship, is “integral to conceptions of citizenship and group membership in the Middle 
East” (King 2018:305). The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government within it, 
use this system of patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity categories 
to citizens.  
Unlike “identity politics,” encounters with ethical difference in contexts of value 
pluralism are more difficult to describe categorically. They rarely “interest” the state, as 
they typically do not produce recognizable changes in identity categories, such as a 
religious conversion. Even in cases of what might be considered “identity 
transformation,” such as religious conversion, marriage, or personal preference (choosing 
to identify with one’s mother’s ethnic or religious identity for example), these subjective 
transformations are not necessarily made “legible.” States like Iraq, whose citizenship 
system and recognition of ethnoreligious identities follow patrilineal kinship practices, do 
not simply fail to acknowledge changes in identity categories – the Iraqi government (and 
the Kurdistani government) does not permit people to change their official ethnic or 
religious identity categories on official identity documents. The state refuses to “see” 
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individual subjects as they ask to be seen. Permitting individual voluntary changes to 
ethnoreligious identity would be disruptive to the state’s citizenship regime. In some 
cases, the state has weaponized ethnoreligious identity to increase the number of people 
identified with a certain group to obtain a demographic advantage, like laying claim to a 
territory, such as in the Arabization campaigns under the former Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein.  
The subjective experiences of identity and value formation that I am describing 
are often subtle, gradual, and have little bearing on a citizen’s relationship to the state. 
They are, in a sense, illegible. Certain kinds of ethical difference I examine in my 
dissertation do, however, pertain to governance and thus “interest” the state, not because 
they challenge inherited or official identity categories but because they figure into 
discourses about the state. I conceptualize ethical differences more broadly than Deeb 
and Harb (2013). Not only does my conceptualization of ethical differences concern 
common “moral” subjects in Muslim worlds about what is or is not permissible in Islam; 
it also concerns the moral dimensions of nationalism and modernization. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, key ethical differences include:  
• Supporting Kurdistani independence versus a unified Iraq 
• Advocating for a more “modern” society with “secular” public spaces and 
gender equality, versus a more “pious” Kurdistan in which more 
conservative forms of Islam guide the state and social life 
• Choosing to remain in Kurdistan / Iraq and contribute to its development, 
or choosing to emigrate and seek better opportunities elsewhere 
 
By working with the concept of “ethical difference,” I hope to avoid the potential 
pitfalls of subjecting my ethnographic data to what Samuli Schielke (2010) refers to as a 
“grand scheme” such as scholars traditionally have conceptualized “Islam.” In his essay 
34 
reviewing the “anthropology of Islam,” Schielke makes two observations that inform my 
approach to understanding ethical or religious experience in my field site. First, Schielke 
notes that Talal Asad’s important intervention in the anthropology of Islam – critiquing 
the “textualization” of religious experience and approaching it instead as a “discursive 
tradition” (1986) – led to a proliferation of anthropological work about religious debate, 
tradition, piety, and ethics. These studies have offered a much-needed corrective to an 
obsession with defining “what Islam is,” especially in the era of the “war on terror.” 
Work on piety and ethics also has helped us “to recognize much better how Muslims’ 
engagement with their religion is neither the outcome of blind adherence, nor the result of 
coercion,” Schielke writes, “but an active and dynamic process of engagement with ideals 
of good life and personhood” (5).  
The problem with a research program focused almost entirely on piety and 
tradition is that it has, according to Schielke, created a meta-narrative in which Islam is 
approached as a critical “other” to Western liberalism and secularism. In an effort to 
critique the “alleged superiority and universality” of liberalism and secularism and to 
analyze how liberal and/or secular regimes mask power, Islam is reduced to a critical 
other or to a site of resistance. Schielke notes that it is too easy to blame “the usual 
suspects” (i.e., Western liberalism and secularism) in understanding Muslim lives in the 
shadow of (neo)colonialism. Although anthropological studies of piety and ethics in 
Islam have yielded rich portraits of religious experience, these portraits do not adequately 
account for the “ambivalence, the inconsistences, and the openness of people’s lives that 
never fit into the framework of a single tradition” (1). Schielke concludes that 
anthropologists may fail to recognize “what really is at stake for the people involved,” 
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and consequently “fail to seriously recognise the humanity of people on their own terms” 
(6).  
In the case of my field site, the intense popular and scholarly interest in Islamic 
movements, Kurdish nationalism, and politics, often does not capture “what really is at 
stake” for people “on their own terms.” Too often, scholarly and popular focus is on 
elites, the “engineers” producing and regulating discourse about religion or politics. To 
accept these “high-level” discourses as paradigmatic of how people grapple with ethics in 
the everyday is misleading. For example, “Islamic piety,” broadly speaking, is one kind 
of ethical positioning in which some of my interlocutors situate their lives. They typically 
appear to remain within the bounds of piety while resisting the pull of other ethical 
regimes, such as nationalism or cosmopolitanism. The majority of my interlocutors, 
however, regularly move in and out of various ethical positions, for reasons I explore 
throughout the dissertation.  
My research attends to contests of values that occur through everyday interactions 
– not just “between Muslims” (Bush 2020), or between Muslims and people belonging to 
other religious communities, but between people with many kinds of ethical differences. 
What do people make of their engagements with religious or non-religious others – such 
as neighbors, teachers, and coworkers – not in the manner of identity politics or religious 
conversions, but in the intimate formation of personal values? Before I turn to developing 
a theoretical framework for understanding ethical difference, I review some important 
contributions of other interpretive frameworks for understanding religious difference in 




Religious difference in a post-Ottoman and patrilineal society 
 In contemporary Kurdistan, relationships between diverse ethnic and religious 
communities reflect historical legacies of imperial and state power. Additionally, 
narratives about those legacies circulate in political rhetoric and in everyday discourse, 
informing how Kurdistani people relate to each other across ethnic and religious identity 
categories. While Kurdistan’s majority population is Sunni Muslim Kurdish, people 
identifying with many other ethnic and religious communities also reside in Kurdistan, 
including: Sunni Muslim Arabs, Shi’i Muslim Arabs, Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, 
Arab Christians, Yezidis, Kakai, Turkmen, Shabaks, and Mandeans. At present, 
intercommunal relationships in Kurdistan are relatively peaceful. Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the Ottoman state and its successors 
repeatedly perpetrated violence against minority ethnic and religious groups (Klein 
2011). American and European incursions in the region also contributed to tensions 
between ethnic and religious groups (Becker 2015; John Joseph 2000; Taylor 2005). 
Centuries of imperial power struggles and state-formation have created a “zone of 
genocide” (Levene 1998) encompassing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.  
 That the history of state and sectarian violence continues to shape how ethnic and 
religious identities are experienced in everyday life is self-evident for people appearing in 
this dissertation. Even Kurdistani young people who had no direct experience of violence 
– such as youth who lived comfortable lives in the Kurdistan Region and who had not 
personally experienced war or displacement or deprivation – recognize how histories of 
violence inform social life in Kurdistan. Kurdistani youth learn about violence in modern 
Iraq through oral histories, news media, and school curriculum. Some young people I 
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knew expressed distrust, fear, or hatred of certain ethnic or religious groups. This usually 
took the form of avoiding members of a certain group.  
On the other hand, many young people in Kurdistan expressed openness to 
forming relationships across ethnic and religious boundaries. Some were the children of 
ethnically or religiously “mixed” marriages. Exogamous marriage is not necessarily 
viewed as problematic, but social and family norms, past and present, tend to favor 
endogamous marriage. “Forbidden” love between people belonging to different religions 
features in Kurdistani poetic traditions (Bush 2020) and in folk music, such as ballads 
about the “kchȋ gawr,” the “heathen woman” (i.e., non-Muslim) who leads pious 
(Muslim) men astray. Nevertheless, friendships and marriages between people from 
different ethnic and religious groups are not unusual in Iraq, though recent conflict and 
renewed politicization of identities have made these relationships more difficult.  
 During my fieldwork, I heard two general discourses about religious difference in 
Kurdistan. One kind of discourse asserted that ethnic and religious “others” were not 
trustworthy. People holding this view referred to histories of genocide and the conflict 
with the Islamic State. They also described ongoing problems between the Kurdistan 
Regional Government and the central Iraqi government not only as a struggle for 
sovereignty, but also as a racial or ethnic problem between the Kurdish minority and the 
Arab majority in Iraq.  
Another type of discourse also pointed to “sectarian” struggle as evidence of state 
“failures.” People contrasted genocidal violence and failures of the Iraqi state with the 
relatively stable Kurdistan Region, which welcomed and protected ethnic and religious 
minorities. In this way, people spoke of the Kurdistan Region as a majority Muslim 
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society and government more progressive than other majority Muslim states, particularly 
antagonist or enemy states like Turkey, the Iraqi state, or the Islamic State. Such 
discourse characterizes Kurdistan as a “counterpublic” (King 2014), an ethical polity 
standing in opposition to the wrongs committed by surrounding states. Counterdiscourse 
about a “tolerant” Kurdistan was prevalent in political rhetoric and in government-issued 
curriculum, which I explore later in the dissertation.  
 I interacted with critics of both kinds of discourse about religious difference in 
Kurdistan. Young people complained of ethnic or religious discrimination and expressed 
a desire to make Kurdistan a more “modern” and pluralistic place. While it is true that 
hundreds of thousands of people have found refuge within the KRI’s borders, the degree 
to which minorities also felt welcomed and treated fairly varied greatly. In my 
experience, critics of the “tolerant Kurdistan” discourse tended to be minorities, and as I 
observed, they tended to be discreet in their criticism. For example, in Chapter 5, students 
Ashur and Rasim express disillusionment with diversity talk they encountered in their 
private high school. Both boys were Christians attending a private school that, while its 
student body was more diverse than those found in government schools, was still a 
majority Muslim school. Although some school administrators and teachers described the 
private school as tolerant of religious difference, Ashur and Rasim observed that certain 
“Islamic” discourses or practices were nevertheless hegemonic.  
“Tolerance” discourse, or “radical affirmation” of religious difference, is a feature 
of post-Ottoman societies (Bush 2020). It also features in scholarship on the Ottoman 
Empire, some of which romanticizes the “tolerance” of the millet system. As 
anthropologist Andrew Shryock (2009) observes in his conversation with historians Marc 
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Baer and Ussama Makdisi, scholars often have treated “Ottoman tolerance as a virtue” 
and have disregarded how the Ottoman state was “a violent, hegemonic imperial 
formation in its own right” (936).  Makdisi (2017) notes that the significance of the 
Ottoman millet system was not about “tolerance” or “intolerance,” but that different 
communities lived side by side through imperial and state formations (53). Likewise, 
rather than evaluating the “sincerity” of the “tolerance” discourse I observed in 
Kurdistan, I examine everyday experiences of coexistence shaped by Iraqi and Kurdistani 
state formation.  
Andrew Bush, another anthropologist of Iraqi Kurdistan, observes affirmation of 
religious pluralism in the form of morality tales. In one famous story, a renowned 
nineteenth century Sufi figure, Kak Ahmedi Sheikh, and another Muslim man are 
conducting business with a Jewish man. Kak Ahmedi’s Muslim companion asks the Jew 
why he does not convert to Islam. The Jewish man replied, “‘If Islam is what they do,’ he 
said, ‘then I have no need for it. If it is what [Kak Ahmedi] does, then I have no strength 
for it’” (Bush 2017). In this tale, Kak Ahmedi demonstrates what Bush calls the “virtue 
of not asking” about another person’s religious identity or pressuring someone to convert 
to Islam. Thus, Kak Ahmedi exemplifies for all Muslims an ethical sensibility of 
magnanimity and tolerance that makes Islam attractive to religious others. Bush argues 
that the virtue of not asking “radically affirms” religious difference while undergirding a 
“natural superiority of Islam” (523).   
 The “virtue of not asking” may derive from the Islamic concept of “People of the 
Book” (‘Ahl al-Kitab). The Quran refers to Jews, Christians, and Sabeans as “possessors 
of books previously revealed by God,” referring to the Torah, Psalms, and Gospels 
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(Esposito 2004:10). Although, in Islam, these books have been abrogated and superseded 
by the Quran, the Quran recognizes Christians and Jews as “protected minorities” 
(collectively,‘ahl ad-dhimmah, or dhimmi). In the Ottoman empire, dhimmi status 
permitted Jews and Christians to practice their religion and to govern their own 
communities through separate religious courts.  
In the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Region, the idea of “People of the Book” 
persists in common sayings like, “Each one has their religion” (In Kurmanji Kurdish, 
“Her ek dine xwe et hȇn”) as Diane King has heard throughout her fieldwork (2017). 
Another saying in Sorani Kurdish is, “Jesus with his own religion and Moses with his 
own religion” (“Issa ba dȋnȋ khoȋ wa Musa ba dȋnȋ khoȋ”). Among the three Abrahamic 
faiths, Judaism has the least presence in Kurdistan. In 1948, the Iraqi government 
required its Jewish subjects to relocate to the newly formed state of Israel. Today, a small 
community of Jewish people, including Kurds, lives in the Kurdistan Region. Members 
of one Jewish community invited me to attend a multifaith iftar2 hosted by a Christian 
institution in Erbil. Around 200 people attended, including some foreign dignitaries. 
Before the meal, a series of representatives from various religious communities gave 
speeches about the historic contributions of individual Christian or Jewish Iraqis. Then, 
some of the audience moved to a nearby grassy area for Muslim prayers; none of the 
other religious communities represented held prayers for the attendees.  
Public “national” space sometimes includes references to religious communities 
in Kurdistan, like the Barzanȋ Memorial Center described in Chapter 2. At the Memorial 
Center, my Kurdish tour guide explained that three prominent domes atop one building 
 
2 The evening meal that breaks the daytime fasting during Ramadan. 
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represent “the three religions of Kurdistan,” which were “Islam, Christianity, and 
Yezidi.” As Kurdistani officials continue to develop the KRI’s public image, religious 
pluralism discourse helps establish contemporary Kurdistan as an inclusive, progressive 
majority Muslim polity “worthy” of statehood. Religious pluralism discourse promotes 
the superiority of the aspirational Kurdistani state, but also the “natural superiority” 
(Bush 2020) of Islam and of Kurdistani society. 
In Erbil, I sometimes heard people express similar sentiments about religious 
pluralism, such as in my exchange with Guldar, a middle-aged Kurdish woman. Upon 
meeting Guldar for the first time, she asked me, “What is your religion?” In Kurdistan, as 
in much of the Muslim world(s), people tend to assume that everyone identifies with a 
particular religious tradition. “Each having a religion” is an assumption based in part on 
the logic of patrilineal kinship. “Patriliny,” the set of ideas and practices concerning 
patrilineal kinship, is “integral to conceptions of citizenship and group membership in the 
Middle East” (King 2018:305). The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government 
within it, use this system of patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity 
categories to citizens.  
Personal status codes also reinforce patrilineal reckoning. In Iraq, the Personal 
Status Law, in effect since 1959, governs family life, stipulating who can marry, divorce, 
inherit, and pass on citizenship to children (Efrati 2005). A series of secular governments 
throughout twentieth century Iraq shaped the Personal Status Law, which was considered 
liberal relative to other majority Muslim countries. Many Iraqis consider the PSL to 
protect women’s rights by raising the minimum legal age of marriage, permitting women 
to initiate a divorce, and regulating more equitable inheritance among male and female 
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relatives. There have been many attempts to amend or abolish the PSL by critics who 
want religious courts based on Islamic law to regulate family life.  
In Kurdistan people know, of course, that some individuals do not believe or 
practice their “inherited” religion, or any religion for that matter. While terms like 
“atheist” (bȇdȋn or mulhȋd) and “secular” (‘almanȋ borrowed from Arabic, or sekuler 
from English) exist in common speech, they are not official identity categories 
recognized by the state. National identity documents identify the bearer as belonging to 
one religion selected from a list of religious identities recognized by the state. As of this 
writing, the state does not permit an individual to change his or her official religious 
affiliation on identity documents.  
However, converts in the KRI are relatively free to practice their chosen religion 
or no religion. For example, in Erbil I visited a church comprised of converts from Islam 
to Christianity. The church operates openly and with state approval in the KRI, which is 
rare in the Muslim world. Many people, nevertheless, keep their beliefs private or entrust 
them only to close friends. If they (de)convert, they often do so in secret and continue to 
give the appearance of adhering to their official religious identity. Although state and 
society maintain rigid boundaries around ethnicity and religion and limit mobility 
between those categories, people find flexibility in other aspects of their lives. They work 
out questions of morality in “private” conversations or in spaces removed from the prying 
eyes and ears of family, neighbors, or the state.  
The Ottoman state, the Iraqi state, and patrilineal social organization have 
codified religious difference in Iraq in enduring ways. The resulting collective identity 
categories, however, appear more bounded and rigid than people may experience them to 
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be in everyday life. Scholars of Iraq and the Middle East have tended to focus on the 
politicization of collective identity categories, sometimes inadvertently reproducing the 
illusion of clearly bounded religious and ethnic identities. As Ussama Makdisi observes, 
“the idea of sectarianism, and the sectarian, has come to haunt the modern imaginary of 
the Arab world in much the same way that the idea of racism has haunted the modern 
imaginary of the USA” (2017:25). Makdisi and other contributors to the edited volume 
Sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017) locate the emergence of sectarianism in the 
form which we recognize it today in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire. During the 
mid-nineteenth century Tanzimat period, the Ottoman state promoted a form of 
citizenship and a sense of nationality untethered from religious affiliation, which Makdisi 
suggests threatened Ottoman Muslim subjects’ sense of superiority. At the same time, 
American and European imperial powers were pressuring the Ottoman state to undertake 
reforms, and Western missionary activity in the Ottoman empire was increasing. Western 
“protections” of Eastern Christian populations became entangled with imperial political 
and economic projects.  
The conflation of religious identity and imperial powers contributed to cycles of 
religious massacres in the Ottoman empire, which continued throughout twentieth 
century Iraq. Fanar Haddad (2017) write,  
The sectarian competition we are witnessing in Iraq today, and elsewhere in the 
region, is not simply a product of the fact of sectarian plurality in and of itself; it 
is more a product of the emergence of the modern nation-state, and is related to 
contested political dynamics to do with nation-building, national identity the 
(mis)management of sectarian plurality, and, ultimately state legitimacy (102).  
 
Scholars critical of “sectarianism” have demonstrated that the presence of religious 
plurality itself is not to blame. Rather, we should look to the imperial and state 
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formations that have pitted communities against one another. My approach to examining 
these problems of power in Iraqi Kurdistan is to consider ethnoreligious identities and 
state-making more broadly as “contests of values,” in which no “vision” (e.g., the Iraqi 
state, Kurdish nationalism, Islam, cosmopolitanism, etc.) adequately unifies all the 
spheres of interlocutors’ fragmented and liminal lived experiences “caught between” 
competing visions.  
In the following chapters, I examine the “contests of values” shaping institutions, 
cultural formations, and individual lives. I have written an ethnography of how 
“sectarianism” intersects with “value pluralism”. Examining value pluralism, or the 
contest of values, is an underdeveloped approach within our discipline and within my 
geographic area of specialization (Robbins 2013b).  Ethnographies of morality in the 
Middle East at times describe how different values pull people in multiple directions. 
Samuli Scheilke (2009; 2015), for example, demonstrates how Egyptian youth experience 
the pull of competing values, like having fun but also being good Muslims. Scheilke 
suggests that youth desire to emigrate to escape the painful pull. Lara Deeb and Mona 
Harb (2013) likewise demonstrate how Lebanese youth draw upon different moral rubrics 
to rationalize their decisions, such as rejecting or accepting a family member’s or friend’s 
invitation to a wedding or a cafe where alcohol is served. Anthropologists of the MENA 
region, like their interlocutors, tend to focus on a particular kind of ethical positioning, 
which is typically some expression of Islam. For example, Saba Mahmood’s The Politics 
of Piety (2005) shows how the ethical and the political can become linked within a single 
domain, such as the women’s piety movement in Cairo. While anthropologists’ tendency 
to approach morals or ethics as Islamic reflects the widespread influence of Islam in 
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everyday life, it is also a testament to the enduring pull of religious systems for how 
compellingly and thoroughly they can organize people’s lives.  
 
 
Ethical positioning  
In the following chapters, my interlocutors, to varying extents, ascribe to various 
competing narratives about Kurdistani and Iraqi observations with Kurdistani people. 
“Ethical positions” are heuristic devices I use to organize my data and analysis; they 
provide narrative frameworks for the many people and stories following. Ethical 
positions, of course, are not clearly delineated in lived experience, and their histories, 
methods, and goals often overlap. Sometimes they clash, and painfully so. My 
interlocutors felt pulled in different directions as they engaged in ethical self-formation 
within the larger spheres of family, religious community, nation, and world. Their stories 
- the ways in which these youth described themselves, explained their situations, and 
struggled to generate hope - comprise the lived experience that this dissertation bears 
witness to and takes inspiration from.  
Cultural transformations that individuals or groups seek to realize often hinge 
upon future-oriented narratives about the desired self, society, or state. The “moral 
ambition” (Elisha 2011) of individuals may involve attracting more people to their cause 
to increase mobilization and their effect on society. During my fieldwork, I encountered 
recurring narratives circulated in conversations with my interlocutors, as well as in news 
media, the Kurdistani government, and non-governmental or humanitarian organizations. 
Each narrative is oriented toward particular goods with reference to some kind of ethical 
position. My use of the language of “ethics” or “ethical” is informed by the recent 
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“ethical turn” in anthropology (Mattingly and Throop 2018), which emerges from 
anthropology’s longstanding concern with morality and values. In this dissertation 
“positions” are “ethical” in the sense that they are concerned with evaluative and 
negotiated moral action about the world as it is said to be, as it is experienced, and as it 
might or should be. People work out their lived experiences, observations, and 
rationalizations in reference to one or more ethical regimes and those regimes’ 
corresponding sets of values. Ethical positions contain clusters of values, with some 
values overlapping with other ethical positions. Most of these positions, however, 
encompass certain values that are incompatible with other positions and their values. 
Thus, people feel pulled in different directions. Not everyone is positioned to be pulled in 
different directions, for reasons I explore in the dissertation, and not everyone resists the 
pull.   
My interlocutors mainly consist of Kurdistani young people who are positioned, 
by virtue of their wealth, status, or education, to move in and out of competing ethical 
positions. Over the 20 months I spent in the field, I observed the various ways my 
interlocutors dealt with the push and pull of ethical life. Some eventually, or at least 
tentatively, settled on one kind of ethical position, perhaps to escape the pain of being 
pulled in different directions. Other interlocutors resisted becoming settled, or 
constrained, by a single position. They struggled to reconcile values characteristic of 
competing frames, such as simultaneously striving to be an “ethnonationalist” and a 
“modernizer.” Values upheld by ethnonationalism, such as loyalty to tribe and nation, 
might be undermined by values upheld by “modernization,” such as egalitarianism and 
pluralism.  
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Ethical positions strongly exert the power to contain people and institutions 
within their narrative grasp. The internal coherence that a clearly defined position, or 
narrative, provides is alluring. Ethical positions compellingly explain the world and offer 
coherence, especially when people feel their world is falling apart. Ethical positioning is 
about generating and negotiating narratives that seek to explain the world and one’s place 
in it, with a strong undercurrent of moral duty to contribute to the realization of a 
particular vision. In my field site, there is a shared sense that things have gone horribly 
wrong in Iraq’s and Kurdistan’s past, but there is no single ethical position or kind of 
positioning that accommodates all possible values or all possible futures for Kurdistan or 
for Iraq. Ethical positioning draws upon with the same raw data of history and lived 
experience and help people (re)frame that data to generate particular justifications for 
their inherited or chosen values. While some of my interlocutors focused on radically 
different interpretations of Iraqi and Kurdistani histories, other interlocutors looked ahead 
to possible modern or cosmopolitan futures.  
 
Bricolage, bricoleur, and ethical self-formation 
My ethnography is a bricolage of Kurdistani youth experiences. I refer to 
“bricolage,” not in the structuralist sense by which Levi-Strauss (1966) theorized myth, 
but rather as an activity, a tactic employed both by interlocutors and by ethnographers. I 
speak of bricolage as a metaphor for a method rather than an epistemological concept. 
The bricoleur combines and creates with whatever is at hand, which is why the French 
bricoleur sometimes is translated “handyman.” Levi-Strauss contrasts the bricoleur with 
the engineer, who has the training and resources to construct a new cultural whole rather 
than to repurpose materials and tools. The engineer, however, is a “myth,” as all 
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discourse is bricolage (Derrida 1978).  People “make do” in their everyday lives as they 
“make innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural 
economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules” (De Certeau 
1984).  
The bricoleur is akin to the “wsta” ( ستاوه ), the Kurdish handy-person who often 
advertises their services by painting “ ستاوه ” and a phone number on the sides of 
buildings. Typically, the wsta is not formally trained. The wsta is a tinkerer or a hack, 
who might, for example, rig up your connection to the neighborhood’s electrical system 
using the abandoned objects lying in the empty lot (i.e., junkyard) near your house. 
Hiring the wsta is more expedient than asking a “professional,” perhaps someone from 
the city’s office of electricity, to come repair the electrical connection, which really is 
part of a systemic problem. Most people appearing in this dissertation are like the wsta: 
They are not wealthy businessmen, or politicians, or religious leaders. They do not have 
the entire “ethical position” and its resources at their disposal, so they appropriate aspects 
of different frames to fashion a working narrative. Their working narratives take into 
account how they really (and not just ideally) live. The “making do” that people live by 
typically does not fit neatly into any ethical position. People who “make do” as bricoleurs 
inhabit the liminal spaces between ethical positions. There are significant social, 
religious, and political pressures to inhabit fully only one frame, and to direct one’s 
efforts at realizing the values of that frame. Thus, inhabiting the liminal spaces between 
frames may be criticized as indecisiveness or hypocrisy. 
Although the bricoleur is criticized for innovation (often considered dubious or 
unsanctioned), it is the self-styled engineers and their followers who do not acknowledge 
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their own projects of bricolage: Ethical positions, though they are presented as original, 
clearly-bounded, and coherent frameworks for living, might themselves be products of 
bricolage, just older and sanctioned. Bricolage enriches the ethnography by connecting 
the threads of seemingly disparate sites - what do schools have to do with bodybuilders or 
city planners? - to weave a picture of everyday experiences of cultural transformation 
across the KRI. Thus, my research sites include: 
• A private secondary school with a diverse student body and faculty 
• A government secondary school for Kurdish girls in a poor, rural area 
• Fitness centers, including one gym where I worked as a group fitness 
instructor  
• Education planning weekly meetings for NGOs and government officials 
•  Youth social gatherings, some focused on fun, such as socializing at 
cafes, and some focused on activism, such as volunteering in IDP or 
refugee camps 
What connected these people and spaces was a shared interest in transformation, a desire 
not only to improve oneself, but also to contribute to the betterment of the larger realms 
of family, religious community, nation, and state.  
 
Outline of the ethnography 
Chapter 2, “Ma’ash nȋya” (“There are no salaries”), introduces Kurdistani 
interlocutors grappling with state failures and national disappointments, which constrain 
how they realize their own ethical lives. The challenging circumstances of the war against 
Daesh, the economic crisis, and alleged government corruption lead people to question 
the cultural and political pillars supporting the “nation” and the “state”. Interlocutors 
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encounter the purported “goodness” of the mythical Kurdish nation and aspirational 
Kurdistani state in social studies classes and in national sites commemorating the nation. 
At the same time, they are confronted with harsh, lived realities of cultural and political 
practices, such as “patriliny” and sovereignty-making, which make them question the 
“goodness” of the “nation.” The chapter also considers how anthropologists likewise 
struggle with analyzing ethical life premised on notions of “the good” in field sites that 
appear bleak.  
Chapter 3, “They Don’t Love Iraq,” reflects on how people critique Kurdistani 
society and aspirations to statehood by measuring “Kurdistan” according to their vision 
of a “national” and “unified” Iraq. The chapter focuses on teachers and students at 
Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), a private high school, and one of several spaces 
featured in this dissertation, in which people encounter competing ethical positions. 
Many people, especially those displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, evaluated their present 
situation in Kurdistan by recalling their life in pre-invasion Iraq. These “nostalgic” 
interlocutors came of age during the sanctions era, which they recall warmly as a time in 
which people supported one another as neighbors and fellow citizens. They contrast their 
childhoods, marked by material shortages, with those of their Kurdistani private school 
students. Their students enjoy material comforts and security but suffer from their insular 
and pampered lifestyles. While some interlocutors expressed resignation about youth 
“apathy”, others, like “Mariam” the high school civics teacher, were determined to 
rehabilitate the state for the next generation – if not a unified Iraq, then at least a 
Kurdistani state committed to the good of all its citizens. Only time will tell if Mariam’s 
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vision for restoring the country reached her cynical Kurdistani students, many who dream 
of leaving Kurdistan for a better life abroad.  
Chapter 4, “This is the Life Here: Ethical Life among Bodybuilders and Gym-
goers,” considers how bodybuilding and gym-going narratives contribute to a larger 
discourse about broken bodies, state violence, and ethical life in Iraq. Interlocutors assert 
that they have created truly “pluralistic” spaces, like “modern” fitness centers, in which 
they can work out their own ethical self-formation by escaping, or at least minimizing, 
the powers of family, sect, and state. By understanding how Iraqi bodybuilding narratives 
both employ and critique tropes about national strength, “modernity”, and pluralism, this 
chapter demonstrates how the spread of the global fitness industry offers individual 
athletes and their fitness communities a set of ethical practices and an interpretative 
framework in the wake of the collapsing Iraqi state. The selves and subjects produced in 
discursively “pluralistic” spaces were at odds: People drew upon romanticized notions of 
the autonomous individual, which conflicted with the ethnonationalist or religious 
citizen-subjecthood desired by administrators, managers, family members, Kurdistani 
society, and the emerging Kurdistani state. 
Chapter 5, “There is No Future,” offers several vignettes in which interlocutors 
express deep doubts about cultural practices, state institutions, and even “causes,” such as 
a future Kurdistani state, or a rehabilitated, shared national Iraqi identity. Some people 
also struggle with reconciling the everyday experiences of the “immanent frame” with the 
transcendent, such as Ashti, the Kurdish teacher who felt “called” to work in Iraqi 
Kurdistan but was sliding deeper into despair at the apparent lack of progress in her 
students and in her homeland. The concluding chapter, “Bits of Hope,” asks if 
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interlocutors’ various modes of ethical positioning, which seem to generate hope and 
make life liveable, might also aid anthropologists. Perhaps an anthropology of “hope” 
could reinvigorate the discipline by returning to its foundational humanism – to “the 
moral obligation to hope” (Geertz 2000) that our efforts can contribute to better 


















Ch. 2 “Ma’ash nȋya”: State failures and national disappointments 
 
“Politicians create fresh hells, not dream cities.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the 
Night of the City 
 
The first day of school 
 In the Grade 10 classroom, someone has opened a window. Students sitting close 
to the window can feel the prickling, January cold on the back of their necks. There is not 
much heating in the school, but the classrooms become stuffy and stale nonetheless. A 
truck selling propane gas canisters drives slowly by the school, announcing its 
neighborhood rounds with a tinny tune like an American ice cream truck. Later a 
vegetable seller passes in his creaky pick-up truck, windows rolled down, shouting, 
“Yalla bandora! Yalla kheyar!” (Come get tomatoes! Come get cucumbers!) 
 It is the first day of the semester at Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), a 
private K-12 school.3 A group of girls has invited me to sit in an empty desk formerly 
belonging to a student who has emigrated with her family to Australia over the Winter 
break. In front of me, two girls turn in their desks to face their classmates. “Everyone is 
leaving!” laments Ishtar, the group’s apparent leader. She studies me, the newcomer, for 
a moment. Then she points to a girl near the front of the room, “She’s leaving next 
week!” Ishtar says mock accusingly. The girl spins around and says, “Yes, I’m leaving 
for Sweden!”  
 
3 Kurdistan Civilizational School was a network of three campuses located in each of the three Kurdistani 
governorates: Duhok, Erbil, and Slemani. Although KCS was locally owned and run, it maintained a 
connection with an American NGO. The American influence in the school was intentional, as KCS taught 
using curriculum imported from the United States and methods characteristic of “classical Christian 
education,” the educational model upon which it was based.  
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“It’s colder there than here,” I observe, shivering from the open window. The girls 
speak rapidly, code-switching between Kurdish, Arabic, and English.  
“We speak like this because we know different languages,” Nergȋz explains. “She 
only speaks Arabic and English [gesturing to Ishtar], and we [gesturing to Gulistan] 
speak Sorani Kurdish, Arabic and English. It’s based on who you’re talking with, which 
language you use.” 
 “Everyone is leaving,” Gulistan says. “We had two or three in our class leave. 
It’s not nice here anymore.” 
“Because of the problem with Daesh?” I ask. 
“Yes,” said Ishtar. “Because of that. But also because sometimes the classes here 
are too hard.”  
Their literature teacher, Jamila, enters the room and directs the class to look at 
Book 18 of The Odyssey, in which a beggar enters the plot. This class is taught in 
English, as most of the KCS courses are, although students sometimes make comments in 
Arabic or Kurdish. “Do you think begging is shameful?” Jamila asks the class. The class 
seems to think so. “If begging is a choice,” Jamila continues, “then why would people 
choose to do something shameful?” Hawar, one of the more vocal male students, gestures 
in the direction of a nearby, busy intersection and exclaims in Kurdish, “There are 
beggars in this street şerem nȋya (with no shame)!” Jamila nods without comment. (Later 
that year, the numerous Syrian refugees, predominantly children, begging at that 
intersection disappeared; allegedly, they were rounded up and taken to refugee camps 
outside the city.) Jamila moves on to the next event in the plot. She finishes her lesson, 
leaves the room, and Bijar the math teacher enters the grade 10 room.  
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In math class, Bijar, becomes distracted by a couple of boys in the front who are 
struggling with the lesson. He leans over their desk and explains. The girls in the back of 
the room take advantage of this interlude and spin around to face each other again. “How 
could she kill herself? She was not the type of person to do that. Everyone says so,” 
whispers Nergȋz. A 24- year-old lawyer had been found dead in her car near the luxury 
residential area “Dream City.” The press was reporting it as a murder, but these girls 
were skeptical. Nergȋz described the condition of the body, gesturing to her face and 
wrists. I leaned closer and asked, “So do you think it was a murder?”  
“Definitely a murder,” Ishtar said, her expression deadly serious. 
“Yes, her brother is a police officer,” Gulistan urgently whispered. “Either she or 
her brother must have been involved in a bad case, a case that wasn’t closed, you know?” 
Mr. Bijar turned again to face the class, and the girls ducked their heads as if working on 
their assigned calculations.  
 During lunch in the cafeteria, several grade 10 students and I gather around one of 
the plastic tables. They take turns sharing information I ought to know as a newcomer to 
Erbil. “Hewlêr is nice,” one timid girl offers. The students all look at me to hear my 
initial impressions of Erbil.  
Before I can respond, another student, Noor, concludes the conversation as the 
bell rings: “That’s bullshit,” she says, standing up and stalking off toward the high school 
building. On the first day of the new semester, students have discussed emigration, the 





(Later, in conversation with grade 10 students) 
Layla: I don’t think that I have a future here. Who would have known that one day there 
was gonna be no salary?”  
 
Serbest: This is the first time in history that people don’t get a salary. 
Layla: How are the people going to live?  
 
“Ma’ash nȋya” 
It was a saying, an explanation, an excuse, and an expression of resignation I 
heard over and over during my field work: “Ma’ash nȋya,” (“There are no salaries”). 
When I asked taxi drivers or service workers about their life in Kurdistan, most often the 
reply included, “Ma’ash nȋya.” When I visited a government school to observe classes, 
only to find most of the teachers socializing in the break room all morning rather than 
teaching their lessons without pay, the explanation offered was, “Ma’ash nȋya.” When I 
heard people complain about the prices of goods, they reminded shopkeepers or 
managers, “Ma’ash nȋya.” The saying was a reference to the Kurdistan Regional 
Government’s months-long freeze and reductions on salaries owed to some 60% of the 
population. The phrase also signified systemic dysfunction of state and society. By the 
end of my field work, when people asked me what I thought about life in Kurdistan, my 
standard reply was, “Khelkȋ Kurdistan bashn, balam ma’ash nȋya” (The people of 
Kurdistan are good, but there are no salaries). This answer seemed to satisfy everyone. 
Many Kurdistani people struggled to feel hopeful in a landscape marred by cycles 
of war and violence and in a time of economic stagnation. My fieldwork (September 
2015 - June 2017) occurred during a period of deepening crisis, or qairan, for the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Many of my interlocutors spoke about the qairan, and it 
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was the subject of numerous news media reports. Qairan primarily referred to the KRI’s 
economic difficulties, although I came to understand that it, like the saying “ma’ash 
nȋya,” referred to political and social woes as well. Economic problems stemmed from 
several sources: First, the Kurdistan Region had become a “safe haven” for people fleeing 
surrounding conflicts, burdening the KRI’s infrastructure. During the 2003-2011 Iraq 
war, thousands of people displaced by the violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq settled 
in the Kurdistan Region. Starting in 2011, refugees from nearby Syria also began spilling 
into the KRI. Then, in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or “Daesh” 
as it is known in the Middle East, invaded Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Iraqi 
military forces abandoned their posts and fled along with hundreds of thousands of 
people, most of whom went north to the Kurdistan Region.  
In the weeks following, Daesh displaced over 500,000 people and attempted to 
exterminate Yezidis, an ethnoreligious minority. The Kurdish peshmerga military forces 
led a difficult campaign against Daesh. In August 2014, Daesh captured Kurdish-
controlled areas and sent the peshmerga retreating. People feared ISIS would attempt to 
take the Kurdistani capital city of Hewlêr (Erbil). In response, U.S. President Barack 
Obama ordered airstrikes to protect American citizens and assets in Erbil. U.S. airstrikes 
continued over the next three years as the conflict spread into Syria and as ISIS 
sympathizers continued to launch attacks inside and outside Iraq.  
 Kurdistani people became increasingly demoralized by the protracted conflict 
and its effects. An estimated 1.5 million refugees and IDPs living within the Kurdistan 
region were straining its power grid; in the intense heat of summer or the damp cold of 
winter, electricity was out for hours at a time. There were frequent water shortages. 
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Meanwhile, those who could afford better lived in gated, luxury residential compounds 
where they noticed only a blip as city electricity (raȋsȋ) went out and expensive, personal 
backup generators (mǒlida) switched on. At the same time, the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) was engaged in another conflict: a political disagreement with the 
Iraqi federal government. After Kurdish forces took control of Kirkuk in 2014, the KRG 
began selling oil independently rather than through the federal Iraqi government. 
Consequently, Baghdad began withholding the KRI’s share of the national budget. 
(Baghdad did not resume sending revenue to the KRG until March 2018.) With its budget 
increasingly strained, the Kurdistani Government began reducing and withholding 
salaries. As over half of the KRI’s population was on the government payroll (Joseph and 
Sümer 2019), economic stagnation ensued.  
It seemed to me that, over the course of my fieldwork, the atmosphere in 
Kurdistan gradually darkened. I often heard people speak critically of the Kurdistani 
Government, which was rumored to be lining its own members’ pockets while claiming it 
could not pay thousands of public sector employees’ salaries. The Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP or PDK), the dominant political party, barred several members of Parliament 
belonging to rival party Gorran (Change Party) from entering Erbil; resulting protests 
turned violent. Kurdistani President Mesud Barzanȋ did not step down when his elected 
term ended, citing a state of emergency. As the months dragged on, patriotic displays 
rang hollow for some. Families who lost loved ones in the war struggled to make ends 
meet. University graduates could not find satisfying work. Many young people I came to 
know through my time at the gym and at a local university, felt their lives had stalled 
59 
indefinitely. With the qairan overshadowing Kurdistan, how could anyone generate 
hope? 
In this chapter, interlocutors living in a time of crisis struggle to conceptualize the 
Kurdish “nation,” which is central to thinking about the “state” in Iraq and in the 
Kurdistan Region. A sense of “rightness” about one’s nation also is crucial for generating 
hope. The stories in this chapter demonstrate how the nation’s disappointments, such as 
being denied an independent state or experiencing some negative aspect of Kurdish 
national “culture,” are intimately connected with personal disappointments. In their 
narrations, interlocutors incorporate national myths, civilizational and regional histories, 
and reflections on life in pre-invasion Iraq (before 2003) and experiences while living 
abroad. People wrestle especially with how their lived experiences and beliefs fit with, or 
do not fit with, their subject positions, as a “Kurdish female,” for example, or as a 
returnee from the Kurdish diaspora. Fundamental to conceptualizing the “nation” is a 
sense of “rightness” or “goodness” (Anderson 1999) that may not correspond to one’s 
lived experiences as a member of, or resident in, that “nation.”    
 
Patriliny and the myth of the Medes 
At Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), the new komalayatȋ (social studies) 
teacher, Karza, was a recent graduate with degrees in sociology and philosophy from a 
local Kurdish university. KCS students had experienced a lot of turnover with their 
komalayatȋ teachers. Students told me that their previous komalayatȋ teachers did not 
answer their questions, did not use the textbook, and instead gave students summaries to 
memorize and recall on multiple choice tests. Their new teacher, Karza, employed a 
different approach. Karza brought a subversive energy into the classroom, where he 
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taught komalayatȋ for students in grades 7, 8, and 9. As required by the Kurdistan 
Region’s Ministry of Education, Karza taught directly from the government-issued 
komalayatȋ textbook. He sometimes departed from it, however, by raising questions or 
including information he learned during his university studies. Although Karza spoke 
only Sorani Kurdish and taught his courses in Kurdish, he frequently paused and 
permitted his multilingual students to translate for one another, as some students at KCS 
spoke Arabic and did not understand Kurdish. Translation often led to debates about 
interpretation that departed from the lesson, and Karza encouraged discussion. He 
prompted his students to think critically and not to accept everything they were told or 
read, including the government-issued social studies textbook. At times, he made subtle, 
critical remarks about contemporary politics, connecting the historical content of the 
lesson to the present-day.  
For example, during one lesson, Karza read aloud from the textbook about the 
Islamic history of the region. He paused reading and asked a boy to draw a tank on the 
dry erase board. “In 2003, democracy came to America on the back of a tank,” Karza 
began. “And long ago, Islam came to Iraq in the same way. Before Muslims came, the 
name of this country was Kurdistan. And with Islam came ‘Arab ideas,’ (fiqrȋ ‘arab) and 
women became victims.” These comments caught me off guard as I sat in the back of the 
classroom taking notes. Karza did not look in my direction, and I wondered if I heard him 
correctly. I felt certain that the government issued textbooks contained nothing overtly 
critical of Islam or the United States. After class, I confirmed with several students that 
what I heard was indeed what Karza said, but the students were puzzled about what point 
their teacher wanted to make. It was one of many episodes in which I wondered how my 
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presence in the classroom influenced the lessons. But Karza’s political commentary also 
was typical of his teaching style, leading students down a critical path but stopping short 
of forming a conclusion for them. Some of Karza’s older students appreciated his edgier 
approach. Most students, however, were baffled by his sly, indirect references to 
contemporary politics, such as the grade 7 students in the following anecdote. 
 That day, Karza began class by writing on the board, “Media” (referring to the 
Median Empire) and “Mediakan” (the Medes). Beside “Media” he wrote “homeland” 
(nishtiman) and beside Mediakan he wrote “Kurd.” He turned to face the class, “You 
know, like in our national anthem, ‘We are the descendants of the Medes and 
Cyaxares.’”   
This was a revelation for the grade 7 students, who exclaimed in unison, 
“Oh!”  Karza described the capital city of the Medes, and he explained that before the 
religions of Christianity and Islam came to Kurdistan, there was another religion called 
“Zoroastrianism.”  
“Is Zoroastrianism the Kurdish religion?” asked Welat.  
“There were many religions,” Karza replied, “but the Medes at that time were 
Zoroastrian.” 
Then Karza wrote “Diaoku” on the board. Karza explained that Diaoku was the 
man who established the Medes and was the first Kurd.  
“So Diaoku is like the first Kurdish father?” asked Heba. Karza nodded and 
explained to the class how Diaoku’s line came to an end when Diaoku’s great grandson, 
Astyages, had no male heir and arranged for his daughter, Mandane, to marry a Persian 
62 
man. Mandane’s marriage to a foreigner was not only the end of Diaoku’s patriline, but 
the end of the Median civilization.  
The Komalayatȋ textbook, and Karza’s lesson, probably drew upon Herodotus’ 
account of the “history” of the Medes. According to Herodotus, the Median King 
Diaoku’s great-grandson Astyages was the last king of the Medes. King Asytyages feared 
his daughter Mandane. This was because Astyages had two dreams, one in which 
Mandane urinated all over Asia, drowning its inhabitants, and another in which a vine 
spread from Mandane’s genitals and covered all of Asia. Fearful of his daughter’s 
potential progeny, he married Mandane to a Persian man named Cambyses. When 
Mandane gave birth to a son, Asytages ordered to have the baby killed because his 
advisers, or magi, believed Mandane’s child would replace Astyages as king. The magi 
advised Astyages, saying, “Sire, it means a great deal to us that you continue to rule 
securely and successfully, because if your rule were to pass to this Persian boy, it will 
come into the hands of others, and the Persians will make us their slaves and despise us, 
since we are foreigners to them” (67). Through a series of twists and turns, Mandane’s 
baby boy, Cyrus, is not killed and, as an adult, leads the Persians in battle to overthrow 
Astyages and conquer the Medes. Herodatus concludes, “Now the Medes would become 
slaves instead of masters, through no offense of their own, and the Persians, the former 
slaves of the Medes, would become their masters” (71).  
 Karza mentioned to the class that Diaoku’s male successors were Phraortes, 
Cyaxares, and Astyages. 
“What was Diaoku’s wife’s name? And what was Astyages’ wife’s name?” asked 
Pinar, one of the more extroverted girls in the class.  
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 “I don’t know,” Karza shrugged.  
 “But weren’t they famous?” Pinar pressed him. 
 “We don’t know their names,” Karza admitted, “but there have been many 
famous and important women in our history.” 
 “Like who?” Pinar asked. 
“There is a famous Kurdish woman, a legend,” Karza began. Then he told the 
class about how this woman worked in an important government office, which was a 
great achievement, especially at a time when few women occupied high positions in the 
government. Her marriage to an Arab man, however, was a source of controversy. Prior 
to this class, I also had heard about this controversy. People said that it was traitorous and 
denigrating for a Kurdish woman from a respected family to marry an Arab man already 
in a polygynous marriage (permissible in Islam, but socially controversial in Kurdistan). 
Some Kurdish people I knew had described Arabs as their “enemy,” or at least had 
expressed distrust of Arabs, due to cycles of conflict and genocide, most famously the 
Anfal genocide against Kurds. Other people argued that marrying “for love” was all that 
mattered. Knowing this, I wondered if the komalayatȋ teacher was drawing a connection 
between a contemporary Kurdish female politician’s “mixed-marriage” with an “enemy,” 
and the mythical “failure” of the Median line when female Median royalty mixed with 
enemy Persians.   
 Karza concluded the lesson by telling a version of the Newroz myth about Kawa 
the blacksmith, a Mede who rebelled against an evil Persian king oppressing the Medes. 
After Karza dismissed the class, I lingered in the classroom to ask a couple students about 
their understanding of the lesson. They repeated the highlights to me. One of the boys 
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turned to Karza, who was erasing the board, and asked, “Was the problem that the 
daughter [Mandane] married a Persian man?”  
Karza simply answered, “Yes.”  
 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, it would be difficult to imagine the Kurdish nation without its 
foundational patrilineages. They include ancient lineages, like Diaoku’s lineage in the 
myth of the Medes, as well as patrilineages from more recent history, such as the three 
generations of the Barzanȋ family whose members have figured prominently in Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s political life. One of the strongest contributors to and stabilizers of Kurdish 
identity is patrilineal kinship, in which a person inherits ethnic and religious identity from 
his or her father (King 2014). In the komalayatȋ lesson, Karza drew upon the logics of 
patrilineal kinship, or “patriliny,” when he spoke of the “failure” of a Median royal 
woman marrying a Persian man, thus producing children who were not considered Medes 
but Persians. Consequently, the Median royal line was absorbed into the Persian nation, 
and the Persians later rebelled and conquered their former masters, the Medes.    
The logic of patriliny also is at work in contemporary Iraq, as it is across much of 
the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. For example, the child of an Arab Christian 
mother and a Kurdish Muslim father would be recognized, both by social convention and 
by the state, as Kurdish and Muslim, the same identity categories ascribed to their father. 
The Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government use patrilineal identity categories 
to assign their citizens religious and ethnic identity categories and to confer citizenship, 
as do the majority of states in the Middle East (King 2018). Patrilineal kinship has 
significant legal implications, connecting people to land and determining how property 
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can be passed from individuals. Many people can trace their genealogy through several 
generations, especially if they belong to an esteemed lineage, such as the descendants of 
the Prophet Muhammad. 
At the heart of Karza’s lesson about the mythical rise and fall of the Kurdish 
nation was a failed patriline. It failed because a Kurdish woman had a child with a man 
from not just the wrong patrilineage, but the wrong nation. In other lessons, Karza 
commented that the Kurdish nation (gel or millet) has been the pawn of its more powerful 
neighbors, Iran and Turkey, for centuries. Many times, Karza expressed frustration that 
Kurdish people are the perpetual pawn of their foreign masters, whether Persian or 
Iranian, Ottoman or Turkish. Likewise, historian David McDowall (2004) observes that, 
“The pattern of nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab or 
subsequently Turkic, alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible, 
became an enduring theme in Kurdish political life” (21). In drawing upon the logic of 
patriliny, Karza drew a line from the original “failure” of the Median / Kurdish line to 
contemporary fears about Iran and Turkey. 
 Within Kurdistan, certain lineages, such as the Barzanȋ family and their 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have become the dominant political players and 
guardians of national mythology. Some people criticized how the Barzanȋs control the 
Kurdish ethnonationalist narrative and regulate displays of nationalism. Karza, for 
example, critiqued contemporary politics by contextualizing them within a foundational 
national myth that provided a narrative structure in which the Barzanȋ family, Iran, and 
Turkey play archetypal roles in contemporary politics. Many of my interlocutors, 
however, spoke of Kurdish nationalism as existing beyond a tribe or political party; they 
66 
appealed to a deeper, larger struggle spanning time and territory. The struggles of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, for instance, or of Rojava, the Kurdish 
autonomous region in Syria, represent “greater Kurdistan,” an enduring and noble nation, 
beyond the provincial cause of a de facto state run by an oligarchy in Iraqi Kurdistan.     
 
The “goodness” of nations 
Benedict Anderson (1991), who famously, and perhaps romantically (Chatterjee 
1999), conceptualized the nation as an “imagined community,” was nonetheless aware of 
the dangers of nationalisms, such as colonialism, racism, and genocide. People living in 
Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region know these dangers all too well. Despite all the “wrong” 
nations can do, however, we have not abandoned the concept of the “nation.” Anderson 
speculated this is because the “nation” represents an essential “goodness” for its people in 
a way that religion does not. Anderson observes that one cannot say, “My religion, right 
or wrong,” as it would negate that religion’s claims on truth and adherents. Conversely, 
one could believe in an essential “goodness” of one’s nation, whether its current rulers do 
“right” or “wrong”:  
For if nations can, at least hypothetically, be ‘wrong,’ this wrongness is 
temporary, and is always set against a more permanent ‘good.’ The question then 
is – and one poses it in opposition to the eternal goodness of religion – what is the 
source of this goodness, given that the nation, no matter how grandly conceived, 
is intrahistorical (it has no place in heaven or in hell)? I argue that we need to 
think about innocence, or, more precisely, about who, in the national ambience, 
guarantees the nation’s ultimate blamelessness”  (1999:197).  
The nation embodies the goodness of the dead, the living, and the unborn. During 
times of crisis, the nation’s leaders invoke the sacrifices made by the nation’s dead, 
compelling the living citizens to make similar sacrifices to ensure the future of the nation, 
symbolized by the unborn. Many scholars have since critiqued Anderson’s “imagined 
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communities”, and I do not examine those critiques here. Rather, I take up Anderson’s 
inquiry about the “goodness” of nations, approaching it not through history or philosophy 
but through ethnography. 
 I argue that what is at stake in encounters with the Kurdish “nation” and its 
purported “goodness” are not merely the political ramifications of successfully or 
unsuccessfully cultivating patriotic sentiment or gaining international support for an 
independent Kurdistani state. Also at stake are individuals’ ethical sensibilities, their 
sense of purpose and identity formed through their participation (or non-participation) in 
the ethical dimensions of nationalisms and state-making. The ethnographic accounts in 
this chapter, which feature Kurdistani people encountering, conceptualizing, and 
responding to the “nation,” demonstrate how individual projects of ethical-self formation 
become entangled with the “goodness” of the nation.  
In what follows, I examine how the genealogy of Kurdish nationalisms and state-
making contributes to contemporary Kurdistani subjectivities, that is, to the way that 
people living in the Kurdistan Region conceptualize selfhood and understand their 
relationships to other individuals, as well as to collectivities like their family, religious 
community, nation, and state. The ways in which people have conceptualized Kurdish 
identity and nationalisms have shaped not only everyday discourse, but also scholarship 
on Kurdistan. “Deep-seated Western views” of language and culture (Allison 2018) and 
orientalist epistemologies have constrained how foreign and local academics and 
politicians approach Kurdish identity and politics (Hassanpour 1993), which a new 
generation of scholars, including many ethnic Kurds, is challenging (Al-Ali et al. 2020).  
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Decolonizing Kurdish nationalisms and state-making 
Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the Kurdish “nation,” “Kurdish 
nationalism” or “ethnonationalism,” and the “Kurdistani state.” Using these terms 
critically requires examining the genealogy of narratives, academic and popular, about 
Kurdish identity and nationalism. A reevaluation of Kurdish studies is long overdue, as 
argued by a recent “Decolonizing Kurdish Studies” roundtable comprised of a new 
generation of scholars, many of Kurdish origin (Al-Ali et al. 2020). The discipline of 
anthropology likewise is confronting its history of complicity with colonization (Jobson 
2020; Allen and Jobson 2016; Harrison 2011), including knowledge production about the 
Middle East North Africa (MENA) region (Asad 1973; Deeb and Winegar 2015; Makdisi 
2008; Sharkey 2008). Reassessing epistemologies and methods within Kurdish studies 
and within anthropology is especially relevant for research about Kurdistan, a territory 
which was, and in many ways still is, a “colony” of the modern state (Kurt 2020).  
Knowledge production about Kurdish people and Kurdistan has been 
concentrated in the West, produced by imperial or colonial agents and by researchers. 
Western and orientalist epistemologies have dominated how foreign and local academics 
and politicians approach Kurdish identity and politics (Hassanpour 1993; Al-Ali et al. 
2020). Kurdish studies scholars, including many academics of Kurdish origin, often focus 
their work on Kurdish nationalism and the possibility of Kurdistani statehood, and thus 
overlook many other aspects of Kurdish or Kurdistani lifeways. During my fieldwork, I 
encountered scholarly preoccupation with Kurdish nationalism on many occasions. The 
most memorable of these encounters occurred when I gave an invited lecture for faculty 
members at a local university in 2017. The organizer asked me to talk about my ongoing 
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research, so I accepted the opportunity, hoping to promote anthropology. I knew that my 
discipline was little-understood and respected in my field site, especially relative to 
prestigious fields like medicine and engineering.  
Faculty in attendance at my talk mainly worked in science and technology fields, 
as the university skewed toward STEM education. Overall, faculty reactions were not 
favorable. While some faculty criticized anthropological methods during the question-
and-answer segment, commenting, for example, that “anthropology is not a real science,” 
others complained that I was missing the point: Why was I socializing with youth in 
schools and fitness centers? Why was I not interviewing politicians and experts? Would 
not Kurdish nationalism be a more important and relevant subject, considering the 
upcoming independence referendum? The consensus was that I had misapprehended my 
field site.  
The critical response reflected, in part, the timing of my talk during a politically 
tense moment in the months before the 2017 independence referendum. At another 
faculty talk, I observed heavy criticism of a foreign guest lecturer who argued that the 
Kurdistan Region should not pursue forming an independent Kurdish state, a very 
unpopular opinion at the time. What struck a nerve, I believe, was that I was ignoring 
local “experts” and their opinions about an urgent issue. Instead, I was listening to 
children and young adults talk about their relatively privileged lives while the rest of the 
country suffers: Wealthy young people, with the latest iPhone model, hanging around 
expensive malls and cafes or sitting idly at home playing video games or watching 
American movies, while refugees beg on street corners and live inside abandoned 
construction sites. Seemingly self-absorbed bodybuilders and gym-goers paying one or 
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two hundred dollars a month for gym membership, when many people struggled to pay 
their rent and feed their families. Including privileged youth in my research, however, 
does not belittle or erase the suffering of others. The painful histories and present 
situations of Kurdish people, as well as of many other groups of people who have 
suffered violence in Iraq, are woven throughout my ethnography.  
Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdistani state are intimately connected with 
longstanding narratives about Kurdish people. Internationally, the following narrative 
outline about Kurdistan is well-known: Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world 
without a state, and they are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. They have 
suffered seemingly endless cycles of violence and many betrayals by their alleged allies, 
reflected in the oft repeated saying, “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.” 
Mountainous terrain ties together much of greater Kurdistan. Those who have sought to 
control this territory, from the seventh century Arab conquests to modern states, have 
been thwarted by the difficulty of governing mountainous terrain occupied by numerous 
independent Kurdish tribes and emirates skilled in the “art of not being governed” (Scott 
2010). The “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” narrative has been effective in 
garnering support for Kurdish causes; it is employed, for example, by advocates of 
American-Kurdish political allyship (Mansfield 2014). 
Such narratives portray Kurdish people as highly nationalistic and resistant to 
imperial and state formations, and thus often the victims of imperial and state violence. 
These narratives endure in political and academic discourse, shored up by scholarship 
that reifies Kurdish identity and politics. Kurdish Studies scholarship often focuses on 
elaborating Kurdish origins and demonstrating a historical, unified “Kurdish” identity. 
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For example, Wadie Jwaideh (2006) argues that, “A strong sense of nationality has 
existed among Kurds for a very long time. Although a people of mixed origin, the Kurds 
constitute a nationality that has proved its vigor throughout the ages” (290). Jwaideh 
attributes a strong sense of Kurdish national consciousness to the Kurds’ “peculiar 
mountain culture” which is the “product of environmental, geographic, and historical 
forces that have combined to shape the general configuration of Kurdish life and 
institutions” (291). Likewise, Peter Hahn (2012) describes the Kurds as a “militant 
mountain people of a distinct ethnic and linguistic identity” (16), language echoing 
colonial racial typologies characterizing some groups, such as the Iraqi Assyrian levies, 
as “martial races.” 
On the other hand, some scholars critique the idea of a unified Kurdish identity 
predating World War I. Historian David McDowall argues that “it is extremely doubtful 
that the Kurds form an ethnically coherent whole in the sense that they have a common 
ancestry.” Kurds are most likely the descendants of various Indo-European tribes who 
moved westward from Iran some 3500 years ago (2004:8). McDowall maintains that “the 
Kurds only really began to think and act as an ethnic community from 1918 onwards” in 
the era of Wilsonian self-determination (2003:4). Anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen 
notes that the term “Kurd” or “Akrad” (its Arabic plural) historically was used to refer to 
all non-Arab nomadic and tribal people; only gradually did people come to use the term 
to refer to a specific ethnic group (1992a:111). Van Bruinessen speculates that the 
“underdevelopment” of Kurdistan, exacerbated by difficult travel and the inaccessibility 
of villages, hindered Kurdish nationalist movements, making “primordial ties” all the 
more important (1992:20-21). Consequently, van Bruinessen suggests that identity 
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dichotomies were intensified, hinging upon a “dualistic world-view” of “my enemies’ 
enemy is my friend” (1992:77), which brings to mind Fredrik Barth’s (1969) classic 
theorization of ethnic boundaries. 
Kurdish identity, or Kurdayetȋ, as conventionally understood today, is based on 
language and ethnic self-identification, as well as other modes of Kurdishness, like dress, 
custom, or cuisine, which are said to signify Kurdish ethnicity (Celiker 2013; Bruinessen 
1992b). In some contexts, “Kurdish” cultural markers may differ little from surrounding 
cultural groups. Perhaps the strongest case for unified Kurdish cultural identity can be 
made for language, as Yalçin -Heckman argues (1991:27). Some scholars have argued 
that varieties of Kurdish are “dialects” of the same language, which reinforces a sense of 
pan-Kurdish identity or national unity; conversely, “dialects” may be more accurately 
described as distinct languages belonging to a Kurdish language family (Ghazi 2009).  
Empires and states historically have subjugated their Kurdish populations through 
suppression of Kurdish language and culture. The Arab conquest brought Islam and the 
Arabic language to the region that is now Kurdistan. Some of my Kurdistani interlocutors 
regarded Arabic and Islam, especially more conversative variants of Islam, as hindrances 
to the Kurdish cause at best, and at worst, as “colonizing consciousness,” to borrow a 
phrase from John and Jean Comaroff (1991). Successive empires, like the Mongols and 
later the Ottomans, perpetuated linguistic domination over their subject peoples. The 
states created after World War I, such as Turkey and Iraq, continued Kurdish linguistic 
and cultural suppression to varying extents (Hassanpour 1996; Fernandes 2008; Salih 
2019). Since its creation in 1921, Iraq has maintained official recognition and language 
rights of its Kurdish population, but, as Christine Allison notes, these rights “have always 
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fallen short of Kurdish demands, which have been a leitmotif of Kurdish resistance” 
(Allison 2018:21). 
Kurdish resistance and aspirations to statehood have become the focal point of 
scholarship on Kurdish identities in Iraq. A rich body of literature examines Iraqi 
identities through the lenses of Pan-Arabism, Iraqi nationalism, and sectarian, class, and 
urban-rural divides (Batatu 1978; Davis 2005; Longrigg 1953; Bashkin 2008; Eppel 
1998). However, Kurdish experiences of identity formation within this literature typically 
are regarded as provincial, with the modern state at the center of identity formation in 
Iraq. Thus, Kurdish identity, like other minority identities in Iraq (Bashkin 2012),  is 
reduced to a kind of “otherness,” conceptualized primarily through its opposition to 
imperial (Ottoman or British) and state formations (Iraq, Iran, Syria, or Turkey). 
Scholarship which views ethnic plurality as inherently problematic within the modern 
Iraqi state also reproduces Kurdish “otherness.” In this literature, the formation and 
contestation of collective identities typically are conceptualized with the Iraqi state at the 
center, undergirded by some idea of “Iraqi nationality,” whether unified or “fragmented” 
(Zubaida 2002). Iraqi nationality competes with pan-Arabism, or with ethnic and 
territorial nationalisms such as with the Kurdish population of Iraq.  
As Arbella Bet-Shlimon (2019) argues in her study of Kirkuk, the “boundaries of 
the nation-state” too often limit conceptualizing identities in Iraqi society. Bet-Shlimon 
observes that historical and contemporary narratives about Kirkuk approach the fact of 
ethnic pluralism as problematic and as a threat to the nation state. In the historical record 
and in the present day, however, many people in Iraq claim multiple or hybrid identities 
that do not correspond neatly to state-recognized identity categories. Furthermore, some 
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people are ethnically or nationally “indifferent” to the identity categories assigned to 
them by external powers, (Bet-Shlimon 2019, citing Zahra 2010) until those identity 
categories are used by the state or groups to lay claim to territory and resources.  
We have seen how popular discourse, political rhetoric, and some scholarship 
perpetuate certain narratives about Kurdish identity and politics. These narratives are 
problematic because they reproduce the colonial gaze; rely on a state-centered approach 
that marginalizes Kurdistan; reify identity categories according to Western notions about 
“ethnicity”; and reduce power struggles between groups and the state to “sectarianism.” 
Such narratives are especially egregious considering the ways in which Kurdistan 
continues to be marginalized, both as a political reality and as an object of study. As 
Lissa Malkki (1995) has argued, theorizing group identities with reference to states and 
the “national order of things” pathologizes “stateless” populations. For the reasons 
outlined above, I use the broader and more inclusive term “Kurdistani” to refer to people 
residing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. I use the ethnic designation “Kurdish” only 
when people self-identify or ascribe this identity to others, and I do not refer uncritically 
to “Kurdish” or any other identity categorization.  
 
Kurdistani sovereignty as a contested good 
 Central to my interlocutors’ encounters with nationalisms and state-making is the 
contested power to define and ascribe “Kurdish” and “Kurdistani” identities, or 
conversely, “Iraqi.” Encounters with the “nation” occur in sites familiar to 
anthropologists of sovereignty and the state, such as contexts of Foucauldian disciplinary 
power like schools, or “spaces of exception” like camps (Agamben 1998). Nationalist 
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messaging in textbooks, in the classroom, and in patriotic ceremonies at schools are all 
well-trodden territory for anthropologists of youth and nationalism in the Middle East 
(Adely 2012; Kaplan 2006; Altinay 2004; Herrera 2006). People predictably encounter 
Kurdish nationalist ideology and imagery at “national” sites, like the Barzanȋ Memorial 
Center described in the following section. Another key site for contesting sovereignty is 
the ubiquitous refugee or IDP camp, found throughout the Kurdistan Region, including 
informal camps like the Yezidi settlement described in chapter one, and formal, 
government-regulated camps, like the camp for Syrian Kurds which appears later in this 
chapter.  
Theorizing sovereignty has been a key concern of the discipline of anthropology, 
from classic studies on kingship and authority (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1940), to the 
emergence in the 1990s of the anthropologies of the state and globalization which 
examine modern forms of governance and the regulation of bodies and populations 
(Aretxaga 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Das 2004; Humphrey 2004). In the past couple 
decades, anthropologists have critiqued “the sign of sovereignty itself as a category of 
Western political thought,” (Bonilla 2017:330), which approaches statehood and self-
determination as if they were “one and the same” across the postcolonial world (Kauanui 
2017:327). Western concepts of sovereignty also may be problematic because they are 
premised upon the classically liberal “fiction” of “autonomous individuals” (Rose 1996).  
Anthropologists continue challenging “the rationalization of sovereignty as 
simply the unification of power and the basic concept of political organization” (Kauanui 
2017:328), instead approaching sovereignty as “a tentative and always emergent form of 
authority grounded in violence” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Studies of settler 
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colonialism reveal how sovereignty is both a conceptual framework and a discourse that 
produces particular experiences of political life (Sturm 2017; Simpson 2014; Ford 2010). 
For example, Amal Bishara’s work in Palestine demonstrates how people enact 
“provisional popular sovereignties” based in “insistent confrontation or quiet acts of 
caring for community in the face of abandonment” (Bishara 2017:350). Although popular 
sovereignties may not impact the political order, they can, however, “challenge the 
legitimacy of state authorities, create new forms of collectivity, and forge new ideas of 
how power should function, even though they have not ultimately restructured state 
power” (350). 
In her work on Kurdish women’s resistance movements in Turkey, Marlene 
Schäfers (2020) shows how “familial and personal relationships are crucial sites where 
expectations of political loyalty and allegiance take on shape and substance but are also 
negotiated and contested” (120). When political movements become institutionalized in 
everyday life, “sovereignty becomes just as much a social as a political project, one that 
is lodged at the heart of ordinary life and the intimate relations of kinship, sexuality, and 
friendship” (120). The embeddedness of sovereignties in the “everyday, the personal, and 
the intimate lends ‘projects of sovereignty’ immense strength while simultaneously 
rendering their claims to power continually vulnerable to competing loyalties” (Schäfers 
2020:121). Schäfers observes that it is “precisely those moments of vulnerability when 
loyalties compete, conflict, or overlap,” which are “particularly valuable from an 
analytical point of view, because they allow us to observe the contours of the social labor 
that goes into the making and maintenance of sovereignty” (2020:121).  
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The sites of contested sovereignty throughout Kurdistan, such as schools and 
camps, are not new ethnographic or analytical territory for thinking about sovereignty, 
but they are underutilized sites for exploring the intersections of “sectarianism” and 
“contests of values.” Rather than analyzing these sites through the anthropology of 
sovereignty, I approach “sovereignty” as a contested “good” within a framework of value 
pluralism. Many of my interlocutors were engaged in a struggle to meet the demands of 
various ethical regimes, and subsequently pursue certain “goods,” while also pursuing 
individual projects of sovereignty, or personal “dreams.” My interlocutors, sometimes by 
choice and other times by force, participate in spaces of contested individual, collective, 
national, and state sovereignties. The incursion of political loyalties, such as the ethical 
dimensions of nationalism and state-making, into the “loyalties” of personal life, such as 
kinship and friendship, deeply impacts Kurdistani subjectivities and forms of belonging. 
Political incursions into personal life can be painful and disruptive. In the vignettes 
following, interlocutors’ encounters with the “nation” leaving some people wondering if 
“sovereignty” and nationalisms are “goods” worth pursuing in contemporary Kurdistan. 
 
National sites 
On a chilly day in mid-March 2017, when the winter had not quite yielded to 
spring, the mouth of Shanidar cave was shrouded in mist. Surrounding the cave, as far as 
the eye could see, rose the jagged Zagros mountains, whose peaks disappeared into grey, 
heavy clouds. A new Kurdish acquaintance, “Sěbr,” was leading us (myself and my 
husband) on a three-day tour around the Kurdistan Region to visit historic and cultural 
sites. I had requested that we visit Shanidar cave. The site became world-famous in the 
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late 1950s and early 1960s, when Neanderthal remains were excavated there by 
Columbia University archaeologist Ralph Solecki and a team of Kurdish workers. Traces 
of flower pollen, presumably brought into the cave by humans to commemorate the dead, 
were considered the oldest and best example of ritualistic human burial. (Later 
researchers argued that the pollen may have been the result of animal activity.) Shanidar 
appears in the Kurdistani government-issued social studies (komalayatȋ) curriculum, and 
the KRG’s official tourism website includes a page about the cave. At the time of my 
visit, the site seemed neglected, with litter scattered everywhere and some weathered 
didactic panels about the cave’s history that needed replacing. Managing this out-of-the 
way-site was probably a low priority at the time for the Kurdistani Government, of 
course, as it was dealing with a war and an economic crisis. 
We returned to Sěbr’s SUV and headed toward the Barzan region. From the 
backseat, I asked questions about Kurdish nationalism, and our guide responded by 
telling us stories about corruption. In one story, Sěbr witnessed a shady government-
business deal being made. He said that for a time after, he worried someone would 
threaten him or something bad might happen to him because he knew about the deal. But 
to his amazement, nothing happened because “they do this openly. There is no secret,” he 
scoffed.  
When we reached a security checkpoint near our destination, Sěbr told the guards 
that we were tourists just passing through the area. He did not mention that we were 
going to visit the Barzanȋ National Memorial center commemorating Kurdish 
revolutionary leader Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ. From the 1940s until his death in 1979, 
Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ was one of the primary leaders of Kurdish resistance movements 
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against the Iraqi and Iranian governments. “If we tell them here that we are going to the 
memorial, they will have television cameras and will interview you, and you will be on 
the evening news, ‘Foreigners come to honor the late Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ,’” Sěbr 
chuckled. Because it was the month of Mullah Mustafa’s birthday and the Newroz spring 
holiday, many people were visiting the memorial.  
 
Figure 2 Kurdish women from Zakho gathered for a group photo during their visit to the 
Memorial Center, March 2017. Photo by the author. 
 
We drove a few minutes more, reached the memorial gates, and parked in a small 
lot. Sěbr asked if I would cover my hair out of respect. “We won’t be here long,” he said 
as if to reassure me I would not be covering my hair for an extended period. I tucked my 
short hair inside a knit beanie.   
As we walked slowly through the memorial complex, Sěbr pointed out a large 
building, with a banquet hall said to hold up to 1500 guests. He pointed to the building’s 
three domes “representing the three religions in Kurdistan.”  
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“Which three?” I asked. 
“Islam, Christianity, and Yezidi,” he replied. Earlier in the day, Sěbr told us that 
his grandmother converted from Judaism to Islam. Her conversion caused quite a stir in 
their small town, Sěbr explained, because it was “not necessary” for Christian or Jewish 
women to convert when marrying a Muslim man. I waited to see if he had any comments 
about religious representation at the memorial, especially about the absence of Judaism, 
but he remained silent. Looming over us, an enormous Kurdistani flag flapped in the cold 
wind.  
The graves themselves were simple stone slabs with inscriptions. A short stone 
wall enclosed the little cemetery, and vivid green grass was growing over the graves. 
Quiet, respectful people left small bouquets of nergiz, the pale-yellow daffodil popular 
during the Spring Newroz season. As soon as we approached the cemetery, a young man 
dressed traditionally in jli kurdi noticed us and walked quickly in our direction, snapping 
photos with his large camera. Sěbr was telling us about the inscriptions, but I was 
distracted by the photographer, who circled around us while our friend talked. Finally, the 
photographer introduced himself, saying he worked for the memorial archive, and that he 
photographs all foreign visitors. Sěbr gave us a knowing look. 
Our guide seemed eager to leave the memorial and continue our tour, but like a 
good host, he waited patiently whenever we saw something that interested us. Other 
memorial visitors began approaching us, smiling nervously, and asking to take group 
selfies with us. I chatted with some young Kurdish women from the town of Zakho who 
were travelling together for the holiday; my husband posed with a couple families. As we 
walked back toward the parking lot, I noticed a banner in Sorani Kurdish and read aloud, 
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“Mullah Mustafa nasnamay netewanȋ gelȋ Kurd.” Turning to Sěbr, I asked, “‘Mullah 
Mustafa is the identity of the Kurdish nation,’ is that translation right?” 
“Yes,” he said, glancing toward the banner. 
“Is Mullah Mustafa a national hero?” Kyle (my husband) asked. 
“The Barzanȋs want to make him one, but most people, especially outside Erbil 
and Duhok provinces, in Slemanȋ and in greater Kurdistan, do not consider him a hero. 
Rather, he is the opposite,” Sěbr replied drily. He stopped walking and hesitated, 
observing a large tent beside the banner. “Do you want to eat in the tent? They serve a 
small meal to visitors. Every year they spend millions of dollars, some of it to feed all the 
guests to the memorial.”  
I nodded. “If it’s not too much trouble.”  
We stepped inside the tent. Around one dozen men and women, probably 
relatives, clustered at one end of a long row of tables pushed together. Sěbr led us to the 
other end, where an old man sat eating alone. The old man asked about us, and the family 
at the other end quieted to hear Sěbr’s brief explanation. A staff member brought us a 
platter of bread to share, and for each person, a plate of bulgur, a small bowl of lentil 
soup, and a flimsy plastic water cup.  
Sěbr looked disappointed. “This is a military meal,” he sighed.  
“There’s no raw onion either,” the old man added. 
 After our meal, we stood outside the tent, sipping small cups of hot, sugary black 
tea and chatting with other visitors for a few minutes. Sěbr motioned for us to return to 
the vehicle. He seemed tense. As we pulled out of the memorial center, I apologized, 
saying, “Maybe we stayed too long.”  
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Sěbr said it was “fine,” though his tone of voice and taut expression said 
otherwise.  
 
 Sěbr, like many Kurdish people I met, expressed disillusionment with political 
life in Iraqi Kurdistan. As we visited sites across the Kurdistan Region, Sěbr’s remarks 
seemed to follow a “script,” benign running commentary that gave an overall positive 
impression of the Kurdistan Region. I imagine he had used this script countless times in 
his career as a tour guide for international visitors to the Kurdistan Region, mostly 
“retired people interested in Mesopotamia,” he chuckled. Knowing that I was interested 
to hear not just a polite script but also his opinions, Sěbr gradually disclosed them. He 
had become cynical through repeated encounters with the Kurdistani Government, its 
agents, its policies, and its “scripts,” such as when he gave tours for “important” 
international visitors. Throughout our trip with Sěbr, he offered us the official script, but 
he prefaced his “scripted” remarks. He drew our attention to how the Kurdistani 
Government would want the Kurdistan Region portrayed and contrasted that “good” 
image with how he and people he knew experienced life in the Kurdistan Region.  
When we visited the Barzanȋ Memorial Center, he spoke in a resigned tone, and 
his comments were tinged with bitterness: About how we international visitors might be 
received eagerly and how our visit might be filmed and reported in news media, as he had 
witnessed many times when working as a tour guide. About how the Memorial Center 
conflated the Kurdish nation with the Barzanȋ clan, evidenced by the banner declaring 
Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ to be the “identity” of the Kurdish nation. And when he pointed 
out the three domes representing the “three religions of Kurdistan,” the lack of 
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representation of other religions, including his own partial-Jewish ancestry, was made 
more obvious by Sěbr’s grim silence.  
On our way to visit the Yezidi holy site of Lalish in the Duhok Governorate, we 
passed by several camps for IDPs. Near the town of Sheikhan, Sěbr pulled the vehicle 
over on a hillside, where we had a view overlooking an expansive IDP camp. The sky 
was grey and misty. White tents flapping in the cold wind stood out starkly against the 
red-brown mud of the plains. Sěbr complained that Yezidi IDPs had suffered more than 
other internally displaced people because Christian churches, foreign and local, only 
supported Christian IDPs. Throughout our tour, Sěbr made oblique remarks about the 
Kurdistan Regional Government’s “inability” to direct money to certain relief efforts or 
to pay government sector salaries.  
 
Figure 3. Refugee camp near Sheikhan, March 2017. Photo by the author.  
During our evening meal in a café, Sěbr ate half-heartedly and told us his story. 
When he was a teenager in the 1990s, Sěbr paid a man to smuggle him out of Iraq. For 
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weeks, Sěbr and a handful of other people trekked through the mountains crossing the 
Iraq-Turkey border. The smuggler abandoned them without food or water for two days in 
a filthy rice paddy; people sobbed from hunger and thirst and incessant mosquitos. At one 
point in their journey, the refugees were instructed to hide inside cotton bales on a truck. 
It was miserably hot, and the cotton stuck to their sweaty bodies. Finally, they reached 
Greece, where Greek people “were kind because of our mutual enemy, the Turks.” But 
the refugees had to sleep in a park that gay men used for clandestine meetups. In the 
morning, the police dispersed the sleepers with water hoses, which was welcome, Sěbr 
said, smiling sadly, because they had not showered in weeks. Eventually, Sěbr made it to 
London, where he worked his way up in the restaurant industry. Like many people in the 
Kurdish diaspora, he returned to the Kurdistan Region during the relatively stable and 
prosperous 2000s. With his savings, he paid 250,000 dollars in advance to secure a house 
in a new residential construction project in Erbil. When the real estate industry tanked, 
Sěbr sold his unfinished house at a huge loss.  
For the last leg of the tour, we stopped in the town of Akre, famous for its Newroz 
(new year) celebrations. Our friends in Erbil had encouraged us to borrow their jilȋ Kurdȋ 
to wear when visiting Akre. Sěbr regarded the traditional Kurdish clothing my husband 
and I wore for the occasion with a mix of amusement and resignation, perhaps having 
seen many tourists also eager to participate in Kurdish “culture.” Waving us off, Sěbr 
stayed with his vehicle and chain smoked. From a crowded rooftop, we watched 
fireworks and men bearing torches marching up the mountains surrounding Akre. 
Another rooftop spectator pointed out to me a separate procession of women bearing 
torches marching up a different mountain.  
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After the fireworks and toward the end of the festivities, there was a frantic rush 
of spectators as everyone tried to return to their homes and vehicles. Myself, my husband, 
and a few other people were quickly enveloped by a column of hundreds of rowdy young 
men, some bearing torches or firearms. In that moment, I realized how quickly the 
festivities had changed from a family-friendly affair to a dangerous one. During the drive 
home, I casually mentioned to Sěbr that I had been “harassed” by men in the street. Sěbr, 
not taking his eyes off the road, replied flatly, “That is how people are here,” and why he 
preferred not to attend such events. 
On the drive home, I thought about how the “nation” can take many forms, like 
the large meals of dolma and biryani we enjoyed in friends’ homes; picnics in the 
countryside during the Newroz holiday; or the families strolling in around the bazaar 
fountains eating ice cream in the cool evening. That night, the nation I observed was 
personified by aggressive men dominating the public space of a national cultural event 
celebrating the endurance and “goodness” of the Kurdish nation. But it was not good for 
all.  
From female acquaintances, I heard a range of stories about gender-based 
violence, from sexual harassment to “honor killings.” Some people spoke with sadness 
about severely curtailed opportunities for women, like when Ashti told me how her 
paternal uncle forbade her from going to school after age eleven. Some expressed 
frustration, such as female students who complained to me that their families would not 
permit them to study abroad but allowed their brothers. And many expressed mixed 
frustration and resignation about cultural gender norms, including men like Sȇbr the tour 
guide. Within Kurdish studies, there is growing acknowledgement and discussion of how 
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the gendered aspects of Kurdish “culture” shape the lived experiences of Kurdish women 
(Hardi 2011; 2013; Fischer-Tahir 2005; 2009; 2010), as well as the experiences of female 
scholars within Kurdish studies (Schäfers et al., 2020; Hardi 2020). In later chapters, I 
discuss how Kurdistani interlocutors deal with the gendered aspects of culture.    
In the ethnographic vignettes in this chapter, we see interlocutors grappling with 
the purported “goodness” of the Kurdish “nation.” If patrilineal kinship, patriliny, and 
“patriarchy” are integral to Kurdish cultural identity, as in the myth of the Medes and in 
contemporary state and social practices of ascribing identity, then can Kurdish “culture” 
be “good” for women? Can a nation run by a “kleptocratic” oligarchy be “good”? Can a 
nation that treats its non-Kurdish residents as second-class citizens be “good”? These 
questions are, of course, rhetorical in the sense that not all my interlocutors ask these 
questions; some people merely allude to problems. I bring these questions to the fore in 
thinking about the ethical dimensions of nationalism and state-making, especially how 
individuals link their own ethical self-formation to the nation or the state. Before I move 
to analyze how interlocutors wrestle with the nation’s “goodness,” in the following 
section I discuss how anthropologists conceptualize “goodness,” particularly as it pertains 
to violence and suffering.  
 
Suffering and anthropology of the good 
Anthropologists, especially those who work in Iraq (Al-Mohammad 2012) or in 
Iraqi Kurdistan (King 2011), frequently bear witness to suffering. My interlocutors 
suffered many types of violence, from gender-based violence, to discrimination, to the 
atrocities of war, such as physical injury, rape, or psychological trauma, that had 
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devastated the lives of so many. Suffering has always been “there,” visible to 
anthropologists working in “the field,” but in recent decades, anthropologists increasingly 
have turned their attention to documenting suffering and the conditions which produce it. 
Anthropologists, who for much of the discipline’s history as a “science of the ‘other’” 
(De Certeau 1986)  focused their research on “exotic others,” or the “savage slot” 
(Trouillot 2003), now focus primarily on the “suffering slot” (Robbins 2013a). The 
“suffering slot” reflects a disciplinary shift to what Sherry Ortner has dubbed “dark 
anthropology,” or a focus on “the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination, 
inequality, and oppression)” (2016:47). “Dark anthropology” infuses ethnography with 
the work of many theorists and social scientists who have examined power, violence, and 
human suffering (Agamben 1998; Butler 1997; Arendt 1970; Foucault 1977). In some 
ways, my ethnography reflects “dark anthropology,” as I would expect any holistic 
ethnographic approach to contemporary Iraq to include at least some of the “dark” 
themes haunting the country.  
One strength of ethnography is “bearing witness” to suffering (Atalay 2018; 
Bonet and McWilliams 2019; Hauser et al. 2018), which is just about everywhere you 
look in Iraq. Bearing witness involves interrogating the effects of overt violence, such the 
thousands of civilian deaths during the 2003-2011 Iraq war. Bearing witness also entails 
examining less obvious forms of violence, like the everyday discrimination internally 
displaced people and refugees suffer in the Kurdistan Region. Discrimination is one 
manifestation, among many, of “structural violence,” meaning “the ways in which epic 
poverty and inequality, with their deep histories, become embodied and experienced as 
violence,” as Paul Farmer has popularized the term (2010:47). Farmer (1996) observed 
88 
that anthropology’s longstanding commitment to cultural relativism and to the “culture” 
concept led many anthropologists to conflate forms of violence with “cultural 
difference.” The conflation was symptomatic of “‘studying down’ steep gradients of 
power” (277), and of a discipline built on “othering” people and societies, as critical 
scholars like Talal Asad (1973) had been arguing for decades.  
While “dark anthropology” has addressed some of the discipline’s problems with 
conceptualizing violence, the intense disciplinary focus on suffering tends to overlook 
other aspects of human experience. Joel Robbins (2013a) observes that, as 
anthropologists in 1980s and 1990s increasingly focused on power and violence and 
began the work of decolonizing the discipline, the “culture” concept receded into the 
background. In the disciplinary transition from studying the “savage” to the “suffering,” 
some of the strengths of ethnography have diminished, namely the “critical potential of 
the notion of difference” (2013a:447). In the era of dark anthropology, ethnographies 
resemble case studies of the same inequalities and suffering subject, just situated in 
different cultural contexts. “We have learned so much in the last few decades about how 
human beings can disregard and do violence to one another,” Robbins argues, that other 
ways of understanding human experience have been neglected (458).  
As a supplement to anthropology of the “suffering slot,” Robbins proposes an 
“anthropology of the good,” a line of inquiry about how “people living in different 
societies strive to create the good in their lives” (457). An anthropology of “the good” 
does not presume the existence any universal goods, but rather examines how people 
pursue various socially or individually defined “goods.” Robbins argues that a shared 
model of human action, one which recognizes that people think some things are good and 
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worth pursuing, has undergirded anthropology since its inception. The “savage slot” drew 
upon romantic notions of a utopia lost to the Western world, which might be found in the 
lives of the “other” (Trouillot 2003). “Dark anthropology,” though it has moved beyond 
the romanticism and orientalism of the “other,” nevertheless suggests in its critique of 
suffering that better ways of living are possible.    
Disagreement about conceptualizing an “anthropology of the good” centers on 
two problems: The first problem concerns how to define ethics and the ethical subject; 
the second concerns whether or not anthropologists can or should describe anything as 
“good.” While it may be argued that anthropologists have been studying “the social 
construction of morality” since the beginnings of the discipline (Howell 1997), 
historically, anthropologists have not given morality and ethics as much attention and 
systematic study as other areas of inquiry, like political or economic life, kinship and 
marriage, or religion (Laidlaw 2017). During the “ethical turn” of the past couple 
decades, anthropologists increasingly approached morality and ethics as objects of 
inquiry by engaging with philosophical traditions. Out of the ethical turn, two general 
schools of thought emerged, which I refer to as “virtue ethics” and “ordinary ethics.” 
There is, of course, more nuance within individual anthropologists’ work, which Cheryl 
Mattingly and Jason Throop (2018) cover in depth in their Annual Review article. Here, I 
group anthropologists loosely for the purpose of sketching an outline of a particular 
debate about ethical agency in which I position my own work. 
Anthropologists in the first group, “virtue ethics,” typically approach ethics as a 
conscious, moral deliberative process, set apart from everyday life, for the purpose of 
determining what is “good” and living accordingly. Their work often draws upon neo-
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Aristotelian thinking to theorize how people become ethical subjects through conscious 
reflection and action. Ethics concerns the examined life, in which, “Every art and every 
inquiry, and similarly every action and every choice is thought to aim at some good; and 
for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” 
(Aristotle 2009:3). It could be said that roughly the same model of human action and 
approach to morality informs both ancient philosophers, now enjoying a renewed interest 
among anthropologists of ethics, and classic social theory. For example, Robbins (Das et 
al. 2015) notes that Emile Durkheim’s formulation of “moral facts” assumes that human 
action is oriented toward pursuing “the good.” This is because, as Durkheim argues, “it is 
psychologically impossible to pursue an end to which are indifferent – i.e. that does not 
appear to us as good and does not affect our sensibility” (1953:45).  
Anthropologists working with a virtue ethics framework posit an ethical subject 
who is a “self-interpretative animal” (Taylor 1989) with a capacity for “reflective 
freedom,” which is the “capacity reflectively to evaluate in light of values or ideals” 
(Laidlaw 2017:188). In this formulation of “ethics,” the ethical subject requires freedom 
and capacity to reflect, a process philosopher Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluation,” in 
which people make distinctions between the importance or value of things. Taylor 
suggests that the power to evaluate desires is “distinctively human” (1985a:15-16) and 
that it shapes individual identities or selves. In this sense, strong evaluation guides 
personal projects in which people “quite deliberately set out on a concerted project of 
refashioning themselves, in light of a set of values or doctrines to which they consciously 
subscribe, or of modelling their conduct on that of chosen exemplars” (Laidlaw 
2017:186) Joel Robbins (2004) points out that chosen exemplars are exemplary because 
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these individuals realize a value to its fullest potential in ways that everyday life does not 
permit ordinary people. We admire Mother Teresa’s compassion and selfless service, but 
most of us do not want to live in deprivation as she lived so that we might realize certain 
virtues to the fullest in our own lives. Although we might not have the conditions, the 
capacity, or the desire necessary to pursue any virtue to the fullest, values are salient 
nonetheless in everyday life. “Our identity is defined,” Taylor argues, “by our 
fundamental evaluations…the concept of identity is bound up with that of certain strong 
evaluations which are inseparable from myself” (1985a:34).  
These basic philosophical observations about ethics, morality, meaning, and 
identity, can inform anthropological analysis, but they only go so far.  If we assume a 
model of human action based in “first person virtue ethics” (Mattingly 2014), then it 
follows that ethnographers need only to listen to how people articulate justifications for 
their choices or way of life. But “dark anthropology” makes evident what we already 
know: Most people do not live in conditions of their own choosing, which greatly 
constrains self-reflective and virtue-oriented ethical agency. An “ethics” which requires 
certain freedoms and capacities suggests that only the privileged have “ethics” or are 
capable of fully realized ethical agency. As Michel Foucault observed (1997), a person 
living in unfree conditions, such as slavery, only can carry out the will of the master or of 
others; a person in these conditions would have no “ethics.” Thus, it is no surprise that 
anthropologists whose research involves people living in extremely difficult 
circumstances vigorously object to neo-Aristotelian models of ethical agency.  
Hayder Al-Mohammad, for example, argues that in war-torn Iraq, the 
fundamental question people are asking is not “‘What must I do?, but rather, ‘What can I 
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do? What am I capable of doing?’” (Das et al. 2015, emphasis is Al-Mohammad's). To 
suggest that people in desperate circumstances are pausing to philosophize about the 
virtue of their actions seems ludicrous when survival is at stake. “You don’t need that 
category [of “the good”],” Al-Mohammad continues, “to say why somebody goes out and 
works for twelve, fourteen hours a day in fifty-degree Celsius heat to explain why they 
struggle for their daughter, their son, their neighbor, their friends” (ibid.). Some human 
action “is simply its own explanation – there is nothing more to say” (ibid.).  
Objecting to the “strong,” or some might say “narrow,” view of virtue ethics does 
not imply that there is no “strong evaluation” occurring in human action. Rather, the 
ways in which human beings are ethical subjects can be found in ordinary human life, 
which “is a life of continuous and routine self-description, self-evaluation and 
incremental self-constitution” (Laidlaw 2017:177). Because ethics can be found in 
mundane, daily acts, this approach is often referred to as “ordinary ethics” (Das 2012; 
Lambek 2010; Lempert 2013). Ordinary ethics questions the degree to which self-
reflection, virtue, and “the good” are necessary criteria for speaking of ethics and ethical 
subjects. The “ordinary” approach views ethical behavior not as a transcendent, reflective 
process requiring certain conditions and freedoms, but immanent in everyday life, and 
especially so for people living in unfree conditions.  
In some cases, perhaps there is “nothing more to say” about many human 
behaviors other than their surface-level description. Al-Mohammad suggests that 
anthropologists, by saying anything “more” – such as interpreting human action through 
virtue-oriented ethics and premising those ethics on some notion of “culture” or 
“tradition” – risk reverting to unequal knowledge production which plagues the 
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discipline. To illustrate his point, Al-Mohammad describes a scene in which he visits a 
household: he takes his shoes off before entering the home; children collect their toys 
from the living room; he is instructed to sit in the most comfortable seat, where he is 
served a glass of juice, and so on. Al-Mohammad reflects how he, as an anthropologist, 
might interpret this domestic scene: 
Maybe if this scene were played out in the Middle East, where I work, I might 
have been forced to reference Islam, the twinned shame/honour, or how the glass 
of juice symbolises vitality, or the wooden table male power and authority, or 
whatever version such logics now take in the discipline. But, thankfully, we will 
be spared this today for the above took place in North London in the home of an 
Anglo-Saxon couple for whom we do not seem to have prepared logics and 
cosmologies as yet…How odd the ethnographic subject has figured out her world 
and can so easily locate goods and bad, never fluffing the distinction. In truth, we 
inhabit worlds we are not masters of, and with no clear blueprint or principles by 
which to proceed – no matter how many texts and traditions we keep citing and 
referring to. What we find in the world are not goods which make claims on us, 
but oughts (Das et al. 2015). 
 
In the above excerpt, Al-Mohammad speaks of two concerns: The first is that an 
anthropology of “the good” conflates “the good” with custom or rules, which is a 
foundational debate about morality. In saying “we inhabit worlds we are not masters of,” 
Al-Mohammad echoes what many social scientists have recognized to be common to 
human experience. As Karl Marx famously phrased it, “Men make their own history, but 
they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, 
but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (2005:1). 
The second objection is to the “prepared logics and cosmologies” of the discipline, which 




Two caveats about the good 
It seems to me that the two concerns Das and Al-Mohammad express – the one 
about orientalist-haunted knowledge production and the other, an observation that people 
are not the masters of their worlds – are conflated in this debate on “the good.” Firstly, 
what Al-Mohammad and Das object to in conceptualizing “the good” is not only the 
concept itself, but also its cultural baggage: Western-dominated knowledge production 
within the social sciences, which continues to haunt scholarship about the “non-Western 
world.” Inviting Eurocentric philosophy into an anthropological conversation about 
conceptualizing ethics in “non-Western” places does seem to perpetuate Eurocentric 
knowledge production about morality. Moreover, that Eurocentric knowledge production 
is historically bound up with colonial and neocolonial projects, which, in justifying their 
rule, have advanced some concepts of “the good” as universal. Modern secular, liberal 
governance, in its “right” to adjudicate “the good,” can harm more than help, such as 
Saba Mahmood (2015) has found in Egypt, where colonial and postcolonial “secular” 
governance exacerbates tensions between religious minorities and majorities. 
Additionally, Elizabeth Povinelli (2002; 2011; 2016) has given us many examples 
demonstrating how late liberalism’s ability to ascribe good and to determine which ways 
of living are best reveals the dark side of “positive liberty” as it empowers settler 
colonialisms.  
In the ethnographic and historical records, we have seen how people mobilize 
concepts of “the good” toward “bad” ends, to put it crudely. Not only have 
anthropologists documented destructive uses of “the good,” such as Veena Das in her 
work on India, in which speaking of “the good” sounds like the “salvation talk” of 
95 
religion or of political liberalism (2014; 2018). Anthropologists also must be wary of how 
“the good” becomes implicated in projects of liberation, including those of our own 
discipline (Das et al. 2015). Das objects to a virtue ethics approach because discursive 
regimes about “the good” grant anthropologists “the right to judge the behavior of others, 
good intentions notwithstanding.” One risk inherent in an anthropology of “the good,” 
Das argues, is that it creates a “division of ethical labor,” in which “the philosophers will 
give us the theory and we the anthropologists will tell them how things are on the 
ground.” Here, I would point to James Laidlaw’s (2017) observation that defining 
anything as “ethical,” meaning related to “ethics,” does not imply that anthropologists 
also approve of said “ethical” behavior or are making any kind of moral judgment. “One 
can imagine a movement, a party or even a society of highly ethical monsters,” Laidlaw 
reminds us.  
Nevertheless, Das is right to be concerned about who gets to theorize about “the 
good” in anthropological analysis, considering the historical dominance of 
anthropological theory in the West (Harrison 2011). Not only have anthropologists 
employed methods or theories we now reject as inaccurate or unequitable; some suggest 
that the discipline itself is irrevocably and irredeemably dependent on knowledge 
production about “otherness.” In her 2017 article reviewing the state of the discipline, 
Lucia Cantero remarks that the “discursive presence of the past” characterizes 
anthropology as “ontologically haunted,” or as “hauntology” (309), using the 
portmanteau coined by Jacques Derrida (1994). In the same year as Cantero’s review, 
Vassos Argyrou also described anthropology’s perennial “problem” as “hauntological or 
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spectral,” again referring to Derrida’s “theme of the spectre or ghost that exists and does 
not exist, is present and not present” (53).  
The “spectre” that haunts the discipline is the problem of representation: “There is 
no anthropological paradigm,” Argyrou argues, “in which cultural difference does not 
emerge as cultural inferiority, not a single one that has not been found guilty of 
ethnocentrism” (2017:51). Argyrou insists that, “no matter how well intended, 
anthropological representations cannot avoid being ethnocentric” (52). Anthropologists 
are “possessed by the idea of Pure Humanity” lurking in the discipline’s foundational 
axioms like “making the strange familiar, and the familiar strange,” and subsequently, 
they seek “ways and means of neutralizing representations.” Consequently, anthropology 
is stuck in a pattern of theoretical “turns” in a struggle to “redeem otherness” (53). Thus, 
in anthropology “the return of the repressed disturbs and spooks the living” (52). It could 
be said that “the good,” like “otherness,” becomes both the object and the subject of our 
discipline.  
In addition to the methodological, or “positional, problems of power when 
anthropologists conceptualize “the good,” Das also expresses concern about how 
anthropologists might conceptualize “the good” as a moral consensus, or as the winner in 
a contest of “values.” An anthropology of “the good” seems to assume that, not only can 
our interlocutors articulate their values and desires, but that it also uncritically accepts 
their articulations as “true”: 
Our experience is never transparent to us, and because we can so often mistake 
our performance of allegiance to higher ideals – be these those guaranteed by the 
state, the party, or religious authorities – as somehow corresponding to our true 
need, conflict of values is too tame a description of the impasse in the light of 
which we must craft our moral lives and our lives as moral (2018:490).  
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In conceptualizing “the good,” there are two interrelated concerns at play: First, 
anthropologists should be careful never to presume that we know what people value or 
desire, or to accept uncritically what they say they value and desire; this is fundamental to 
our disciplinary training. The second and related problem concerns theorizing the role of 
custom, rules, and power in shaping “morality” or “ethics.” For Al-Mohammad and Das, 
anthropologists working with virtue ethics risk conflating “the good” with the 
“normative.”  
Das suggests that what a virtue ethics approach considers “a conflict of values” is 
simply “the difficulty of reality,” because “real” life does not “offer us a set of 
commensurable values among which we can choose” (2015). Although “cosmologies 
might appear coherent and well-integrated when they are narrated,” Das concedes, they 
often are incommensurate with lived experience (2014:490). Das fears that 
conceptualizing “the good” as a kind of transcendent ethics undermines the value of 
everyday human action. “So great is the lure of the good,” Das argues, “that power 
disappears in rethinking the social” (Das et al. 2015). Rather, attention to the 
contingencies of experience, such as “luck” or “chance,” can tell us about “the shape of 
our moral lives,” in which our obligations stem not from contracts between sovereign 
subjects but from our willingness to accept responsibility for an other whom fate has 
placed in our vicinity” (490-491). Das’s description of ethical agency gets to the heart of 
the problem of freedom in ethics: “whether action and reflection are to be set apart” 
(2014:493)  
Although Das, in her 2014 article, does not propose a new theoretical framework 
for “ethics,” other anthropologists have offered some alternatives to what I have 
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categorized as a “virtue ethics” approach. Hayder Al-Mohammad, for example, seeks to 
broaden the scope of ethics beyond a focus on the “self,” found not only in “virtue 
ethics,” or the “ethics of self-cultivation” (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006), but also in 
some “ordinary ethics” approaches (Lambek 2010; Das 2012). Instead, he develops an 
“ethics of being with” (2010) which recognizes the always, already situatedness of people 
and the “interdependency and intercorporeality” of human action (Das et al. 2015). 
Borrowing from Wittgenstein the concept of “the rough ground of the everyday,” Al-
Mohammad examines how ethics emerges from everyday interactions in which “lives 
come together in complex ways and in which care and also neglect and violence ravel 
and unravel the entangling of lives with other lives”. His concept of “entanglements” is 
immanent in everyday life, and it echoes Veena Das’s “contingencies” and “willingness 
to accept responsibility for an other.”  
Drawing upon Erving Goffman’s work on interactions in which people move 
through shared space without bumping into one another, Al-Mohammad proposes an 
“ethics” embodied in similar everyday movements between people. “If one turns to the 
everyday in Iraq,” he writes, “one can find small gestures, moments of kindness and care, 
that are not simply positive tales contained within the destruction of post invasion Iraq 
but are the very grounds by which many Iraqis have been able to survive and live through 
the terror and uncertainty of the last decade” (2015:111). Al-Mohammad’s middle way 
ethics, between transcendence /event and immanent / everyday, produces a picture of life 
in Iraq that does not reproduce tropes of destruction and breakdown and does not cast 
people exclusively as victims or survivors.  
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 Other anthropologists also offer theories of ethics which hold the transcendent / 
event in tension with the immanent / ordinary. In Webb Keane’s work, for example, the 
ethical subject is not just an individual but any collective or system with a capacity for 
conscious self-formation. An ethical subject expanded beyond the scope of the individual 
opens the way for anthropologists to reevaluate work on collectives, such as kinship 
studies, as James Laidlaw suggests (2017). In his analysis, Keane makes a distinction 
between “ethics” and “morality,” which he adopts from philosopher Bernard Williams: 
Ethics is the Socratic examined life, whereas “morality or “the morality system,” refers to 
how people generate answers for the problem of the examined, or ethical, life. It is a 
distinction that may be clarifying, but not necessary. 
Another philosophy-inflected anthropological approach to ethics can be found in 
Jarrett Zigon’s work. Zigon argues that ethics are found not in the “metaphysical 
humanism” of virtue ethics and self-cultivation, but in “assembled and situated worlds.” 
Morality is built on living in “attunement” with one’s world, something like habitus 
(2008:17). “Ethics” emerges only when that attunement is compromised by “breakdown” 
and attunement is no longer possible. One response to breakdown is cultivating “an ethics 
of dwelling,” which Zigon describes as “the response to an existential imperative 
emerging from a world that has become unbearable as a result of a particular situation 
that has led to the breakdown of this world” (2018). An “ethics of dwelling” is not a 
premeditated, “examined life,” and cannot be known before breakdown. It is, rather, 
living “sanely” to the degree possible in the world as people experience it.  
In approaching ethical life in Kurdistan through an “anthropology of the good,” I 
describe my interlocutors as I found them: positioned somewhere between constraint, like 
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Zigon’s “attunement,” and the “freedom” inherent in self-reflection. Amidst the 
“breakdown” of state and society, interlocutors still point to certain, desirable “goods,” 
whose attainment seemed possible in the transitional moment for Kurdistan in which I 
conducted fieldwork. Recognizing the complex, constrained, even miserable, conditions 
in which people live does not entail their complete inability to speak about moral self-
evaluation or reflective capacities. The pull between the “ought” of morality and the 
“can” of ethical self-reflection is where I locate ethics. The tension between the two is a 
productive space for anthropologists of value pluralism. As James Laidlaw writes,  
It is part of the work of an anthropology of ethics to describe the historical 
changes, the changing kinds of institutions and practices, that explain the greater 
and lesser degrees to which, as well as the differing ways in which, people at 
varying historical junctures have become taken up with ethical reflection and the 
formulation and following of explicit, more or less rationalized, ethical doctrines” 
(2017: 184). 
 
This positioning – between the “should” and the “can” of moral systems – allows me to 
work with concepts of the “good” just as interlocutors do: In an always emerging, 
tentative way, in which individual projects of ethical self-formation intersect with the 
larger projects of the “nation” or the “state.” It is a position that recognizes the two 
aforementioned caveats characterizing an anthropology of ethics – that virtue ethics 
brings with it some Western cultural baggage, and that “ethics” often is conflated with 
the normative, not “can” but “ought.” At the same time, it is a position that is not 
hindered by the tedious work of sorting out the “immanent” or “everyday” from “virtue 
ethics” and “self-reflection.” It recognizes, rather, that “ethics” is what emerges from 
those intersections or tensions. It is in those intersections that I find my interlocutors 
working out their ethical lives, and in which I situate my analysis.  
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Sovereignty-making in a Syrian Kurdish camp 
In an earlier section, I suggested that “sovereignty” and “sovereignty-making” 
might be conceived of as desirable “goods,” or as undesirable, according to which 
interlocutors and discourses were speaking. In this section, I explore this idea further by 
examining how Kurdistani “sovereignty-making” in a camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees 
impinged upon the ethical lives of two young men, Serkar and Serhand, in their efforts to 
realize their own “moral progress”. The refugee camp was a 30-minute drive outside 
Erbil’s city limits, in an impoverished town called “Betala.” During former Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein’s regime, hundreds of thousands of non-Arab minorities, 
including an estimated 600,000 Kurdish people, were forcibly resettled in camps called 
“collective camps” (mujama’at) as part of Saddam’s Arabization campaigns (McDowall 
2004, 339). Betala began as a collective camp. A Kurdish university professor I knew 
described Betala as one of the “empty places” created by displacement, rather than a 
meaningful place associated with a particular family or group and their claims to the land. 
With time, as camp residents constructed more permanent residences and small shops, 
Betala the Kurdish collective camp became Betala the town. Years later, after Betala had 
established itself as a Kurdish town, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
constructed new, separate camps for recently displaced Arabic-speaking Iraqis and for 
Syrian Kurdish refugees.  
One afternoon, I was in the area and decided to visit the Syrian Kurdish refugee 
camp in Betala. Unlike the Yezidi settlement described earlier, the camp for Syrian 
Kurdish refugees was enormous and clearly visible. Small, uniform cinder block 
structures in neat rows stretched as far as the eye could see. As my Kurdish taxi driver 
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and I approached the camp, he clicked his tongue and said, “Zor badakhtawa” (How very 
unfortunate). The camp was tightly gated and guarded. I heard that its residents were 
discouraged from mixing with the Betala townspeople, probably to maintain control over 
the population, such as preventing intermarriage, minimizing any potential conflict 
between camp and town, and contain the spread of (mis)information about camp 
conditions.  
While I had walked freely into the neglected construction site where the Yezidi 
people were living, at Betala camp a security guard ushered me into an office crammed 
with several men. An official demanded to know why I wanted to see inside the camp; 
they “had problems” with people visiting the camp for “exposé” journalism. Several 
minutes of intense negotiations followed, during which I assured these officials that I was 
a harmless student merely there as a cultural observer and not as a critic. It would be 
better if I had a letter of support, they said, though there was some disagreement about 
where I should get the letter. I suggested the Erbil Governorate education office. The 
official said it would be better to take a letter from the Kurdish security police (asayȋsh). 
For a couple minutes the men discussed the situation in Behdȋnȋ, a dialect of Kurdish I do 
not speak or understand. Finally, the official turned back to me and said, “Actually, you 
could visit the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation and take a letter from our director. That would 
be good.”  
Surprised, I asked, “So the asayȋsh letter wouldn’t be necessary if I have a Barzanȋ 
Charity letter?”  
The official explained, “We [the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation] are in charge of the 
camp. The Asayȋsh [security police] answer to us.”  
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This answer was unexpected, so I said, “Oh, I didn’t know the Barzanȋ Charity 
Foundation was in charge.” A long pause followed, during which I worried about this 
revelation. The Barzanȋ family had been the Kurdistan Regional Government’s ruling 
family since Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ led the Kurdish struggle against the Iraqi central 
government in the 1960s and 1970s. The current KRG President was Mullah Mustafa’s 
son, Mesud Barzanȋ, who controversially had overstayed his elected term since 2015, 
citing a national emergency. It was said that the Barzanȋs were involved in many business 
deals, pocketed large sums of money, and had their critics imprisoned or killed. I did not 
know about the nature of the relationship between the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation and 
the Kurdistan Regional Government, but I suspected it might be highly politicized. 
With some hesitation, I was told that I would be allowed inside the Syrian 
Kurdish refugee camp today only and with a chaperone beside me at all times. I was 
forbidden from asking any political questions. I could not ask about the situation in Syria. 
I could not ask about Kurdish political parties, or the Kurdistan Regional Government, or 
the Kurdistan Regional Government’s relationship with the Turkish government. I 
vigorously agreed to these conditions. My chaperone would be “Serkar,” a quiet young 
Kurdish man who had been standing silently in the corner during the meeting. 
Negotiations ended and I followed Serkar out the office door. Once out of earshot of the 
other officials, Serkar became very talkative. He hoped to continue his studies in the 
United States. He had earned a law degree from a Kurdistani university, but he did not 
practice “because practicing law is very dangerous here,” he said. I nodded, recalling that 
the previous year a female lawyer was found murdered in her car near Dream City. After 
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graduating, Serkar struggled to find a job in a stagnant economy, so he accepted a 
position with the Charity Foundation which shared his name (Barzanȋ). 
“This camp is really good, the best one, you know,” Serkar said eagerly to me as 
we walked around the camp. “You know we were refugees in Iran. It was terrible. We 
didn’t have anything, not like this. No shelter, no food. That’s why it’s important for me 
to work in the camp. I know what it’s like to be in this bad situation.” I asked him if he 
was talking about the failed 1991 uprisings against Saddam Hussein’s regime, resulting 
in thousands of Kurdish people fleeing into the mountains. “Yes, some to Turkey, some 
to Iran. The Barzanȋs, we went to Iran. And you know they killed 8,000 of our men,” he 
said, referring to an earlier tragedy: In 1983, Saddam Hussein’s forces abducted and later 
murdered an estimated 8,000 males belonging to the Barzanȋ tribe (McDowall 2004). 
Serkar was born as a refugee in Iran and spent the first three years of his life there before 
returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1994. I found it strange that he spoke as if he remembered 
living in camps when he was between 1 and 3 years old. Perhaps it was a collective 
memory; perhaps his relatives impressed upon him the horrible conditions they suffered 
in the camps.  
Serkar pointed to some new plots, where very small cinder block structures were 
being built. “We have only 80 plots, but already 1,160 people have given their names. 
There is not enough space,” he said in a quiet, serious voice. During our camp tour, we 
ran into some employees of the International Finance Corporation (a sister organization 
of the World Bank). Months before I visited Betala, I had met these IFC employees in a 
different camp. They warmly greeted me, explaining that they were in the Betala camp 
for “awareness raising” purposes. Serkar seemed alarmed by my acquaintance with the 
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IFC staff, but he remained silent. After our tour ended and we ate lunch with some of the 
BCF staff, Serkar said farewell. A fellow BCF employee, “Serhand,” offered to give me 
and another BCF staffer a lift back to Erbil.  
From the backseat, I watched the flat, dull landscape rush past. Oil tankers 
lumbered along this route headed to and from the border with Turkey. Serhand broke the 
silence, “Do you have any questions about the camp?”  
“Oh, I always have questions.” I thought for a moment. “What is the general 
opinion about the camps? I mean, people who maybe have never been in the camp, what 
do they say about them?”  
Serhand replied in a resigned tone, “Oh, sure, you know, I am very sorry to say 
this - this isn’t my opinion, I am just telling you what people say - they say that the 
people in the camps are bad. Because they see some Syrians begging in the street, like 
gypsies, they think all people from Syria are like this. Actually, only 30% of the refugee 
population is living in the camps. The rest are living outside.”  
“Do you mean in the host community?” I asked. 
“Yes, with the host community.” Again, he emphasized that this was not his 
opinion, just the general public opinion about refugees. After Serhand dropped off his 
fellow staffer, he invited me to move to the front passenger seat. 
Aware that women typically sat in the backseat when traveling with unrelated 
males, I asked, “‘Ayb Nȋya?” (It’s not shameful?). I had to repeat it twice before he 
replied.  
“Do you know what this word ‘ayb means?” He seemed agitated. “It means 
something like sherem (shame), like something a person shouldn’t do.” He paused and 
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then said, “Well, maybe you have some idea about it, but for me, I’m not one of these 
traditional people. You are like my sister or friend; there is no difference. It doesn’t 
matter to me.” I apologized for my rude question and moved to the front seat. “Besides,” 
Serhand continued, “Kurdistan is changing. People are becoming more open.” I asked 
what accounted for this change. “It is social media, people are traveling, it is more open, 
people go outside for study.” As he drove, Serhand told me about his time in Cyprus 
studying for a law degree. “When I was there, I had a girlfriend,” he said, “and she came 
to Kurdistan and visited my family.”  
“But would your sisters be allowed to travel outside?” I asked. 
 “Well, you are right, there is a difference,” he conceded. “Yes, they can travel 
with family or friends, but alone, no. And they can have male friends, but not to stay the 
night, if you know what I mean.” I didn’t comment, waiting to see if he would say more. 
“I mean, here the woman has to be a virgin until marriage, but not for the man.” I 
nodded.  
“Did your girlfriend enjoy her visit to Kurdistan?” I asked. 
“Yes, Barzan is a beautiful area,” he began, his aspect brightening. He wistfully 
described the natural beauty, rivers, mountains, and the Spring Newroz (new year) 
season. After a lull in conversation, I asked Serhand if he had any plans for the future. 
Would he keep working for the Barzanȋ Charity Foundation? He seemed unsure. He said 
the economy was bad, and he didn’t have a plan. He fell silent and remained so until we 
reached my drop-off point. I thanked him again for his hospitality. His tone became 
resigned again, “You’re welcome. It was our duty.” 
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Serhand’s parting comment about “duty” reflects not only cultural hospitality 
norms, but also how his own ethical self-formation was bound up with the larger process 
of sovereignty-making in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The Barzanȋ Charity Foundation, 
with the permission of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), manages the Betala 
camp residents because the refugees are ethnically Kurdish; the KRG’s right to govern 
this “Kurdish” population is presented as “natural,” as Kurdish people from Syria and 
from Iraq belong to “greater Kurdistan.” For many years, the KRG has been positioning 
itself as the patron of all ethnic Kurds in “greater Kurdistan,” a homeland and aspirational 
future state spanning Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Refugee and IDP camps not only 
shelter populations; they also heighten and make visible political and social tensions. 
Liissa Malkki’s work (1995) has illuminated the central role the “camp” plays in creating 
boundaries and purifying identities for the nation or the state. In my encounter with the 
officials running the camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees, I was told I could not ask any 
questions about Syria or Turkey or their political relations with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. Instead, the camp officials presented the refugees from Syria as primarily 
“Kurdish,” and thus rightfully under the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) and its agents, the duty-bound patrons of all Kurdish people living in greater 
Kurdistan.  
In Chapter 1, I wrote about Sara, the displaced Christian woman who worked as a 
teacher and volunteered in a camp for displaced Yezidi people. By working in the camps, 
Sara, Serkar and Serhand linked their own sense of moral duty and ethical self-formation 
to the larger frames of family, nationalism, and religion. Sara, Serkar, and Serhad 
represent the motivations and concerns of many people I met during my fieldwork; they 
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are, in a sense, “types.” Sara primarily drew inspiration from her Christian faith and made 
appeals to shared Iraqi citizenship and shared humanity. Throughout my fieldwork, I 
heard many people make similar appeals. Sara became a key interlocutor who could 
speak about living in the Kurdistan Region as an ethnic or religious minority, and she 
appears again later in the dissertation.  
Serkar and Serhand also made moral appeals to common humanity. Additionally, 
they contextualized their own moral strivings within the Kurdistan Region’s claims to 
sovereignty, tolerance, and progress. As bearers of the Barzanȋ name, Serkar and Serhand 
expressed a duty to help other ethnic Kurds. They also were eager to tell me about the 
moral progress and modernization they saw in Kurdistan. Both men, nevertheless, 
expressed deep disappointment about the stagnant economy, lack of jobs, and Kurdistan’s 
perennially “victimized” position in regional and global affairs. For good or for ill, their 
fortunes were tethered to the Kurdistani Government’s. Although probably better-
connected and better provided for than the average Kurdistani, Serkar and Serhand 
nevertheless echoed the countless conversations I had with young people throughout my 
fieldwork, in which individual moral strivings were intimately connected with the moral 
dimensions of nationalism and state-making. 
 
“Kurds ascending” 
Politicians, journalists, historians, and everyday discourse characterize the 
Kurdish nation as the victim centuries of cyclical violence, including genocide, war, and 
civil conflict. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and ensuring war, while it absolutely devastated 
much of the country, was the beginning of a new era for the Kurdistan Region in northern 
Iraq. The invasion seemed to bring one chapter to a close – that of Kurdish people 
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suffering violence at the hand of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein – and to open 
another. For almost two decades, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq enjoyed a relatively calm 
period of political stability and economic growth. Many Kurdish people who had been 
living abroad in diaspora returned to their homeland. International commerce flourished, 
in large part secured through the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independently 
negotiated agreements with foreign companies. During this era of “Kurds ascending” 
(Gunter 2007), many people became hopeful about the Kurdistan Region’s future. After 
decades of struggle, Kurdish people in the KRI were living with more autonomy and 
prosperity than ever before. 
The Kurdish ascent came to an abrupt halt in 2014, when the Islamic State began 
its campaign across Iraq and Syria. As a result of the 2003-2011 Iraq war, the conflict 
with Daesh, and the ongoing war in Syria, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
people and refugees have settled in the KRI. Some of the IDPs and refugees are 
ethnically Kurdish, but most are not, such as Iraqi or Syrian Arabs, Assyrian and 
Chaldean Christians, and Yezidis. Kurdish people, although still a minority population 
within the state of Iraq, are the largest demographic in the Kurdistan Region. Thus, the 
Kurdistan Region has found itself in reversed roles, suddenly in the position of 
overseeing hundreds of thousands of people belonging to other ethnoreligious 
populations, such as Arabs, with whom Kurdish people have a long and storied 
history. During the war with the Islamic State and the ensuing economic crisis, the 
Kurdistani president Mesud Barzanȋ, son of Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ, declared a national 
emergency and overstayed his elected term. Members of Parliament associated with 
Goran, a political opposition party, were barred from entering the Erbil Governorate, and 
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Parliament was suspended for months. The Barzanȋ family and their political party, the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP or PDK), tightened its grip on the Region’s 
government.  
For many people, the ascendency of the Kurdistan Region signaled the end of a 
unified Iraqi national identity. Throughout my fieldwork, I observed many 
demonstrations of Kurdish ethnonationalism, often mandated or regulated by the 
Kurdistan Regional Government. These demonstrations are not always well-received 
among ethnically Kurdish residents of the Kurdistan Region, many of whom question the 
sincerity of the demonstrations, considering the alleged corruption of KRG politicians 
and restricted freedoms, such as freedom of expression. I met many Kurdish people who 
professed belief in a greater Kurdish cause and desire for an independent Kurdish state 
yet had little hope that the current political regime would promote these causes equitably, 
if at all.  
A victory for the “Kurdish nation,” such as an independent Kurdish state, would 
not be a victory for all. Many of my non-Kurdish interlocutors expressed ambivalence 
about living in a Kurdish majority polity. Some had escaped violence elsewhere in Iraq or 
in Syria and had found refuge in the Kurdistan Region, for which they were grateful. But 
many newcomers to the Kurdistan Region also encountered racism or felt they were 
treated as second-class citizens. I also heard non-Kurdish people, some from families 
living in the KRI for generations, criticize how the Kurdistan Regional Government 
privileged its ethnically Kurdish citizens. Non-Kurdish people were expected at times to 
participate in displays of Kurdish ethnonationalism, such as the non-Kurdish private 
school students appearing in Chapter 3. For others, especially some of my older non-
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Kurdish interlocutors, a victorious independent Kurdish state would be the final nail in 
the coffin of a unified Iraq. For those worried about Kurdish hegemony, the KRG is in 
danger of repeating many of the same injustices Kurdish people experienced at the hands 
of former Iraqi government agents.  
 In this chapter, we have witnessed people living in Kurdistan grappling with the 
purported “goodness” of the Kurdish “nation.” The centrality of patriliny and patriarchy 
in Kurdish “culture” has left many interlocutors wondering about its “goodness.” 
Patriliny figures into national mythmaking, as we saw in the komalayatȋ lesson about the 
Medes, and in ethnonationalist displays, such as those during the Newroz holiday or at 
national sites like the Barzanȋ Memorial Center. National mythmaking portrays the 
Kurdish nation as continually victimized but resilient, as in the popular saying, “The 
Kurds have no friends but the mountains.” But some, such as Karza the komalayatȋ 
teacher, or Sebr the tour guide, point out the underlying power struggles and betrayals in 
the Kurdish nation’s “ascent,” which have precipitated many an individual “fall.” In that 
uncertain, transitional moment, it seemed the Kurdish “nation” and the Kurdistani 
Government teetered on the edge of a political and social downfall.  
Whether Kurdish or not, young or old, privileged or poor, many of my 
interlocutors hold in common a set of questions about their life in Kurdistan: Why did 
this bad thing happen to me, to my family, to my community, and to my country? How 
should I live in light of this knowledge and experience? One answer, proposed by many 
Kurdish politicians and nationalists at the time, was an independent Kurdistani state that 
would protect people from violence inflicted on them by others – often by the Iraqi, 
Iranian, Turkish, or Syrian state, or the “Islamic State.” An independent Kurdistani state 
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seemed like a good answer to some people, but many of my interlocutors who were not 
Kurdish worried that a Kurdistani state would not protect them equally, if at all. If so, 
then a Kurdistani state would not be a good thing worth pursuing. Alternately, emigration 
seemed like a good option – for those who could afford it. Moreover, suffering so much 
state sanctioned violence left many people questioning the “goodness” or “desirability” 
of a Kurdistani state, and by extension, question the purported “goodness” of the “nation” 
and of the political formation known as the “state.”  The following chapter takes up the 














Ch. 3 “They don’t love Iraq” 
 
“My architect friends, fellow users of protractors, compasses and rulers, look at 
this city. Consider the tall, stone houses with Greek-style columns and all the 
serenity of the dwellings of the Olympian gods that are slowly mushrooming. 
What, when you look carefully, do you see other than disorder? Nothing. Nothing. 
Despite the meticulousness of the engineers, each working to their own designs, 
it’s still a wasteland. Any beauty you plant in a wasteland will only draw more 
attention to that wasteland.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of the City 
 
 
The school minibus bumped along one of the major thoroughfares of Ainkawa, 
the Christian-majority township of the city of Erbil. During the months I conducted field 
work in Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), I often rode a minibus to school with 
students who lived near my home. I sat in the front seat, with Marwa sitting between me 
and the driver, a kindly, middle-aged man everyone called “Amo” (“uncle” in Arabic). 
Marwa was in grade 8 at KCS, but she projected the authority and disapproval of a 
maiden aunt. The bus transported around 15 students to and from Ainkawa, mostly rowdy 
boys older than Marwa. The boys frequently argued over which English pop songs to 
play on the bus radio, which was connected by Bluetooth to their smartphones. From the 
front seat, Marwa policed song lyrics, alerting Amo, who understood some English, when 
the song was “dirty.” Amo would scold the boys and make them choose another song. On 
the daily bus ride, Marwa alternately worked on homework and offered commentary on 
students’ behavior, her classes and teachers, and things we observed outside the bus.  
 One morning, a compact car with four passengers turned in front of the bus. It 
moved slowly, impeding our progress. Amo, Marwa, and I leaned forward to study the 
car’s license plate: Someone had applied an image of a Kurdish flag with the word 
“Kurdistan” to cover up the part of the plate that typically says “Iraq.” Amo pulled 
around the car, and we stared at the passengers as we drove past. After a moment of 
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silence, as if to process what they had just seen, Amo and Marwa began discussing the 
license plate. “People here are so crazy about their country,” Marwa said to me, rolling 
her eyes. I understood that by “country,” Marwa meant “Kurdistan.”  
Not long after meeting Marwa, she told me privately that she was Mandean, a fact 
she did not draw attention to at school. Mandeans are one of Iraq’s dwindling 
ethnoreligious minorities. Their community formerly was centered around Baghdad. 
During the Iraq war, Marwa’s family fled Baghdad and moved to Erbil. Between 2003 
and 2019, about 90% of Mandeans left Iraq. By 2019, the Ministry of Endowments and 
Religious Affairs estimated that only 400 Mandeans were living in the Erbil Governorate 
and were facing “extinction” (Salloum 2019). “I hate everything Kurdish,” Marwa 
continued, “komalayatȋ (social studies), grammar, all of it!” Amo nodded solemnly and 
said, “They don’t love Iraq.”  
 
 
 In this chapter, I examine how people critique Kurdistani society and aspirations 
to statehood by measuring “Kurdistan” according to their vision of a “national” and 
“unified” Iraq. In some cases, people also referred to ideas about “democracy” that might 
be called “Western” or “neoliberal.” Many people, especially those displaced from 
elsewhere in Iraq, evaluated their present situation in Kurdistan by recalling their life in 
pre-invasion Iraq. They characterize their former homes as “open-minded,” diverse, and 
peaceful, rather than as divided according to sect. These “nostalgic” interlocutors, like the 
teachers appearing in this chapter, came of age during the sanctions era, which they recall 
warmly as a time in which people supported one another as neighbors and fellow citizens. 
They contrast their childhoods, marked by material shortages, with those of their 
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Kurdistani private school students. Their students enjoy material comforts and security 
but suffer from their insular and pampered lifestyles. Consequently, the younger 
generation lacks the good character or ethical sensibilities formed through hardship. To 
their teachers’ dismay, students often exhibited apathy toward their peers, especially 
toward those belonging to different ethnoreligious groups. These Kurdistani youth, like 
many of their adult counterparts, are not motivated by a shared sense of “Iraqi” identity. 
As Amo the bus driver observed, “they don’t love Iraq.”   
 Students’ lack of “brotherly love” and apathy about Iraqi society’s fragmentation 
discouraged their teachers, and some, such as Naila, became increasingly cynical. Other 
teachers, like Sara and Mariam, redoubled their efforts to help their students cultivate the 
ethical sensibilities they lacked. In their lessons, they made frequent appeals to concepts 
like common humanity, a shared monotheistic identity, or duty to one’s self, family, and 
country. Students received these lessons unevenly. Sometimes they resisted and argued 
with their teachers, and at other times they remained silent. Occasionally, older students 
expressed sentiments about improving themselves and their country, but more often they 
expressed a desire to escape the turmoil.  
 Teachers’ efforts to cultivate a sense of moral obligation in their students often 
failed, or appeared to fail, to motivate them. With a few exceptions, teachers’ appeals to 
shared “Iraqi” national identity were met with defiance or indifference; most students 
asserted they had no such national identity. Likewise, appeals to a shared “Kurdistani” 
experience only seemed to prompt students to recount their internal differences and to 
retreat into their fragmented sense of identity and insular lifestyle. When I interviewed 
students, individually or in groups, however, their thoughts on these topics could be 
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drawn out, though not without provoking some to arguing, and in one case, a near fist 
fight. My impression was that many teachers had “given up” and resigned themselves to 
focus their lessons on mastery of content rather than on character, and I could not blame 
them. 
 On the one hand, we could, as some interlocutors told me, expect “immature” or 
“selfish” behavior from children. Upon hearing that my research involved listening to 
youth, people reacted variously with amusement, dismissiveness, or even indignation that 
I was not consulting with “experts” and “elders.” In conducting research with children, I 
confronted not only negative “cultural” attitudes but also scholarly skepticism. In a recent 
American Historical Review roundtable, historians discussed to what extent 
“chronological age” is a “useful category of historical analysis.” In a vigorous rejoinder 
to the roundtable, “The Kids Aren’t All Right,” Sarah Maza argues that children are not a 
reliable or productive category of analysis because they “produce few sources of their 
own voices, have limited agency, and as individuals and as a group soon outgrow their 
subaltern status”  (Maza 2020).  
 I think we can make a couple observations, without delving into this debate 
among historians. First, anthropologists conducting ethnographic research might be better 
positioned to collect the ephemeral data of childhood. Secondly, not all children 
“outgrow their subaltern status,” because there are more ways of being subaltern than 
simply age. Among my interlocutors, refugee or displaced young people seemed 
painfully aware of their low status. Even wealthy Kurdish youth I knew expressed 
frustration with their low place in the social and political hierarchy, which for many 
families still centers on the dȋwanxane, a room for receiving relatives and other guests. 
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More than once, I heard a Kurdish young person complain that their presence was 
welcome in the dȋwanxane, but not their opinions. Kurdistani society generally did not 
regard young people as social or political actors, or at least not agents of consequence.  
 My sense is that the dismissive talk about the political agency of Kurdistani youth 
that I heard during my fieldwork represents a fissure in Iraq’s collective memory and 
contemporary experience. As Hanna Batatu (1978) notes, many protests throughout 
Iraq’s history have been youth driven. In the years since my fieldwork, protests in 
Baghdad (Barbarani 2019; Bobseine 2019), as well as in the Kurdistani city of Slemanȋ 
(Saadi and Chomani 2020), have consisted largely of youth. On the one hand, members 
of older generations criticized youth because they seemed to shirk their political duties as 
agitators and revolutionaries. On the other hand, negative commentary about youth 
referenced not only the moral shortcomings of seemingly apathetic youth and their 
families, but also the state “failures” which produced them. Chief among those failures is 
national unity.  
 The problem was not that Kurdistani youth were unaware of their political 
potential; I knew from their conversations with me that many believed it would not 
matter. In this chapter and in the following chapter, I center the voices of people 
belonging to two groups: The first group is comprised of teachers, most of whom came of 
age during the sanctions era and who are critical of their students’ moral and political 
behavior. The second consists of young people who are surprisingly articulate about how 
state failures and national disappointments have created an aura of apathy, but not exactly 
as their teachers perceive it.  
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To demonstrate how people envision and critique Kurdistani statehood vis-à-vis 
Iraq’s, I offer ethnographic vignettes observed during a semester I spent in Kurdistan 
Civilizational School (KCS), a private school in the city of Erbil. I found the Kurdistan 
Civilizational School to be a microcosm and laboratory of the aspirational Kurdistani 
state: As microcosm, the internal dynamics of the school illuminate the imaginaries, 
subversions, and evasions of statecraft and its subjects; as laboratory, the administration, 
teachers, and students experiment with potential socio-political futures within the 
relatively safe space of the school. While I observed some of these dynamics at work in 
other private schools and in government schools, the demographics and power struggles 
within KCS uniquely reflect those of Kurdistani society and state. I suggest that this 
private school is unique among the dozen or so private schools I visited in the region 
because its founders and education program invited religious plurality and promoted 
critical thinking. KCS presented an unparalleled opportunity to witness the complexities 
and subtleties of Kurdistani statecraft and emerging sovereignties in a transitional 
moment for the country.  
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Figure 4. Youth walk through Sami Abdulrahman Park, facing the Kurdistan Regional 
Government Parliament building. Photo by the author. 
 
Negotiating identities at KCS 
Before moving to examine how the Kurdistani state is produced and contested in 
educational settings like Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), I first provide some 
context about education in general in Kurdistan, as well as historical context for KCS. 
The majority of Kurdistani students attend government schools, while less than 3% attend 
private schools (Vernez et al. 2014). My interlocutors tended to categorize private 
schools either as “local,” meaning government-run schools, or as “international,” which 
referred to private schools. For example, the Choueifat school belongs to an international 
organization which establishes schools across the Middle East, and every school operates 
according to standardized policies, procedures, and curricula. Other “international” 
schools are based on a foreign, national education program, such as that of the United 
Kingdom. For example, the British International School of Kurdistan (BISK), followed 
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the same sequence of courses and exams given in the U.K., with the goal of preparing 
students for higher education there, or perhaps elsewhere in Europe or in the U.S. I 
regularly encountered Choueifat and BISK students, and sometimes their teachers, at the 
gym where I worked or at popular cafes. The impression these students and teachers gave 
me was that their schools were hyper-focused on their respective international curricula 
and exam systems and gave little importance to Kurdistani government curricula.  
The KRG Ministry of Education mandates that private schools incorporate 
Kurdistani curricula into their programs (interview with KRI Director of Private Schools, 
2012), but it appears that this policy has been applied unevenly. Some people speculated 
that certain private schools with connections to wealthy and politically powerful families 
were exempt from the KRG Ministry of Education’s requirement to teach Kurdistani 
courses like komalayatȋ (social studies). In these allegedly exempt schools, it seemed to 
me that there were few opportunities for students to explore controversial religious or 
political topics. Private school students told me they sometimes discussed sensitive 
subjects among themselves, but these topics rarely arose in the classroom, and certainly 
they were not the focus of lessons as they often were at Kurdistan Civilizational School.  
Another network of private schools in the Kurdistan Region followed the Gülen 
hizmet model which originated in Turkey and advertised its religious tolerance, 
opportunities to learn Turkish and travel to Turkey, and strong STEM training. It was no 
secret that Turkey exerted influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. In June 2016, the Turkish 
government blamed a violent, attempted coup on Fetullah Gülen and his supporters. 
(Fethullah Gülen, from his exile in Pennsylvania, denies this and instead accuses Turkish 
president Recip Erdogan of staging the coup to consolidate power.) Consequently, the 
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Gülen schools in the KRI became suspect; it was said that connections between the 
Kurdistan Region and Gülen were dangerous. These Turkish schools were “taken over” 
(that is, the schools were sold and some administrators and teachers were replaced) and 
alleged ties with Turkey were severed. Being shut-down or taken-over was a fate the 
administrators of KCS likely feared.  
The copresence of government courses and government trained ethnic Kurdish 
teachers alongside the private school’s “classical Christian” curricula and ethnically and 
religiously diverse faculty presented a challenge. To understand this challenge and the 
religious ethos of the school, I first offer some historical context. In 1991, after the First 
Gulf War, the United States established a no-fly zone over the Kurdistan Region, as well 
as in the Shiite south, to prevent Iraqi aircraft from entering those airspaces. In 1992, the 
Boutros family, who are Arab Christians, emigrated from Baghdad to Kurdistan with the 
goal of opening a private Christian school to serve local, Kurdish children. The Boutros 
family asked their American, Christian humanitarian aid acquaintances to help them 
establish the school through a partnership with a sister school in Tennessee and through a 
Tennessee-based NGO. These partnerships provided American classical Christian 
education curricula, which follow the classical Trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric 
under the umbrella of a “Christian ethic.” Additionally, each year a few American 
volunteers moved to Kurdistan to teach in the schools. During an interview in 2012 I 
asked KCS cofounder Yakub Boutros what his initial “vision” for the schools was: 
In 1992 I moved from the south and came to the north to stay with the [Kurdish] 
nation. And I saw many NGOs and different groups of people including churches, 
including ministries, Christian ministries, trying to help, working, spending 
money, time, people. But a lot of things needed to be changed, specifically in the 
lives of a lot of people. I think the way to do that, education is the best way to 
touch the heart and mind of people. Not just any kind of education, but a specific 
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kind of education which will be in addition to any scientific subject. The ethic is 
very important. Read, write, and be exposed to real ethics in the world, including 
Christian world, the Christian ethic, as well as world ethics. To help those 
students in a new generation to understand life, real life, that’s one hand, and 
number two is that they can affect their home, their mother, their father, their 
brothers, their sisters, and that’s how education can help impact. That was the idea 
when we started.    
 
The Iraqi family-American NGO partnership eventually opened three campuses 
across Kurdistan, one in Duhok, on in Erbil, and one in Slemanȋ. A steady stream of 
American Christian evangelicals volunteered to teach in the schools. The current and 
former teachers I spoke with understood their teaching assignments as opportunities to 
contribute to the development of an “under-served group” (Kurds) through education 
with a strong Christian influence. Whether their activities inside and outside the school 
constituted “evangelism,” or proselytization, is contested and highly individualized. My 
sense is that any activities that could be construed as Christian “evangelism” were 
tolerated for many years, until a tragic event occurred that involved the death of a foreign 
teacher and a local student. 
Boutros asserted that the school always had been open about its Christian content, 
and that parents knew this when enrolling their children. When I asked most students and 
parents about this, first during preliminary dissertation research and later during my 
dissertation fieldwork, most parents acknowledged they knew about the Christian 
orientation of the schools, but they did not mind it as long as no one was “forcing it” on 
the students. Besides, the English language education and perceived quality of its 
curricula relative to the Kurdistani government schools were very attractive to local 
parents.  
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One could argue that the three Kurdistan Civilization Schools were “colonizing” 
the KRI, and that is what some critics, both local and foreign, suggested to me in private. 
During our interview, Yakub Boutros showed me a thick stack of publications 
condemning the schools. He held up one Arabic language article written by a mullah, 
titled “Replacing Islam with the Cross.” Boutros tossed this article in the direction of the 
stack and said, “Moushkila” (A problem). Some Europeans and Americans working in 
the Kurdistan Region also told me privately that they considered the KCS approach as 
“cultural imperialism.” It was not incidental that all three KCS campuses opened during 
periods of American intervention in the country. However, these periods of international 
intervention, both war and humanitarian aid, also made possible the many, other private, 
“secular” schools, as well as a variety of business opportunities. One could assert that, 
collectively, international schools were “colonizing” the Region. As far as I know, most 
of the international private schools opened with the invitation and participation of local 
Kurdistani people.  
What Kurdistani people I spoke with considered objectionable about the KCS 
approach was that the schools were teaching Christian religious content to a student body 
that was majority Muslim. In the Kurdistan Region, people are accustomed to 
government schools offering religion and language courses corresponding to the student 
population’s ethnoreligious identity. For example, in the Christian majority township of 
Ainkawa there are government schools designated for the majority Christian population 
there; these “Christian” schools offer some instruction in indigenous Syriac language, as 
well as Christian religion classes. Across the Kurdistan Region, Turkmani, Arab, and 
Kurdish students receive the majority of their education taught in their first language; 
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additionally, schools offer some courses in other languages, like English. Students 
customarily are not subjected to religion classes that do not match their family’s religious 
identity. Older generations reportedly dealt with religiously diverse student populations 
in places like Baghdad by simply asking the Christians to leave the classroom during 
Islam classes, or vice-versa, and another teacher would offer lessons about Christianity. 
This was not always the practice, as some people told me about their own experiences of 
having to stay in the classroom during the majority students’ religion class or being sent 
outside without another teacher to offer alternative lessons.  
 Boutros argued that these practices of “separation,” or, what many might call 
“sectarianism,” plagued Iraq. In response to public criticism, Yakub Boutros responded 
by emphasizing that KCS modeled religious plurality, to the benefit of society: 
We told some papers saying that yes, we are Christian schools. They know I’m 
not just a Christian but a pastor. I speak, I disciple, I preach, I travel and so on. 
But [I’m] not using the school to do that, let’s say, to convert kids to 
Christianity…The curriculum and the school, because of the moral actions, is 
Christian based. The Bible is one of the resources, that’s one. But the ethic is that 
the students will be exposed to a wide range of religions in the world: Judaism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and you know, Hinduism, and Yezidism, all that. 
So in this case it’s not the issue of directing the students of what to choose, but the 
reality is to educate the students about different kinds of belief, different kinds of 
religions, different kinds of holy books. You know in Islam they believe they 
have their prophets, and in Christianity they believe they have their prophets, and 
Judaism they believe they have their own prophets and holy book and so on. So 
it’s kind of neutral on one hand, but to focus on the positive sides on each. It’s not 
our business to convert this or that, and really the statement I have [about] the 
school is to educate the students to be what they want to be. When they will be 
18, when they will be legal age, when they will be in college, when they will be 
adult age, they decide whatever they want to be. That’s the philosophy we have. 
We do have books about the world religions. That book is shown to the 
Parliament, and shown to the Minister of Education, and to the curriculum 
department of the Ministry of Education. Parents, parliament, [government 
education] ministers – they are happy about the program as it’s neutral...They 
suggested, “Christians can read the Bible, Muslims can read the Qu’ran.” And we 
said, “No, that is the nation’s problem, separating people. We don’t care what 
outside the school will happen; inside the school is private. Everybody will study 
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Islam. Everybody will study Christianity. Everybody will study Judaism. 
Whatever they will do at home is not our responsibility. 
 
Boutros’ suggestion that students will be able to “decide whatever they want to 
be” is counter-cultural in Kurdistani society, as in much of the Middle East. Religious 
and ethnic identity is understood to pass patrilineally from fathers to their children, which 
is reinforced by the state’s strict recognition of inherited ethnoreligious categories on 
residents’ national identity cards. The state automatically registers its residents according 
to the father’s ethnoreligious category, and people are not allowed to change 
ethnoreligious identity on government documents. Having a religion, preferably 
monotheistic, is normative, and state recognized identity categories do not include 
“atheist.” Personal status laws enforce heritable ethnoreligious identity through strict 
regulations about inheritance, property ownership, and business. Furthermore, there is 
intense social pressure to remain within one’s inherited ethnosectarian category, as well 
as to socialize and marry within it. 
KCS’s vision, or at least Yakub Boutros’ vision, celebrating the values of 
religious pluralism and individual agency produced tensions in the school. Tensions 
emerged especially when these broadly “Western” or “Liberal” values crossed with social 
practices that reinforce the conference of ethnoreligious identity through patrilineal 
kinship and a pervasive majoritarian “Islamic” atmosphere in the school. Later in the 
chapter I examine these tensions in more detail. Perhaps the way Boutros presented his 
school to me was a reformulation of the school’s educational mission following the 
aforementioned tragedy. Perhaps the formerly more explicit Christian content and 
practices were recast as general character education in a monotheistic, pluralistic society, 
as some teachers and students suggested to me in private interviews. KCS had become a 
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laboratory for exploring social and political experimentation through evolution of the 
curricula, practices, and sovereignties. Perhaps due to the impending Kurdistani 
independence referendum, the war with ISIS, and the economic crisis, experimentation at 
KCS seemed to be at its peak during my fieldwork. How the contest of values and its 
tensions affected individual teachers and students varied greatly.   
The KCS campus in which I conducted field work enrolled around 800 students 
from Kindergarten through grade 11 (in 2016 there was not yet a grade 12). The principal 
was a member of the Boutros family that had been instrumental in founding the network 
of Kurdistan Civilizational Schools. Most of the KCS administrators and teachers were 
Iraqi. In the high school building, there were 6 international teachers at the time: one each 
from Brazil and Pakistan, and four from the United States. The high school faculty also 
included at least four IDPs, including Christians and Muslims, and several local, 
ethnically Kurdish teachers. These ethnic Kurds were recent graduates of government 
Kurdish language colleges or universities. Subsequently they were employed to teach 
Kurdistani Ministry of Education mandated courses like Kurdish language and literature, 
Human Rights and Genocide, and Komalayatȋ (social studies focused on Kurds and 
Islam). Incorporating the government required courses in addition to the private school’s 
American-style curriculum based on classical Christian education produced tensions in 
the school.  
When I conducted fieldwork in KCS in 2016, the Kurdistan Region was hosting 
some 2 million refugees and IDPs, a serious strain on its 5 million Kurdistani residents. 
KCS likewise absorbed many internally displaced people belonging to different 
ethnosectarian groups. The school’s population included people displaced from Baghdad 
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and Mosul during the 2003-2011 war, while other people, such as those from Christian 
towns like Qaraqosh, more recently joined KCS after fleeing the Islamic State and 
resettling in Erbil. At the time of my fieldwork, the student body was comprised of a 
Sunni Kurdish majority but had enrolled significantly many more minority members than 
in previous years, including Shi’i, Assyrian and Chaldean Christian, Turkoman, Baha’i, 
and Mandean students. In some ways KCS was able to accommodate minority students, 
such as by enrolling non-Kurdish speakers in remedial Kurdish language classes. Still, 
these same students were required to be present in the government-mandated courses 
taught in Kurdish, such as komalayatȋ (social studies) and human rights and genocide, 
despite not being able to follow the lesson. In many cases, other students translated for 
their non-Kurdish peers as needed, while some non-Kurdish students were permitted to 
work on material from other courses.   
The increased diversity of the student body, the faculty, and other school staff was 
a source of tensions in the school, particularly as competing views on Kurdistan and Iraq 
clashed in komalayatȋ and civics courses. Some teachers, especially those who had been 
displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, made a point to incorporate their experiences and 
opinions into their lessons.  
Relative to their government counterparts, KCS students and teachers enjoyed more 
freedom of expression. Teachers, while subject to many curricular requirements, had 
enough instructional time and autonomy within the classroom to incorporate their 
experiences and opinions into their lessons. This may have been the case because the 
school’s administration considered “ethics” and religious plurality central to the school’s 
educational program. KCS instructors expounded upon the curriculum by incorporating 
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moral or ethical commentary, whether they taught social studies, civics, history, 
literature, or even math and science. Some teachers guided ethical discussions by sharing 
their own experiences and views and by encouraging students to do likewise. For 
example, teachers reminded students to be mindful of the diverse experiences and views 
within their school and society, particularly when those diverse experiences stemmed 
from ethnoreligious differences.   
In some courses, such as Civics, discussions about ethics were built into the 
lesson. In other classes, such as Komalayatȋ (Social Studies), the teacher sometimes 
diverged from the required textbook, which included Kurdish ethnonationalist content, to 
foster critical thinking in the classroom. Consequently, many class sessions involved not 
only explicit lessons about ethics, nationalism, and the state, but also implicit lessons on 
the virtues of evasions and subversions of the state and on the nature of sovereignty. 
Teachers and students employed various strategies in these lessons, such as humor, 
proverbs, or narratives about personal experiences. In this way, the school functioned as a 
laboratory experimenting with competing identities and obligations in a society and state 
said to be fragmenting and failing.  I observed these experimental lessons most often in 
the Komalayatȋ and Civics classes.  
Outside of the classroom, KCS students regularly encountered Kurdish 
ethnonationalism in mandatory patriotic ceremonies, like the one described below, and 
sometimes at other school events. For example, KCS organized a Newroz (Kurdish New 
Year) party for high school students, but required everyone in attendance, including non-
Kurdish students and teachers, to wear jli kurdi, or traditional Kurdish clothing. Many 
students, including some Kurdish students, bristled at the requirement and chose not to 
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attend the party. Patriotic ceremonies and observing Kurdish holidays with mandatory 
Kurdish dress seemed performative, demonstrating that KCS, despite its “Christian” 
educational model and many non-Kurdish administrators, teachers, and students, 
nevertheless retained a generally “Kurdish” atmosphere. Intentions aside, performing 
Kurdishness was strategic during a time of heightened Kurdish ethnonationalism due to 
the war with the Islamic State and ongoing conflict with the Iraqi government in 
Baghdad. Moreover, because KCS was a private school based on a “Christian” education 
model, it was subject to some government scrutiny. Members of the Iraqi Arab Christian 
family who had been instrumental in founding KCS and who worked in administrative 
positions at KCS lead by example in performing “Kurdishness.” 
 Additionally, the war and political infighting produced economic stagnation and 
put government salaries on hold. Some KCS families were reconsidering whether KCS 
was worth the private school tuition when there were alternatives like cheaper private 
schools and basically free government schools. Thus, performing “Kurdishness” in part 
concerned maintaining the approval of the majority Kurdish school population, as well as 
the representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Education who 
inspected the school and sometimes attended formal events at KCS. Performing Kurdish 
culture and Kurdish ethnonationalist ideology produced discomfort among many non-
Kurdish students and teachers, as they were drawn into production and contestation of the 
Kurdistani state, or into efforts to remake the “failed” Iraqi state.  
 
Sara’s brotherly love 
At Kurdistan Civilizational School (KCS), teachers, staff, and students, though they 
came from all over Iraq and from different ethnoreligious communities, had one thing in 
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common: They were “stuck” in the Kurdistan region, whether they liked it or not (and 
most did not). By necessity they were employed or enrolled in KCS, under pressure and 
trying to make the best of the situation. One can almost trace the pressures coming down 
from the Iraqi state, to the Kurdistani statelet, to its Ministry of Education, to this 
particular private school and the family that ran it, to the administrators, teachers, hall 
monitors, and cleaners who populated the school. This diverse group’s daily interactions 
seemed to me like an impressive juggling act of ethnicity, religion, language, political 
affiliations, and competing sovereignties. 
KCS had absorbed many students and teachers displaced, first by the Second Gulf 
War, and later by the conflict with the Islamic State. I came to know Sara, one of the 
displaced teachers, well during my field work. She first appears in Chapter 1 as she 
volunteers in the Yezidi camp in the abandoned construction site near Dream City. Sara 
was a Christian woman in her early twenties from the Christian village of Qaraqosh. She 
had been teaching at KCS for one year before I arrived to conduct field work there. At 
university, Sara had majored in English and aspired to earn a master’s degree in English 
Literature. When the Islamic State invaded in 2014, Sara and her extended family fled to 
Erbil, taking only what they could fit in their vehicles. They left behind their homes, land, 
and livelihood. The expensive agricultural equipment which the family used in large-
scale farming was destroyed by ISIS.  
 At KCS, Sara taught English language and literature with warmth and enthusiasm. 
Her large, expressive eyes shone with genuine concern for her students. They frequently 
came to her in the teachers’ room for advice, both academic and personal, and texted with 
her outside of school hours. Sara had formed an intense friendship with “Shams,” a 
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Muslim woman who was close in age and was displaced from Baghdad. Like Sara, 
Shams was a lover of books and an English teacher, and the two were almost always 
together, inside and outside the school. Sara and Shams bonded over their shared interests 
and their experiences of displacement and dreams put on hold. Sara struggled with her 
own, deep disappointment at how her life had been impacted by war, and this was the 
subject of many conversations between Sara, Shams, and their fellow teachers. Among 
the Christian and Muslim teachers there was a kind of interfaith dialogue about God’s 
will, faith, and how to make the best of their situation. Sara was the most vocal in urging 
the other teachers, as well as her students, to believe that there was a meaningful reason 
for their suffering.  
 Over the course of my field work semester in KCS, I witnessed many dialogues in 
which people critiqued Kurdistani society by comparing it to their experiences in pre-
invasion Iraq (pre-2003) and questioning whether one could be hopeful about Iraq’s 
future. Sara had many disheartening encounters with students, which tested her ability to 
maintain a sense of hopefulness about her students’ future, as well as about her own. 
Once, a difficult student confronted Sara in the middle of a lesson, shouting, “Why do 
you hate me?!” Sara recalled, “It was just two months after Daesh [invaded Mosul and 
displaced Sara’s family], and I had so much teaching, grading, and work. I couldn’t help 
it, when he said this word ‘hate.’ I couldn’t take it. It hurt me. I don’t hate anyone. I just 
started crying.”  
 As we sat together in the teachers’ break room, Sara spoke at length about her 
struggles to reach her students:  
If you pass them in the hallway they will just [bump, push past] you. I remember 
when I was in school, we didn’t dare look the teacher in the eye. Now they look 
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straight at me and interrupt, “What? Why?” These kids, they are so selfish. Last 
year we asked them to give some donations because we are building a school for 
refugees in Dohuk. We told them they can bring something used; it doesn’t even 
have to be a new thing. Something they already have. And the students didn’t 
want to. They said, “Why should we do this?” I told them, “We are all human, 
God created us all the same. You are not different from these people. You have 
maybe 4 or 5 bags. What are you going to do with all these bags? After some 
time, you will throw some of them away because you can, because you will buy 
new. So you can just give it to someone who needs it now.” And they are racist. 
In my class [today], they are all Kurdish. One is from Duhok. And I said 
something to them about being one family, “You are all brothers.” And one from 
Hewler said, “I don’t want the Duhoki for my brother.” And the Duhoki said the 
same of the Hewleri. I said, ‘What is this? You are all the same. You even look 
like you could be brothers.” But they said, “I would never be his brother!” And 
they don’t respect the old people either. Last year we read a book that had a 
character named the Ancient. And I asked, “Why do you think this character is 
named the Ancient? What can we learn from old people?” And they said things 
like, “Old people don’t know what they’re doing. They are useless. They have a 
meaningless existence.” I couldn’t believe it. I loved my grandparents, respected 
them, even more than my parents. Because that is how I was taught, that I should 
respect them the most because they are the oldest. 
 
Hearing this, I commented that I hoped her country would not become like the United 
States, “where old people are put in nursing homes and sometimes abandoned by their 
families.”  Sara nodded and continued,  
This is why I miss Qaraqosh. I went to America for two months, you know. And 
when I was there, I saw how people lived. I had a host family. The father got up at 
5am and went to work and came home maybe 5pm or 6pm and only had 2 hours 
with his kids. I understand that people work like this sometimes to afford the 
living. And his wife didn’t work, so of course he should work hard like this. But I 
want more than two hours with my dad. So I said I wanted to go back [home]. 
And people said are you crazy? How could you not want to stay here? But I 
missed my home, the life there, so much. [Pause] I am afraid of what is happening 
now. This generation is being ruined. There is no future.  
In response to the disheartening exchange between the Hewleri boy and Duhoki boy, Sara 
selected a poem, one not in the students’ textbook, to share with her students: James 
Kirkup’s  
“No Men are Foreign.”  
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Remember, no men are strange, no countries foreign 
 
Beneath all uniforms, a single body breathes 
 
Like ours: the land our brothers walk upon 
 
Is earth like this, in which we all shall lie. 
 
They, too, aware of sun and air and water, 
 
Are fed by peaceful harvests, by war’s long winter starv’d. 
 
Their hands are ours, and in their lines we read 
 
A labour not different from our own. 
 
Remember they have eyes like ours that wake 
 
Or sleep, and strength that can be won 
 
By love. In every land is common life 
 
That all can recognise and understand. 
 
Let us remember, whenever we are told 
 
To hate our brothers, it is ourselves 
 
That we shall dispossess, betray, condemn. 
 
Remember, we who take arms against each other 
 
It is the human earth that we defile. 
 
Our hells of fire and dust outrage the innocence 
 
Of air that is everywhere our own, 
 
Remember, no men are foreign, and no countries strange.   
---- 
 
I recorded Sara’s lesson with her students and present it below:  
 
Sara: I chose this poem because I have seen so many situations in this school where 
people need to learn this lesson. We should learn that we were all created by God. He 
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created everyone of us to resemble who? Him. So when we look at each other who do we 
see? God. In every person you see the reflection of God. You don't have to be from the 
same religion, the same color, the same country. God loves us all. He wants us to know 
one thing: God is love. He wants us to learn to love each other. If you hate a person... 
 
Boy: I hate my sister... 
 
Another boy: Everyone hates his sister... 
 
Sara: It’s not hate, it’s not the word you should use. Annoyed maybe. Ok. Maybe not all 
of you know where I am from... 
 
3rd boy: Mosul! 
 
Sarah: No, not Mosul. 
 
4th boy: Qaraqosh! 
 
Sara: I lost my house, everything. My future is on hold. While I was escaping, we had 
final exams, and now I have only one paper that says I graduated. I cannot apply to 
master’s programs, and I want to do my master’s. Should I hate ISIS? 
 
Students all together: Yes! 
 
Sara: No, because God is love. I cannot hate my enemy... 
 
Girl: Then why do we have wars? 
 
Sara: Because we are stupid. Do you think if I saw a person from this group or that group 
who needs help should I not help? 
 
Students: Never help your enemy! 
 
Sara: No you should because you will show them they are wrong. Our actions can change 
them for good or bad.  
 
2nd girl: Miss, but if you say that to a Kurdish guy, you should love your enemy, ISIS, 
you think cutting heads [off] is ok?! 
 
Sara: And love is not about the things you say but what you do or don’t do. If my friend 
is absent and I say bad things about her, how could that be loving her? Also when you see 
[refugee] people selling in the streets, tissues or something like this, and you say “ugh” 
[disgusted sound], Why? They are doing their best to survive. What about war? Can we 





Sara: How? By fighting and killing and cutting heads you will win a war? Peshmerga are 
fighting furiously every day. Do you think about these people, these people who are 
dying every day, they are losing their lives, their families, what will happen to their kids? 
To their families? If you start with yourself it will make a lot of change. [Pause] My best 
friend is who?  
 
Students: Miss Shams! 
 
Sara: I have another best friend who is not at this school and is a Muslim too - my best 
friends are not even my religion. Should I treat them or you any differently?  
 
3rd girl: Miss, what if they treat you differently? 
 
Sara: Then it’s their problem if they do. I have a friend in this school - you don’t know 
her, she works in the elementary building - we were in college together for four years. I 
helped her a lot when she was in college. I used to help everyone in college. We studied 
together. When we left Qaraqosh and came here, I found her a job in this school. I am not 
saying this because I am saying I am a better person. No, I helped her because she is my 
friend. But something happened during phase 2. She stopped saying hello to me. I would 
wave and say hello to her, and she would say nothing. Even my friends were asking, why 
does she not say hello to you? But I had no problem with her. It hurt me, but I kept saying 
hello to her and gave her a hug. God’s teaching of forgiveness is that God wants me to do 
this. Because he told me through his word that I should forgive. Why should I ask for 
forgiveness from God, or anything from God, but I don’t forgive? If some person comes 
to me for help, I shouldn’t ask if he or she is Sunni, Shi’i, Christian. He is a person. If I 
didn’t do this myself, I would be a hypocrite. You know what that means? God not only 
sees what we are doing but he knows our thoughts, what is in our hearts. In all situations, 
you will learn that when you are helping others you are doing a good thing.  
 
 In many lessons as in the lesson recounted above, teachers like Sara and Mariam 
the Civics teacher encouraged their students to resist divisions within their communities 
and country. Sara presented sectarianism as a threat not only to the social and political 
health of Iraq, but also to the spiritual health of her students. “Hating” one’s “brother” 
would impede students’ moral progress, Sara argued. Because her students did not accept 
their classmates belonging to different ethnic or religious communities or different 
political parties as their “brother,” Sara’s appeals to the ethical “golden rule” did not 
appear to me to persuade her students to reconsider how they viewed their fellow Iraqi or 
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Kurdistani citizens. In the section following, another teacher named “Naila” joins Sara in 
reflecting on their childhoods in Iraq. The teachers contrast their childhood experiences 
with those of their students, questioning whether any “love” for Iraq has survived the past 
three decades of war and sectarianism.  
 
Naila’s Dark Age  
 Naila entered the grade 7A Humanities classroom and arranged her things at the 
desk in the front, where she always sat facing the class. She preferred to sit rather than 
stand, and she rarely wrote on the board. Her method was to follow the textbook closely, 
often reading passages aloud. Before the lesson began, a female student asked if Naila 
heard about some recent government regulation. “No, I don’t like to watch the news,” 
Naila crisply replied, waving her hand dismissively. “I don’t want to know about wars.” 
Naila, like many of her fellow school employees, had been displaced by war. Turning to 
the lesson, Naila asked, “Do you know why the Medieval era was sometimes called ‘the 
Dark Ages’?” A boy answered “lack of education.” She agreed, noting that “dark” means 
“without education.” Naila then compared the Medieval period to present day Iraq. “Here 
we have many children who have left the school and beg in the streets. This is a Dark 
Age,” she concluded. 
Naila conveyed a pessimistic, no-nonsense attitude whether in the classroom or in 
the teachers’ break room. In the break room she often sat at a table alone, reviewing her 
lesson plans. Sometimes she joined in discussions with other teachers, especially if they 
were commiserating about a problem student. Otherwise, she mostly listened to her 
coworkers’ discussions about family matters or issues of faith, periodically looking up 
from her lessons and frowning without comment. Naila shared little information about 
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her personal life, especially not with students; she argued there should be a professional 
“boundary” between teacher and student.  She often expressed annoyance with her 
students. “I don’t like children,” she explained to me. Naila tolerated them because she 
relished learning and sharing her knowledge with other people. Thus, it was a surprise to 
see laconic Naila become so animated when I interviewed her in an empty classroom one 
afternoon. 
She talked at length about her esteemed family history: How her great, great-
grandfather served in the Ottoman military and traveled extensively. His descendants 
were adventurers, as well as photographers, poets, and engineers. Her family ran a 
printing press in Basra, and her grandfather took tango dance lessons there because “the 
people of that time were so open-minded.” When she looked at her family members’ 
photographs from throughout the 20th century and observed their less conservative, 
Western-style clothing, Naila lamented the loss of freedom of thought and expression. 
Now Basra was a place where people “refused to develop.” As the political and religious 
landscape shifted in Basra, Naila and her “open-minded” family moved to Baghdad, 
where she received most of her education. Many women in her family worked as 
educators, and Naila said that she felt from a young age she was destined to become a 
teacher. She remembered distinctly the moment she first learned to read, laughing as she 
recalled her father catching her reading furtively in the middle of the night. Reading 
English literature transported her to faraway places, as her ancestors had traveled before 
her.  
Like many people I met during my field work, Naila spoke nostalgically about a 
difficult but contented childhood in the 1990s. Conflict and sanctions helped people 
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appreciate the little they had; an orange from the freezer on a hot day was a luxury. Nalia 
recalled,   
In a way it was nice. It was innocent. Our generation is not like this generation we 
are teaching now. They don’t care. We lived in that time...In that time if we had 
sugar, we were so rich. And my dad was just a normal person. He worked in a 
factory that belonged to the government. He used to work in a factory that made 
copybooks for students. Very quality copybooks! [Laughs bitterly] I think 
yesterday or the day before, I saw someone who still has this kind of book. It was 
recycled paper. Too dark. He took a picture of it and on Facebook said do you 
remember this? Most people who made a comment said that we didn’t like it at 
that time, but it is much better than what our children have now. The government 
used to give us those [textbooks] for free. Now our children have everything, but 
they are not happy. My father was poor, you can say, but we were ok. We never 
took money from somebody. We lived with dignity. And we were happy 
alhamdulliah, thank God...After, especially 1999, 2000, things started to be 
wonderful. Higher salaries, a little bit for all of the people who worked for the 
government. And things started to come, and factories started to work again. Like 
factories which were closed in the ‘90s, factories, dairy, sugar, so it was good 
until 2003.  
Focusing on scarcity and hardship while narrating childhood experiences was a 
way for people to reflect on and reaffirm their own moral or ethical formation that still 
serves them as adults. In such narratives, people often contrast their successful childhood 
moral formation with that of the present-day youth. In recalling the low-quality paper of 
government-issued textbooks during her childhood, Naila remarks ironically that they 
were better than contemporary school textbooks produced with better paper but lacking 
good educational content. Like many other internally displaced people I knew, Naila 
described the dangers of commuting to and from university classes in Baghdad during the 
2003-2011 war. Narrowly missing explosions or having classes cancelled was a regular 
occurrence. In 2006, her cousin was “savagely” killed, and the family moved to Erbil. 
Naila recalled her grief at parting with some of her books when the family moved. During 
her first couple years in the Kurdistan Region, she worked odd office jobs, where she felt 
her Kurdish co-workers did not respect her. Finally, she found a job opening at a 
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relatively new private school, teaching grade 2 Humanities. As the school added a grade 
each year, she moved with her students, teaching the same group for six years. I asked 
Naila to reflect on the school’s curriculum and students:  
     Here I think the curriculum is much better, because it has a focus on different  
civilizations, ancient and modern. As I said, before it was all about Arabic 
civilization in public school...revolutions and so on, and later, First and Second 
World War with no details. Only [sighs] in a dry way. It was written in a dry way. 
And the other years about Islamic history and then again about Arab civilizations. 
Now I think it is nicer. It is written in a very nice way. But the students, I don’t 
know. I have so many things to say about the students. I am always complaining 
about this generation, they don’t care about anything. The blessings that they have 
now. When I was their age, we couldn’t buy sugar. Not just me, all of my 
generation, we couldn’t travel, we couldn’t choose anything. We had to live like, I 
don’t know, the horse when they put [the bit and harness] around its face. But 
now they don’t appreciate what they have. The curriculum is good, the teachers. 
We didn’t have school like this. They have AC [air conditioning]. We didn’t have 
AC at that time...Anyway, here they don’t understand when I tell them that you 
have to thank God for what you have, appreciate your parents, your teachers. 
They don’t even respect books. They step on them sometimes. The problem is 
also about the parents who are careless, who are saying we are paying the money 
so my son or daughter should pass. [Lowering her voice] I asked my students 
once, that 20 years after this, or 30 years later, what will happen to the earth? 
Because it seems that it’s not just in this country or this part of the world, but 
everywhere is like this. What will happen when we pass away and you will be the 
older generation and you have to raise your kids, what are they gonna learn from 
you? And they didn’t understand. And they started to laugh. When we talked 
about culture, and we had this exercise about culture, we said each one should 
write about their culture. And they said the smartphone is our culture. I couldn'’t 
even answer them. I said you can find [smartphones] here, but they also use them 
in China, and the United States, so where is [your] culture?  
Naila described her students as completely unmoored from national identity and 
culture; they lacked moral sensibilities, failing to comprehend, and mocking the ethical 
lessons teachers offered. In her childhood, Naila recalled how every day her mother read 
stories to the family and how they discussed the stories and their morals. “We would say, 
‘Is it ok to say [what that character says]? Is that good behavior? Can we say this in our 
community or not? What will happen if we face the same situation that happens in the 
novel?” Naila encouraged her students to ask similar ethical questions, but they seemed 
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to lack empathic ability, perhaps due to a failing of the imagination, an idea to which I 
return later in the ethnography.  
The day following our interview, Naila and I sat with Sara in the teachers’ break 
room. Naila and Sara were discussing how their country had changed: 




Naila: It was something, she could buy gold with it and travel. 
 
Sara: But in my mom's time in the 90s [the teaching salary] was so little it 
wouldn't even buy a set of eggs, you could not buy even shoes. 
 
Naila: 75 dinars per one piece of bread, so we used to bake our own bread at 
home. So many died because of explosions of the oven. My cousin died because 
of that. 
 
Sara: I remember when there was a time that you didn't even have proper food to 
eat. They would eat barley and mix something with it. My mom kept one and 
showed it to me saying, see this is how we would eat. 
 
Naila: I told [Diana] yesterday about how we didn't even have ice cream. 
 
Sara: But even with all this it was better than now. We were happy. We had 
peace. 
 
Naila: We didn't have this thinking like who is Christian? Who is Muslim? 
 
Sara: I even thought [Naila] was Christian... 
 
Naila: This always happens. People say happy eid on Christian holidays and I say 
to them too. Sometimes I explain [that I am actually Muslim]. Maybe because I 
don’t cover [her hair]. 
 
Sara: So we had no problems at all. Even though there were not much resources, 
at least we were happy. And simple things would make us happy. 
 
Naila: We had hope for the future.  
 
Sara: And people were educated more than now. People liked to learn. Now 
people don't care about education. Before, even though the salaries were low, but 
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people cared about education. They wanted their kids to have good education. 
Even the teachers wanted to give more than their salaries...  
 




Naila: Now nobody loves the country.  
 
Sara: Like, I do this [teaching] for money and nobody cares. I go to this college so 
I will be employed and that's it. 
 
Naila: Before 2000 things started to be better. Salaries were higher.  
 
Sara: We were talking about the early 90s... 
 
Naila: From ‘90 to ‘96... 
 
Sara: But later it was good. It became very, very good and people were eating 
well. I don't think Saddam destroyed the country at all. It is the opposite for me.  
 
Naila: Maybe if he stayed by this time we...  
 
Sara: ...would be better... 
 
Naila: Be better, but we would have another war with another country [waves 
hand dismissively]. 
 
Sara: But not war inside, not [civil war]. 
 
 I heard countless conversations like the one above. Many of my Kurdish 
interlocutors, though they did not share Sara and Naila’s views about former Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein, agreed that the education system had declined, and people no 
longer “cared” about learning. As Ashti observed, people had become docile and easier to 
manipulate in politics and in religion. It was this apathy and docility which produced a 
dejected spirit among many of my interlocutors. True, chronic war and economic 
stagnation also contributed to a shared sense of hopelessness, but the lack of proper moral 
sentiment and hope seemed the most daunting obstacle of all. Naila said that when she 
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began to hope, something bad would happen that would discourage her anew. Toward the 
end of our interview, I asked Naila what actions she might take in light of her general 
discouragement and hopelessness about the future. She replied, “I just am passing the 
days. If God wants me to travel, I will. If not, I will stay here, and maybe it's better for 
me. There are so many people who want something, but later they regret it or something 
bad happens. So I will wait and see. I believe in destiny.” 
Discussions between teachers and students illuminated intergenerational tensions 
about hope and futures. My interlocutors who came of age in the 1980s and 1990s talk 
about how war and sanctions shaped their difficult childhoods, which were and are 
central to their continuing projects of ethical self-making. For my interlocutors in their 
20s and 30s, generational memory often takes the form of narratives about how war and 
its effects shaped their childhoods. Difficult memories are softened by nostalgia for small 
or simple pleasures, such as eating an orange from the freezer on a hot day. Members of 
the 80s and 90s generations expressed appreciation for how hardship early in life fostered 
the fortitude and perspective that enabled them to make sense of and to endure their 
current difficult situations, perhaps even to feel hopeful. Perhaps not incidentally, many 
of these hopeful people in their 20s and 30s worked as teachers.  
Many times, I observed teachers trying to help their students cultivate similar 
strategies for coping and for generating hope in trying times. Many lessons could be 
summarized as “We survived and you can, too.” Students typically did not accept their 
teachers’ narratives and perspectives. In private conversations with me, students would 
comment that many of their teachers were displaced and that teaching was a stressful, 
low-status, low-income job. How could anyone feel hopeful in those circumstances?  I 
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cannot recall many students expressing a desire to become a teacher; they aspired to 
medicine, engineering, and other higher-status type jobs. Both the private school and 
government students I spent time with typically did not feel hopeful about their futures, 
though for different reasons. Privileged students anticipated leaving Iraq upon graduating 
high school or college, and poor female students anticipated early marriage and 
childbearing. Teachers who survived harsher childhoods than their students became 
exasperated and discouraged by their students’ refusals to adopt hopeful attitudes.  
 
Declaring independence 
The civics teacher, Mariam, was not easily discouraged by her students’ negative 
attitudes about Iraq. For its classical Christian education model, Kurdistan Civilizational 
School imported American textbooks, including an American civics textbook. Curious 
about how Mariam would use these American books, I joined her class as often as I 
could. Mariam, like some of the other teachers, permitted me to sit in the back of the 
classroom with my laptop and transcribe everything that was said. Mariam and her family 
had been living in Erbil for a few years since they fled their home in Baghdad during 
some of the worst sectarian violence in the Iraq War. In civics class she often described 
her experiences and expressed her personal opinions, allowing the students to disagree 
with her and to debate. In the semester before I conducted fieldwork at KCS, Grade 10 
students began learning about the formation of the American government. Mariam 
announced that this semester, students would study the U.S. Constitution and then the 
Iraqi Constitution and would compare the two documents.  
 On the first day of the new semester, Mariam opened her lesson with a question: 
“Do you think it is important to declare independence?” At that time, there was 
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widespread discussion about whether the Kurdistan Region could and should declare 
itself independent from the federal Iraqi government in Baghdad.  
 
Gulistan: It’s not always important. It depends on the country and if it’s ready. There 
should not be any economic problems. 
 




Mariam: We should agree on everything or on one point? 
 
Kamil: Not agreeing on everything but standing as one... 
 
Hawar: There should be one idea and they work together... 
 
Mariam: But this one idea - let's talk about Iraq. 
 
Ashur: We don't even have the definition of independence here. Everyone has a different 
subject, a different party. They have debates and discussions, ok, but each has his own 
idea, so they leave the party and make a new party.  
 
Mariam to a confused student: He's [Ashur] talking generally. He doesn't mean a specific 
party. 
 
Hawar: Unity means working together and being as one. 
 
Mariam: [To Hawar] You are a Kurdish Muslim, and I am a Chaldi Christian. How can 
we solve this if we are different? 
 
Hawar: We have a discussion, a debate... 
 
Layla: Can’t we put away our differences even if we are different races? 
 
Mariam: What if these differences are in our blood? We have so many different religions 
here: Ba'hai, Chaldi, Yezidi, Muslim...how can I reach the end of this conflict without 











Kamil: If you want to be part of something with me, let’s form a system that involves 
both Christians and Muslims. 
 
Mariam: [This semester] we will compare the Iraqi constitution with the American one. 
The Iraqi constitution writers did not think about the Ba'hai or Christians. They only talk 
about the majority. What do I believe? I’m a human. We don’t have to believe the same 
thing. Respect. We should share. Serbest, you have all the resources you need to declare 
independence. What will you do? 
 
Serbest: Who gives me this authority? 
 
Mariam: I give the authority to declare independence. What will you do?  
 
Serbest: Here [in Kurdistan]? 
 
Mariam: Leave Kurdistan, leave Iraq. 
 
Serbest: I will first check my qualifications... 
 
Yakub: You have none! [class laughs] 
 
Serbest: Ok I will check the economy, see what resources I have... 
 




Serbest: Resources...nuclear weapons! 
 





Rozhan: What about religion?   
 
Mariam: That is part of culture. 
 
Mariam wrote the following list of students' answers on the board: 1) Economy, 2) laws, 
3) people, 4) education, 5) government, 6) culture, 7) power, 8) flag, 9) national anthem  
 
Medya: A coat of arms? 
 
Serbest: A name for your country! 
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Mariam continued writing: 10) Name, 11) Land (Mariam’s suggestion, after the students 
failed to think of territory) 
 
Mariam: Serbest, will you immediately declare independence if you have all these 
things? 
 
Zayna: What about army? 
 
Mariam writes 12) army. 
 
Mariam: Who should you go to first if you want to declare independence? 
 
Hawar: The neighbor countries, the border countries 
 
Mariam: Ms. Diana, what do you think? 
 
Diana to class: In your human rights class, didn't you just learn about an international 
organization? 
 
No one takes my hint. Mariam says, "Yes, what is this international organization?" 
 
Thomas: United Nations 
 
Gulistan: We don't need them. 
 
Mariam: For sure you need them. Let's go through the list to see why. What about 
economy? Ashur, why do you need an economy? What do you need? 
 
Ashur: I need...[looking at his desk] stationary? books? [class laughs]. I mean, I need to 
buy these things. Where do we get the books? America, right? [Indeed, much of the 
school’s curriculum was shipped from the United States through a connection with a 
sister private school.] 
 
Mariam: Ok, so yes, you need to buy these things. Tell me about your parents, what about 
the things they need? 
 
Rayna: Jobs because if there is no salary, business will go down... 
 
Mariam: No more shopping... 
 
Serbest: ...the price drops... 
 
Hawar: …then protests.... 
 
Mariam: Economy is very important so we can work, eat, live. What about law? 
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Kamil: Law is to keep the country moving without problems. 
 
Rozhan: Law is designed to protect liberties. 
 
Zayna: Without law there will be chaos. 
 
Mariam: Yes, there will be chaos. Yakub said that without law, he will be the first one to 
kill and steal. [class laughs] 
 
Farhana: We need law to keep humanity... [students chatter excitedly] 
 
Hawar: No, it is a nice thing she said, to keep humanity... 
 
Farhana: ...because in this country men think they are superior to women, so law will 
make us equal. 
 
Hawar: Laws are designed for justice, equality, and freedom.  
 
Kamil: Objection! Objection! Justice doesn't mean equality. There are higher powers... 
 
Mariam: For any society we need equality, justice, and freedom. These three are 
connected to each other. In America, for example, I don't know if I can have justice, but 
the other two I can have [equality and freedom]. I can have more freedom. But for 
Middle Eastern countries this is a problem. And freedom doesn't mean you can do 
anything, like something wrong. The problem is we don't have it [freedom and equality] 
from the time we are kids. It starts with the family, the religion, the society. If the family 
is not having the relationships of equality, then zero [equality outside the family in 
society]. 
 
Rozhan: But tradition? 
 
Mariam: We have to respect certain traditions, rules, but if we are to be equal, we start 
with the family. Then there will be justice. So if Farhana and Serbest are my daughter and 
son and come to me, it doesn't matter if [they are] girl or boy.  
 
Rida: Justice is related to equality... 
 
Mariam: If I have a ticket to freedom and I give it to you, what will you do? 
 
Kamil [grinning]: Sell it for a higher price. That's how you make a profit. 
 
Mariam: But what about the people who are victim to this buying and selling? Laws need 
to suit every single person. Ok, let's talk about people.  
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Kamil: People are basic to the country. [Unclear discussion among boys at the front of 
the room] 
 
Mariam: The murderer is basic? We have countries that don't have these crimes... 
 
Serbest: In those countries the people are good. 
 
Mariam: No, the laws are good. 
 
Hawar: If the laws are good, who makes them [follow the law], who scares them? 
 
Mariam: The state. 
 
Kamil: If we have criminals, we can't have a proper country... 
 
Mariam: We have a proper country... 
 
Kamil: ...But all the points [gesturing to the board] must agree with each other.  
 
Mariam: There are countries without [a lot of] crime! I don't remember the names now, 
but there are. Ok, let's talk about education. What is it for? 
 
Rozhan: To keep our country in a forward position.  
 
Mariam: Be realistic. You have to improve yourself for your country? You are in school 
for your country? Be realistic. [touching the wall, indicating an imaginary framed degree] 
You will take a degree for your country? Seriously? No, first you improve yourself. What 




Mariam: For what? 
 
Yakub: A communist [students laugh] 
 
Mariam: Thomas, why are you here? 
 
Thomas: My parents made me [class laughs] 
 
Mariam: I agree with you, Thomas. You have to go to school until age 18. We are forced 
to come to school. I was like you. My family forced me to be in school. Why?  
 
Hawar: I want to be something. When you are a student you are nothing! You want to 
grow up and be something. 
 
Mariam: My dream, remember what I told you? 
149 
 
Students: You wanted to be a lawyer.  
 
Mariam: When I was younger I wanted to be a teacher. But then I discovered I have the 
ability to be a lawyer. But my father kept asking me, "Why do you want to be a lawyer? 
Will you be an ambassador?" Finally he used his authority and said, "This is the end of 
discussion. No more lawyer." Ok. I finished high school and decided to go to the English 
Language department. I got good grades. I decided it was ok to be a teacher. I don't know 
why I changed, because my dream is still to be a lawyer. But still I love teaching. This is 
a blessing. I'm sure some of you are following your parents who are telling you to study 
medicine, engineering, whatever. But I have a friend who quit medical college. Her mom 
forced her to go. After 8 years of study she quit, said bye, went to France and studied 
engineering, which is what she wanted. Getting [an] education without getting what you 
really want, to me, it's nothing. [Bell rings, class disperses] 
 
 
Judgment Day and the national government 
Early in the semester, Mariam distributed photocopies of the United States 
Constitution to her 10th grade civics students. Her method was to ask different students 
to read through the chapter aloud in class. Mariam would stop the student reading aloud 
to discuss important points in the chapter or to ask discussion questions. She opened class 
with a question, “Why did they [the U.S.] need a national government?” Silence. She 
asked again, and still the students were silent.  "You know what?" she asked. "You need 
to start watching the news." 
 
Serbest: Miss, we have too much homework to watch the news. 
 
Mariam: So what? Since 1991, when I was 7 or 8 years old, I kept hearing about the 
“judgment day.” People were saying what was happening was the judgment day. This is 
always the case when something bad is happening. For example the Armenians after 
World War I said that it was the judgment. One day it will be judgment day for you. You 
don't know and I don't know when. So I just live my life and try to know what is going 
on. [pause] So why do we need a national government? 
 
Zayna: To prevent chaos. 
 
Mariam: That's it? 
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Gulistan: What do you mean by national government? 
 
Serbest: In Kurdistan we have our own government. 
 
Mariam: But still Kurdistan is part of Iraq. What else? You know why we have brains? 
To think with them. Think: What do I need by a government? 
 
Rasim: A system of laws. 
 
Zayna: A country. 
 
Gulistan: A system that organizes a country through rules and laws. 
 
Mariam: Ok, but what does government mean to you? In one word. [silence] Thomas, 
what does it mean to you? 
 




Ashur, [from the back, sitting tall and struggling to be heard]: I think of it as a large 
company that produces... 
 
Serbest: A factory! 
 
Layla: ...especially for oil. 
 
Mariam: Ms. Diana, what do you think?  
 
Diana: Does it have to be one word or can I say a phrase? 
 
Mariam: Ok, a phrase. 
 
Diana: Protection of liberties. 
 
Mariam: Wow, that is a good answer, but we don't have this in the Middle East! If you 
were to find an Iraqi woman Ms. Diana's age and ask her, she would never say this 
phrase. 
 
Hawar: What did she say? 
 
Diana, louder: Protection of liberties.  
 
Mariam: We can compare the two [Iraq and the U.S.]: The difference between Thomas [a 
white American citizen whose parents were employed in Erbil] and Hawar [a Kurdish 
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local] is what they learn and how they will think. Why did Ms. Diana give me this 
answer?  
 
Yakub: Because she is in university! 
 
Ishtar: Because this is what she learned in school, what her parents taught her... 
 
Mariam: What else? 
 
Ishtar: ...and this is her experience of living in America.  
 
Yakub raises his hand and says almost exactly what Ishtar has just said.  
 
Mariam: Yes, her experience. [Brief interruption] I want you to keep thinking about this 
question about why we need a national government.  
 
Gulistan resumes reading the textbook chapter aloud. Mariam instructs students 
periodically to underline things in the text, especially dates.  
 
Hawar: Miss why do you make us learn all these dates? 
 
Mariam: Dates are important. Do you know when is Army Day? [Silence] No one. Of 
course you know the date of Newroz because you have a holiday, you have a celebration. 
Do you know the date of the liberation of Baghdad? [Silence] 
 
Serbest: We only know the Kurdistan dates! We don't study Iraq in school. 
 
Mariam: You can't blame the school because you don't know! [Pauses, shakes her head] 
To be honest, I have full respect to the United States. The people who live there deserve 
it. 
 
Zayna: And we don't deserve it?! 
 
Mariam: No, we don't. [The students look shocked.] The regime of Saddam Hussein, if 
you said your opinion [makes throat slitting motion], bye bye. We asked for help to get 
freedom and democracy, and this is the result? We have greedy people in the 
government. And what do we do about it? So, I will do my best to earn what I want. It is 
the same with you. Like, when you cheat, what do you get? 
 




Yakub: You go to university! 
 
Mariam: And after that? 
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Rasim: You get a career! 
 
Mariam: You can't get the career if you didn't work to earn it. You can't become a doctor 
without studying. 
 
Serbest: Miss, I don't want to be a doctor. I only want to pass. [laughter] 
 




Ishtar: Mr. Bjar [their math teacher] told us that he worked as an engineer. And what he 
studied in school did not help him on the job. He had to learn on the job. He said he was 
“lost” because what he learned in college was not the job.  
 
Mariam: My sister is studying physics right now. You're telling me what she is studying 
"isn't real"? Physics is how things work. Math is how things work. History is how things 
happened. What you study IS REAL. The people who are lost are the people in villages 
who don't study.  
 
Hawar: None of us will graduate from this school and get [into] a good university. 
 
Zayna: Speak for yourself! 
 
Mariam: If you have a dream, a goal, you have to put a plan for yourself. 
 
At Mariam’s instruction, Gulistan resumed reading aloud.  
 
Mariam: One of the things about having a new country is that you have to be organized. 
This is one of our problems. 
 
Gulistan resumes reading aloud. A brief discussion about slavery follows, then Gulistan 
reads aloud until Mariam stops her again. 
 
Mariam: It's normal when you start a new country to have struggles. Being part of the 
struggle is normal. But what happens after the struggle is important too.  
 
Gulistan resumes reading a passage about the electoral college. 
 
Mariam: This is the same as the example I told you about yesterday, where you have the 
village agha or sheikh who represents the village. 
 
Gulistan resumes reading the passage, which is about the delegates not agreeing about the 
Virginia versus the New Jersey plans.  
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Mariam: Why is it always going nowhere? 
 
Serbest: Because people have different opinions. 
 
Rozhan: They did not reach a conclusion.  
 
Mariam: Yes, they didn't. Why? 
 
Serbest: No one is willing to change how they think.  
 
Mariam: Let's use school as an example: I say school is important. Someone will disagree 
with me. At the end we will not have a conclusion. Why? Because I want something to 
serve my own interests. [Yakub says something in Arabic.] English, Yakub.  
 
Yakub: I don't know how to say it in English. 
 
Mariam: Sometimes the disagreement is over something silly. [Pause] 
 
Mariam tells Mamiz to pick up reading where Gulistan stopped, a passage about the 
Supreme Court. 
 
Mariam: Is it right or wrong that we have certain [politicians]? Do we really know them? 
Let's say we have certain names here [makes a gesture like list-making] Is it right for me 
to elect people I don't know? What do you think? [Silence] 
 
Serbest: It is better for people to choose. Because someone on the committee may bribe, 
or they pick their cousin. 
 
Mariam: The time of Nouri al-Maliki was like this. [Pause] Hadi, what do you think? 
[Hadi mumbles something.] Ok, I will come back to you. Malek, what do you think? 
 
Malek: It is better to know the people. 
 
Hawar, turning to Malek: Why? 
 
Georges: The politicians can be bribed or biased. If you don't know the person... 
 
Mariam: The only time I voted I was at university. It was my first and last time to vote. 
When I decided to vote for [Ayad] Allawi, it was because I saw what he did [his record].  
 
Yakub: What did he do? 
 
Mariam: Many things! I felt safe then. As a woman I could go out from the university 
[into public places]. He helped the poor. And many properties that REALLY belonged to 
the church he gave back. 
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Zayna: Was it the only good time? 
 
Mariam: Yes. [Pause, silence. The bell rings.] 
 
  In the class session transcribed above, the civics teacher and her students are 
reformulating sovereignties and notions of personal agency in a strained socio-political 
environment. Mariam frames their discussion with the concept of a “judgment day,” a 
time of testing which “everyone” will face. Spurred on by the imminent judgment day, 
Mariam impresses upon her students their roles and responsibilities in, if not preventing 
the judgment, then responding appropriately to it. The civics classroom served as a “safe 
space” for students to express their opinions and disagree. Because their teacher was a 
displaced Iraqi Christian, her perspective differed from other teachers in the school. The 
government Kurdish courses particularly seemed to present only Kurdish ethnonationalist 
perspectives; other teachers, such as in math or science, were simply very focused on 
their course content. When Kurdistani students protested learning about “Iraq” because 
they are in Kurdistan, Mariam reprimanded them. She reminded students that they remain 
subject to federal Iraq, however flawed it may be. In the class transcript below, Mariam 
continues to ask students probing questions about the nature of government and calls 
them to action against corruption. 
 
Corruption and a call to action 
The photocopied chapter from the U.S. Civics textbook was titled "Struggle for 
Ratification." Mariam began class by asking a student read the text aloud. The text 
outlined the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. After a few sentences, 
she stopped the student reading and asked the class, "Which do you prefer? Federalists or 
Anti-Federalists? And why?" 
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Hawar: Federalist because they want a strong national government.  
 
Mariam: What about citizens' rights? 
 
Hawar: They will be there. 
 
Mariam: Are you sure? 
 
Sara: With a bill of rights. 
 
Thomas: If you take a little from both it will be better. 
 
Mariam: We will get to that later. A strong government needs limits. 
 
Gul: I'm with the Anti-Federalists. They showed more care for the people. 
 
Mariam: Don't you think you need a strong national government though?  
 
Gul: I don't see... 
 
Ahmed: It depends on the government. 
 
Mariam: What about the people of this government? [pause] I should teach you all 
philosophy.  
 
Hawar: [Government] should have limits. 
 
Mariam: What are the things that should have limits? You should have a list. 
 
Gulistan: No tyrants. Abuse of power. 
 
Mariam: Even when the country has a democracy a tyrant can be there. 
 
Hawar: No greed. 
 
Mariam: Georges, if you are going to choose this list of rights, what should they be. 
 
Georges: I don't know. 
 
Hawar: Maybe so someone will not lose their job by force... 
 
Mariam: Ok, what else? 
 
Thomas: Freedom of speech. 
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Mariam: After Saddam Hussein, they said you will have more freedom, you will have 
these freedoms, freedom of speech. 
 
Yakub: We have! 
 
Mariam: No, we don't. Many journalists in Baghdad had this freedom of speech, and they 
are dead now. To me, if we have a little of both - because they both have positivity and 
negativity - I think they will reach not only a strong national government but also the 
rights of the citizens.  
 
Nergiz resumed reading. Mariam stopped her and asked why the text said, "America was 
an immature nation." It was a comprehension question. Nerqiz answered that it was "not 
much time since the Declaration of Independence." Mariam said , "Yes."  Nergiz 
continued reading. 
 
Mariam: We can see that it's not just declare independence and that's it. Iraq has been 
struggling how many years? Since 2003. And still, it's not a stable country. Each person 
wants something for himself. That's why it's not stable. It's not just I have land, I need a 
government. There will be many killed, many victims. And I think - maybe it depends on 
the way that the Middle East people think. It's in our blood that we are selfish people. 
[Several students nod, say “ay wallah.”] If you get power, you will forget your beliefs, 




Mariam: Not only greed. You are the generation that we depend on to change something. 
[The class falls silent.] Not just politics. If you are a teacher, doctor, engineer - it doesn't 
matter - you don't need power to change society. You should have your own beliefs and 
your own principles. You live in Iraq, so what? Change your beliefs.  Maybe you can't 
see it now, but you can change something. I depend on you. Ms. Jamila [their literature 
teacher and school administrator] depends on you. Don't give up your hopes and dreams 
because of the society. Our society is not correct. Maybe 40 percent of it is, but.. 
 
Rasim: But we have corruption. 
 
Mariam: It is corrupt. But don't corrupt yourself. It's not about having power or an army. 
You can set your own rules. Be the citizen that we can depend on. It's not only about 
getting a degree or the college you want.  
 
Georges: What do you think of the U.S. society? 
 
Mariam: To be honest, most of us look at the U.S. according to the movies. But for 
example, if you want to change your religion, in the USA no one will kill you, judge you. 
You still have the rights of a citizen. What we need is a real freedom. We don't have it. 
Still there are certain things you cannot say or do. My uncle, my relatives live there [in 
the US] and to them it is heaven. They lived in Iraq. They didn't have their rights here. 
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There are negatives, sure, in every society. But as a citizen no one can touch you or hurt 
you. 
 
Georges: But no one has touched or hurt me. 
 
Mariam: Maybe you say that now. But grow up, go to university, get a job and then see if 
you still feel that way. 
 
Ahmed resumes reading. Mariam stops him to emphasize the phrase "a more perfect 
union."   
 
Mariam: Of course there is no perfect country. But they were trying. [Continuing her 
interaction with Georges] So what I see here, Georges, is no protection for the citizens. 
No protection from the attacks of other people. Why did I move here from 
Baghdad?  [Some students say freedom or because your family did.]  
 
Serbest: Freedom, for protection.  
 
Mariam: They threatened us. [pause] Yeah, they did.  
 
Georges: For what? 
 
Mariam: For being Christian. Ms. Diana, can someone threaten you for your religion in 
the U.S.?  
 
[I asked her to repeat the question.] 
 
Diana: If someone threatens you for your religion, you can go to the police. [That's all I 
said, unsure about how to introduce complexity into this conversation.] 
 
Mariam: My brother was in Rome studying theology. If [sectarian militants in Baghdad] 
found out they would have killed him.  
 
Georges: What about now? [Other students ask if Baghdad is safe now.] 
 
 Mariam: All of the Christian families in that area are gone. 
 
Georges: Couldn't you just move to another area [of Baghdad]?  
 
Mariam: Maybe we would face the same people.  
 
Ahmed continued reading aloud from the textbook chapter until the bell rang. 
 
When students attempt to shirk their moral and political responsibilities by 
pointing to state failures, Mariam insists that such failures do not absolve students of their 
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civic and political duties. While Mariam agrees that corruption and greed plague their 
government, she also acknowledges that new countries endure struggles, which is 
“normal.” Although she critiques those in power who are “corrupt” and “greedy,” she 
does not condemn power itself. Rather than adopting a defeatist attitude about said 
corruption, she encourages her students to “not corrupt themselves.” Instead, students 
must choose to work hard in school and in a career, for which their current classes are 
preparing them, until they come of age to vote and take other political action. “Be the 
citizen that we can depend on,” she implores them. 
 
Writing their own constitutions 
By April, the 10th grade civics class had moved on to analyzing the Iraqi 2005 
Constitution. Mariam distributed copies of the constitution in English. She instructed her 
students to look at the Preamble and asked Hawar to read aloud. Hawar read, “In the 
name of God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate…” 
Mariam: It starts with this one because it's an Islamic country. Second, we have the sons 
of Adam [referring to the second line, “We have honored the sons of Adam”]. These are 
the circumstances of this country, the fighting. It means we honor all of us, Muslims, 
Christians, Jewish, whatever races, whatever religion.  
 
Hawar continues: “We, the people of Mesopotamia,… 
  
Mariam: So far, they didn’t separate the people of Iraq [into sects] but considered [them] 
as one. 
 
Hawar continues reading, “...the homeland of the apostles and prophets, resting place of 
the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of writing, and home of numeration. 
Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, and the oldest pact of just 
governance was inscribed, and upon our soil the saints and companions of the Prophet 
prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized, and writers and poets excelled.” 
 
Mariam: Here we can say, “Wow, what a country we have!” Filled with religions, 
prophets, philosophers. Meospotamia was the first to write. We have this history; imagine 
what is happening now.  
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Hawar continues reading, “Acknowledging God's right over us, and in fulfillment of the 
call of our homeland and citizens, and in a response to the call of our religious and 
national leadership and the determination of our great authorities and of our leaders and 
politicians, and in the midst of international support from our friends and those who love 
us, marched for the first time in our history towards the ballot boxes by the millions, men 
and women, young and old, on the thirtieth of January 2005…” 
 
Mariam: For the first time since Saddam Hussein's regime, people have a right to vote. 
But later we will find out about what the people who represent us, the leaders, what they 
did.  [There is a guest at the door. Mariam steps out for a moment and then reenters.]  So 
you will say I will vote for this one because he or she will do something for me.  
 
Hawar reads, “...invoking the pains of sectarian oppression inflicted by the autocratic 
clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq's martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds 
and Turkmen and from all other components of the people…” 
 




Mariam: Yes. They have suffered a lot. I don't mind that I live in a religious country as 
long as they say I can keep my rights. To me, I prefer the secular countries. It will 
guarantee the same rights for all citizens. We are the people from this land. Syriac, 
Assyrian, Chaldi. We are from here. Why did they not mention us? Iraq consists of many 
races, religious groups. Mark this section. Put a sign on it. 
 
Hawar reads on about sectarian conflict and the suffering of various ethnoreligious 
groups until he comes to the phrase "hand to hand, shoulder to shoulder," which is meant 
to symbolize unity, but Mariam stops him. She repeats the phrase sarcastically, making a 
clashing motion with her hands and shoulders. One student jokes by making a self-
flagellation movement in reference to Shi’i religious practices. 
  
Mariam: This is the difference between people who learned from the past and those who 
did not. If we go back to ancient times, we were more developed then than now. Imagine 
it: We are blessed in this country because we are part of this land, but we are cursed, too. 
For example, I am 33 years old. My mom keeps worrying about me, about my 
grandchildren. If we stay here there will be no future, she says. Shall we go or shall we 
stay? Shall we act or shall we be like a people just watching, waiting? But we have this 
faith in each one of us. It will make us have hope.  
 
Yakub [sneering]: Inshallah  
 
Mariam [seriously]: Yes. Inshallah. 
 
Hawar resumes reading aloud and asks, "Miss what does 'sectarianism' mean?” 
160 
 
Mariam: It means sects, like Sunni, Shia, madhhabiyy in Arabic, I don't know the word in 
Kurdish.  
 
There is some brief discussion about diversity.  
 
Hawar continues aloud: ...[We] have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice 
to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this 
permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the 
findings of science and man's civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves 
for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty. 
 
Mariam: [Our experience] is below the expectations. Because, let's be honest, maybe at 
that time...what grade you were in 2003?  
 
Students: Miss, we were not even in school! [Students chatter] 
 
Mariam: [Claps hands] It was the dream of all Iraqi citizens... 
 
Hawar: for Saddam to go... 
 
Mariam: Yes, I am telling you: many families suffered, many families lost their members, 
moms, dads, kids, and we all know what happened in Halabja and Anfal. [Pause] Some 
of them - the ones that supported him, they didn't want to - but when they had decided 
was that Iraq should be changed, it should be better. But what I see is that is that it turned 
worse. My dream is to go back to Baghdad, the place where I was raised, the place where 
I spent my childhood, my university was there, my friends are there. And I keep 
dreaming of my own house, of our garden, the big one, and the tree in the middle of the 
garden. And I keep dreaming of how I used to ride the bicycle in the middle of the street 
with my friends and still I want [trails off]...but when will this come true? [Pause] When I 
am reading this [constitution preamble] it is perfect, and then as I continue reading it is 
missing something. And then as Hawar said, it is lies. [Politicians] should not blame the 
citizens if they [politicians] did not do their duties. 
 
Yakub: But Saddam was the most powerful... 
 
Medya: Why do some people believe in his reign, say that it was all safe? 
 
Hawar: It was safe, wallah, it was safe! 
 
Mariam: I will answer you [Medya],but let us go back to that one [section]. 
 




Mariam asks another student, Belend, to read aloud “Section One: Fundamental 
Principles.” Belend reads, “Article One: The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, 
independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, 
representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the 
unity of Iraq…”  
 
Mariam: Article one is very important. They mention many important features: 
republican, representative, democratic. Well. Which one of these points we can see that 
they did not [achieve]? Is it a republic? [Students shake heads no.] I agree with you: 
Failure. When we saw on TV the fighting, stealing, killing, and where is the money? 
[Imitating politicians] Blah blah blah. And we can go and see [the politicians’] castles, 
some of them are in London, some of them around the world. 
 




Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:   
1.  No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam   
2. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.   





This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and 
guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all 
individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans.”  
 
Mariam [raises eyebrows, speaks in a sarcastic tone]: Oh really? [Pause] I prefer 
separation of religion [and state]. Because here Islam is the official religion, but it is not 
the same of Christianity, Yezidi, Jewish; it is not the same with other, different religions. 
[Pause] I'm sorry, but you know my ideas. I am very free and open. There will be 
struggles. There will be clashes. There are certain points, like, getting the Iraqi ID is 
against Christianity. [Pause]  Here the Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the 
majority and guarantees the full religious right and practice of all individuals such as 
Christians, and, by the way, the Mandeans are the people who follow Yahya.... 
 
Rasim: John the Baptist 
 
Mariam: There are certain ceremonies we have - as Christians we are proud to be, and the 
Muslims are proud and the Jewish are the same. And believe me, I can tell you it 
happened that many families in Baghdad prevented Christian families to put the cross on 
their doors. Why? [They said] “we are Muslims, you have no right.” It happened at 
university, I remember this: I used to wear a short skirt. And one of the girls wearing a 
veil, she said, “Why you don't wear a long [skirt]?” And I said “Why?” And she said, 
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“Don't you have respect for our religion?” And I said, “Respect your religion first and 
then come and respect our religion.” And my friend, he was a Shii Muslim, and he said 
[to the veiled girl], “You have no right to ask her to do something that her religion is not 
asking her to do that.” And it happened with many: the security of that university at that 
time tended to be more religious and they kept writing “to respect yourself as a girl, you 
have to wear a veil and reduce your makeup, and it is better if you are wearing gloves.”  
 
Hawar: But, miss, Islam does not say wear long skirts like this. It is only an idea... 
 
Mariam: I know. I can see the real Islam in Mihriban [gesturing to her]. I can see the real 
Islam in you. But the majority, I don't know what they think of themselves. So I don't 
agree with this [point in the Constitution]. They did not guarantee my religious practice. 
Or my rights. They did not. [Speaking rhetorically] Why am I here? Why I am here in 
Kurdistan? Why did I not stay in Baghdad? [silence] 
 
Belend continues reading aloud, “Article 3: Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, 
religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League and is 
committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world.” 
 
Mariam: You can see they keep repeating "the Islamic world". Ok. We got it. 
 
Hawar: Miss, what is wrong with that? 
 
Mariam: You will see that they do the opposite of what they say.   
 
Belend reads aloud, “Article 4: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the 
two official languages of Iraq.” 
 
Mariam: Did they achieve something? Well, yes. Before [2005] only Arabic was official 
[language]. And now Kurdish [is an official language]. But still, there are Assyrian and 
Chaldean, and they are not [official] languages; they should mention them here.  
 
Belend continues: “The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, 
such as Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational 
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private 
educational institutions.” 
 
Mariam: I studied Kurdish. I was in grade 10. But did they really apply [Article 4]? Are 
Christians and Assyrians studying in their mother tongue? 
 
Rasim: But now there are restaurants having names in Assyrian... 
 
Ashur: Miss, they are in Ainkawa... 
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Mariam: No, I am talking about the school. I studied Kurdish in grade 10, one year, yeah 
I studied, only one year. Did I study the Syriac one? No, I did not. My sister studied for a 
very short time, and they decided we will change it for something else. 
 
Hawar: Miss, now it is really better. In Duhok there are schools who teach Christianity. 
 
Mariam: I am talking about Baghdad. 
 
Ashur: For example, I studied in grade 1 through 6 in Syriac in Ainkawa (a township 
within Erbil). 
 
Mariam: Guys, I am talking about Baghdad and the South!  
 
 
 Throughout her lessons, Mariam returned to the same themes: She and her family 
enjoyed a good life in Baghdad until the 2003 invasion, the subsequent war and sectarian 
violence, and her family’s eventual displacement. In her narrative, she emphasized that 
Christians and other ethnoreligious minorities had been targeted, citing this as evidence 
of the failing Iraqi state. While still living in Baghdad, she witnessed the spread of 
sectarian political culture and violence, which she associated with a corrupt and failing 
government that had betrayed its citizens. Although Mariam initially desired to become a 
lawyer, her father disapproved, and she chose to become a teacher instead. With time, 
Mariam had begun to see her role as a teacher as an opportunity to contribute to 
rebuilding her country. She told her students that they could make the best of their 
situations, just as she had done and continued to do during the (then) current economic 
crisis and war with the Islamic State. Students could choose what to study and discern 
how best to improve themselves and their country. Like Sara and some of the other 
teachers, Mariam’s expressed hopes for the future largely rested on her students’ success 
– if she could persuade them to not give up hope and abandon Iraq, either by emigrating, 
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or, if they remained in their country, by resigning themselves to cynicism or apathy and 
withdrawing from political, and to some extent social, life.  
 Mariam’s students received her lessons unevenly. Some students questioned 
whether the situation in Baghdad, and in Iraq as a whole, was really “that bad.” Her 
students had not directly experienced any violence in their relatively insular, privileged 
lives in the Kurdistan Region. Some found it difficult to empathize with their displaced 
teachers’ stories and to respond to teachers’ appeals to morality and duty. When I asked 
students during private interviews to tell me what they thought about their teachers like 
Mariam and Sara, a few described them as role models or inspirational and expressed 
appreciation for their teachers’ apparently genuine concern for their students. Other 
students, however, complained that they did not want to stay in Iraq, where they might 
end up in a “lower status” job like teaching. Others aspired to medicine and engineering 
but conceded that these were careers their families desired for them. Instead, many 
students hoped to emigrate to Europe or to the United States, where they could escape the 
“failed” Iraqi state, the “failing” Kurdistan Region, and perhaps family pressures, too.   
 
“The history of where you are from” 
During my semester in KCS, I conducted several class wide group interviews. 
These usually occurred when a teacher was too burdened with administrative work or felt 
unwell and offered me the opportunity to interview their students. Teachers were never 
present during group interviews. I sat at the front of the class typing furiously on my 
laptop while students answered my questions. 
Diana to grade 8 class: What have you learned in komalayatȋ class? 
 
Dana: The history of our country. 
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Chira, correcting him: The Islamic history of our country. 
 
Dilvin: Komalayatȋ in this school isn’t taken seriously. This is the first year we’ve 
had a proper teacher and book. We should have started from grade 4, but nobody 
paid attention to it. Komalayatȋ is about your country and where you are from, and 
you should know it. But no one in this school does. In other schools they 
memorize it. 
 




Many students: Kurdistan 
 
Diana: How many of you consider your country to be Iraq? [Ahmed raises his 
hand.] And the rest of you? 
 
Other students: Kurdistan! [15 raise their hands. The remaining 4 students had 
lived outside Iraq and thus considered themselves to be foreigners, e.g. Canadian.] 
 
When I interviewed the fifteen or so students in grade 9, my asking their opinions 
about Komalayatȋ provoked them, leading to a heated debate:  
Zina: Yes, we need to learn about [komalayatȋ]! They teach us “Human Rights 
and Genocide” [another Kurdistan Regional Government mandated course], so 
why not this?  
 
[Students begin to speak over each other] 
 
Rebwar: ...it’s important to keep a culture alive... 
 
Halo: ...It’s a really good class but some students hate it... 
 
Gul: ...it’s horrible because in this type of school we are in now we really don’t 
need it… 
 
Yusuf: ...It’s a waste of time, we don’t do anything real… 
 
Cejne: ...The teacher is really nice, but the lesson is boring... 
 
Rebwar: ...The info is useful, but the majority of the class doesn’t care... 
 
Lunja, unable to stay silent any longer, stood up and turned to confront Yusuf:  
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Lunja: So you think it is unnecessary to study komalayatȋ?! So, when someone 
asks you the history of where you are from, what will you say? 
 
Yusuf: I am from Iraq! 
 
Several students speak over each other arguing about the definition of “their country.”  
 
Gul to me: Miss, if you come to the truth of it, there is no Iraq, there are Kurds, 
there are Assyrians... 
 
Halo, rising from his desk: Your history is who you are, your identity. If you 
don’t know your history, you don’t know who you are.  
 
[Students cheer and clap] 
 
Arjin, a petite, outspoken student stands up and faces her classmates. 
 
Arjin: Let me tell you about my country: First of all, there is no gender equality! 
[Some female students vigorously clap] Second of all, they force religion upon 
you! They are close minded! 
 
 
Just as in Mariam’s civics lessons, the Grade 9 students could not reach a 
consensus on national identity. Their criticisms of Iraq and Kurdistan referenced 
sectarianism, gender inequality, economic crisis, and government corruption. They were 
especially cynical about Kurdish ethnonationalism and the campaign for an independent 
Kurdistani state. When Bailen, one of the more patriotic Kurdish students tried to defend 
his political party, the other students heckled him. Bailen moved aggressively toward 
Yusuf, and students stood between them to prevent a fight. Frightened, one of the female 
students left the room and informed Ms. Helin, who entered the classroom and 
commanded everyone to sit and be silent. That was the end of my interview with Grade 9, 
and thereafter I interviewed students in smaller groups.  
After the fight in Grade 9, some students told me privately that they were 
disturbed about what happened. There had been previous tense episodes like the one I 
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witnessed. The students had learned to avoid controversial topics to keep peace among 
the relatively small student body. Many had grown up together in the school, and now the 
school was more diverse than before. The komalayatȋ class, as well as my presence in the 
school, seemed to exacerbate tensions about controversial topics. When I created a space 
for students to express their opinions, their discussion quickly deteriorated into a brawl. 
Not incidentally, Karza, who incorporated political critique and secular philosophy into 
his lessons, was not invited to return to teach komalayatȋ the following semester. Students 
once again did not have a social studies teacher.  
Teachers like Sara and Mariam strove to help their students cultivate an ethical 
sensibility premised on religious or humanistic “brotherly love,” as well as on shared 
national identity. Over the months I spent in KCS, I observed their moral efforts in the 
classroom and later listened to their dispirited conversation in the teachers’ break room. 
No matter how hard they tried to reach their students, it seemed that students generally 
were not receptive; rather, they were antagonistic or evasive. In school, and in social and 
political discourse, young people were instructed to desire a functional state, whether 
Iraqi or Kurdistani. The cause of rehabilitating national identity, however, did not 
motivate students, especially ethnically Kurdish students. They simply “[did] not love 
Iraq.”  
But these youth did not appear interested in an independent Kurdistani state 
either. They expressed disenchantment with all forms of political life, and not just the 
forms available to them, but also those forms they were encouraged to imagine and aspire 
to in their civics and komalayatȋ lessons. Perhaps these private school students’ 
comfortable and insular lifestyles rendered them apathetic and selfish. That would be a 
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partial explanation, one favored by some of my interlocutors, but not applicable to all 
students. Some had experienced the effects of war, displacement, financial insecurity, and 
discrimination in the Kurdistan Region. Through their lessons in school and their family 
histories, young people knew that cycles of war and genocide had plagued their homeland 
for well over a century. That knowledge, and the pervasive gloom due to war, economic 
crisis, and political disappointments, produced a kind of emotional fatigue.  
In addition to historical knowledge and emotional fatigue, young people also 
expressed skepticism about their own agency. In lessons, and in private conversations, 
students discussed how “culture” or society limited their abilities to realize personal 
goals. They experienced restrictions on friendships, relationships, mobility, and choice of 
career. They expressed little hope, if any, in any potential individual efforts to affect 
changes in society or in politics. And yet, their teachers repeatedly insisted that students 
not only possessed the necessary abilities, but that young people had a moral duty to use 
these abilities to the aid of their family, community, and country. Teachers like Mariam 
and Sara drew upon a particular model of ethical life presented at Kurdistan Civilization 
School (KCS), premised upon individual autonomy and heavy responsibility for one’s 
own moral progress.  
When students resisted their teachers’ appeals to this model of ethical life, they 
were not merely shirking responsibility, if they were avoiding it all. Rather, I believe that 
their resistance reflected their skepticism in the feasibility, and not necessarily the 
desirability, of individual autonomy in Kurdistan and in Iraq. Since my field work, I have 
observed some of these young people express solidarity with youth in Baghdad, and more 
recently in the city of Slemanȋ, protesting government corruption. On Instagram and 
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Snapchat, they have shared news stories with the hashtage “SaveTheIraqiPeople.”  My 
sense is that, although these young people expressed solidarity with protestors, they were 
nevertheless skeptical about the “goodness” of the nation and the “goodness” of the state. 
Ethnonationalism was problematic; they had observed this at school. And desiring a 
functional state was not enough. Countless times I heard older people speak of the Iraqi 
state as being “better” during the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, not 
because they enjoyed more freedoms, but because the state provided more economic and 
political stability.  
Young people I listened to were acutely aware of what was at stake in talk about 
the nation and the state. They had heard people express nostalgia for an authoritarian and 
genocidal regime, and they had observed how their classmates and teachers had suffered 
from “sectarian” violence and discrimination. Now, they were being instructed to 
“desire” certain forms of political life, when they knew well that these political forms had 
not protected their friends or communities. Is it any wonder, then, that they questioned 
whether the nation or the state were ideal political forms, not just for achieving protection 
or stability, but for advancing human flourishing? Desiring freedoms and desiring the 
state are not the same thing, especially when one is a member of an ethnoreligious 
minority community, or when it is unclear who is friend and who is foe. 
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Figure 5. Mural depicting schoolchildren carrying the Kurdistani flag, painted on the wall 
of a school in Erbil. Photo by the author. 2017 
 
“Oh, my enemy!” 
On a chilly February morning, Kurdistan Civilizational School students hurried 
from their buses to the basketball court. Students and teachers were assembling for a 
patriotic ceremony. Inside the court there were four groups: Grades 9 and 10 stood 
together as one unit; grades 7 and 8 stood together; and grade 11 stood by itself. The 
fourth group was comprised of three students who had been selected to march toward the 
flagpole and raise the Kurdistani flag. The flag-raisers stood beside a handful of students 
chosen to sing the national anthem into a microphone. I noticed Muna from grade 8 was 
one of the singers.   
Muna was born into a well-educated Arab Muslim family in Baghdad. Both her 
parents earned advanced degrees in science and engineering. When Muna was 10 years 
171 
old, the family moved to Kurdistan. The move was difficult for Muna. In her new, 
Kurdish-majority school she was bullied by some kids who said, “Go back to Iraq, we 
don’t want you here.” Their taunts puzzled Muna: The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is an 
autonomous region within the federal Iraqi state; it is subject to the federal government in 
Baghdad, and it is located within Iraq’s national borders. Strictly speaking, the Kurdistan 
Region is part of Iraq. But Muna’s bullies spoke of Kurdistan as many people do – as a 
separate country. The disputed nature of the Kurdistan Region’s political borders and 
character is one of the major themes, not only of this chapter, but throughout the 
dissertation. 
It had been three years since Muna moved from Baghdad and enrolled in 
Kurdistan Civilization School. Now people rarely said negative things about Muna’s 
“Iraqi” identity. It seemed to me that she had adjusted to living in Kurdistan and her new 
school as well as one could hope. She made every effort to be cheerful around her 
teachers and peers. When I visited Muna’s classes, she eagerly waved me over to the 
empty desk beside hers; she enjoyed surreptitiously writing notes to me during 
komalayatȋ (social studies) which was taught in Kurdish. She did not know enough 
Kurdish to follow the komalayatȋ lesson, so she worked on other assignments, doodled, or 
passed notes back and forth with me. In Muna’s remedial Kurdish language class, the 
teacher wrote example sentences about the peshmerga (Kurdish military) and the Kurdish 
nation, and he asked the students to do likewise. Muna worked hard to learn Kurdish. “I 
hate feeling left out,” she said about everyone around her speaking a language she did not 
understand.  
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At the patriotic ceremony, Muna and her fellow singers waited for their signal. A 
male voice instructed the students to stand at attention; they became quiet and stood tall. 
Only a few placed their hands over their hearts. The three flag raisers marched to the 
flagpole and hoisted the Kurdistani flag.  A recording of the Kurdistani national anthem, 
“Ey Raqib” (“Oh My Enemy”) began playing; it had a tinny sound, reminiscent of 
children’s songs. The students began singing. Most appeared to know the words and sang 
with blank facial expressions. I saw Marwa, the Mandean girl I often sat beside on the 
school bus, standing in the grade 8 block and looking very uncomfortable. Literature 
teachers and close friends Shams, an Arab Muslim from Baghdad, and Sara, a Christian 
from Qaraqosh, stood with grim expressions. I wondered what emotions the Kurdish 
anthem stirred in Shams and Sara, both displaced and unhappy. I stood beside Liloz, one 
of the Kurdish language and literature teachers. She bore an inscrutable expression. 
Leaning close to her, I asked if she knew all the words (yes), and how often they sang? 
“Once a week,” she replied quietly. Turning to look at me with a serious look, she added, 
“It’s necessary (Payweesta).” During the anthem, she stood silently at attention. 
Meanwhile, the chosen female students sang the anthem haltingly. Muna looked 
around the gym, her wide eyes full of uncertainty. After the girls finished singing the 
anthem, high school administrator Ms. Helin took the microphone and said a crisp 
“bayanitan bash” (good morning) which received a weak “bayani bash” reply from the 
crowd. Ms. Helin routinely spoke in Kurdish to the students, unlike most of her fellow 
administrators who spoke English. She announced that she would be visiting the 
classrooms for inspection today, “bashe?” (ok?). We were dismissed. I hurried to catch 
up with Muna, who was standing with a friend. I asked if she volunteered to sing, or was 
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she chosen? Muna said she was chosen, and her friend added, “Yeah she had to [sing] 
unless she wanted minus on her marks.” Muna said she was “really embarrassed.” She 
wondered why she was chosen considering that, “We [non-Kurdish students] don’t even 




Ch. 4 “This is the life here”: Ethical life among bodybuilders and gym-goers 
 
“Brother, don’t build your city of dreams. Help the people of this city to escape 
even more sadness. We fantasise to forget our suffering. Imagination acts as a 
shield in this city.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, I Stared at the Night of the City 
 
 
The coach’s atrophied body 
From an early age, Rashid wanted to be a bodybuilder. He was born in the late 
1980s in the city of Mosul, a hub for Iraqi bodybuilding. In elementary school, he drew 
bodybuilders while other kids drew trees and flowers. At age 12, he did 200 pushups a 
day and lifted any heavy object he could find. Although relatively small in stature, Rashid 
was determined to build muscle. In his teenage years, he joined a bodybuilding gym and 
admired the guys who worked out there because they “loved to be big.” By 2010, Rashid 
was coaching in that gym, following the example of Fahd, the head coach and a 
professional bodybuilder.  
In 2012, Rashid left Mosul and moved to the city of Erbil, also called Hewlêr, the 
capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). During the day Rashid 
worked in an accounting office, and in the evening, he taught fitness classes and offered 
personal training in a new gym. A couple years later, Fahd also moved to Erbil, where he 
reconnected with Rashid. When Rashid saw the physical condition of his old friend and 
former coach, he was shocked:  
When [Fahd] was in Mosul, he was in prison for a while for something that he 
didn’t do, and he got tortured there. Before he got caught by the police, no, the 
government – I don’t know what part captured him – he was a really huge guy. I 
first saw him after he came out of prison. I didn’t recognize him when he came 
out. He was so thin, 45 kilograms. So it was weird seeing that big guy turn into 




Rashid also recalled standing with Fahd on a busy street in Erbil when a nearby car 
braked loudly and startled the coach. “He got scared, he snapped up. I felt sorry for him. 
Anyhow, thank God he has a gym [in Erbil] now,” Rashid concluded. State violence had 
reduced Fahd from a champion bodybuilder and local hero to a malnourished and 
nervous immigrant in a city where he knew very few people. Although Fahd recovered 
enough to open his own gym in Erbil, the traumas he suffered in Mosul haunted him. 
In contemporary Iraq, the effects of violence inscribed on individual bodies like 
Fahd’s make visible the legacies of war and the disintegrating Iraqi state. In speaking of 
individual debilitated bodies, Iraqis also speak of violence committed against the 
fractured body politic. Everyday encounters with visibly traumatized bodies, individual 
and collective, make the discourse of broken bodies especially salient in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq. The Second Gulf War (2003 – 2011) and the conflict with the Islamic 
State (2014 – 2017) not only injured countless Iraqi people, but also sent waves of 
internally displaced Iraqis and Syrian refugees into the Kurdistan Region. During my 
fieldwork, approximately two million IDPs and refugees were living in the KRI – a 
staggering forty percent increase in the Kurdistan Region’s population. Water and 
electricity shortages became more frequent. The burden of hosting IDPs and refugees 
also exacerbated problems between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the 
federal Iraqi government. When the KRG independently and “illegally” negotiated oil 
sales with international buyers, Baghdad responded by withholding the KRG’s share of 
the national budget. For months on end, the KRG reduced or ceased paying public sector 
salaries, which supported an estimated sixty percent of the population. However, in this 
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same period of violence which decimated so many Iraqi bodies, bodybuilding and the 
fitness industry in Kurdistan were flourishing.  
In this chapter, I examine how bodybuilding and gym-going narratives contribute 
to a larger discourse about broken bodies, state violence, and ethical life in Iraq – or, as I 
heard many people put it, “this is the life here.” I argue that the convergence of war, 
state-making, and the global fitness industry upon the sporting body make it a site of 
resistance and ethical self-formation. Because the sporting body typically symbolizes the 
“positive” powers of the state or empire, discourses about strength mask the sporting 
body’s vulnerabilities to these same powers. They also obscure the contested symbolic 
life of the sporting body in everyday experience and in contexts of violence. In the 
Kurdistan Region, individual athletes and gym-goers speak of their fitness practices, not 
as success symbols of the nation or state, but as a means of personal recovery from 
sectarian violence and failures of the state. Although some version of the victorious 
athlete trope remains in the narratives of individual Iraqis, it is often transformed into a 
neoliberal success story inflected with modernization discourse: Individuals compete, not 
for the sake of the nation or with the aid of the state, but for the sake of becoming a 
stronger and more “modern” person with the aid of the global fitness industry. By 
understanding how Iraqi bodybuilding narratives both employ and critique tropes about 
national strength and “modernity,” this chapter demonstrates how the spread of the global 
fitness industry offers individual athletes and their fitness communities a set of ethical 




From bullets to bodybuilding 
 It was June 2017 and the middle of Ramadan when I met “Georges,” a 
bodybuilder involved in opening “Fitness World,” a new gym in the city of Erbil. I was 
surprised to hear that a new gym was opening in this period of what seemed like total 
stagnation: The war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dragged on. The 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) faced a deepening economic crisis and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) had reduced or ceased paying public sector salaries. 
Consequently, most projects had halted. Marlana, a fitness instructor I met while visiting 
various gyms, had invited me to see Fitness World, which was not yet open to the public. 
She knew the owner and was friendly with the staff. Her brother Yusuf, a self-described 
“gym addict,” was already working out there despite the lingering construction litter. 
Fitness World sat along 100 Meter Road, one of the major roads that loops around the 
city of Erbil. The side of the building facing 100 Meter Road had floor to ceiling 
windows, displaying cardio machines and the people using them to the busy street below. 
The hall contained neat rows of gleaming new cardio equipment and orderly weight sets.  
Georges was mild-mannered and not as bulky as some of the other bodybuilders I 
had met in Erbil. He had an unassuming smile and soft voice. Born into a Chaldean 
Christian family in Baghdad in 1982, Georges left school in grade 11 to earn money for 
his family. At age 19, he was conscripted into the Iraqi army, where he became 
accustomed to the physical exercise and discipline around which he still organizes his 
life. After completing his military service, Georges trained with a well-known coach and 
participated in a few bodybuilding competitions in which he medaled. In 2006, during 
one of the worst periods of sectarian violence, his coach was assassinated in a terrorist 
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attack. Georges’ friend was shot dead beside him, and Georges was shot in the back. He 
and his family, like so many other Iraqis during the war, fled north to the relatively safe 
Kurdistan Region. 
 After two months in the hospital and one year of physical therapy, Georges 
returned to bodybuilding. In 2015 and 2017 he placed first in competitions in Erbil. As 
we sat in the gym office and talked, he gathered his many certificates, trophies, and 
medals from a display case and spread them across the desk between us. The sun’s rays 
shimmered on the medals and trophies, and Georges smiled as he told us about each one. 




Figure 6: Georges’ trophies. Copyright by the author.  
 
Gyms and sports in the modern Middle East 
 Gymnasiums and bodybuilding have contributed to the creation of the modern 
Middle East in ways that scholars only recently have begun exploring. Historians have 
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documented the role of sports in producing “fit” and patriotic citizen subjects and in 
creating new spaces of intimacy. Empires and states were envisioned as strengthened 
through citizens’ contributions to the body politic through sports. In the 19th century 
Ottoman Empire, physical education in schools and in private sports clubs, as well as 
through the transnational circulations of exercise culture, contributed to the creation of a 
shared physical culture among Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Yildiz 2019). European or 
American notions of “muscular Christianity” circulated throughout the Middle East, 
inspiring the “muscular Islam” of scouting organizations (Krais 2019).  
Paul Silverstein (2019) notes the tendency to over-attribute the genealogy of 
sporting masculinity to imperialism and colonial missionary activity. There is an older 
and broader “ongoing intimacy” between sports and religious movements (483). In Iran, 
for example, the “ancient” martial arts practiced in the zurkhaneh (house of strength) are 
believed to have religious origins, possibly in Zoroastrianism. The zurkhaneh also 
incorporates Islamic virtues and understandings of the body, which continue to inform 
notions of modern, virtuous, and masculine Persian subjects (Smith 2016; Ridgeon 2007). 
“Physical exercise, and even competitive sports, have long been integrated into the daily 
practices of committed Muslims,” Silverstein observes (2019:483). Sports follow the 
rhythms of the religious calendar: Soccer offers a welcome distraction from fasting and 
abstaining during Ramadan (Schielke 2009). At the gym where I worked, one 
bodybuilder broke his Ramadan fast every evening with a protein shake before working 
out. 
The co-presence of more traditionally masculine sports like bodybuilding with 
mixed-gender gyms in the Middle East, or the co-presence of the religious with the 
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secular, is not a bug of “development.” These are features of modernity itself, of ethical 
self-making and modern state-making. Silverstein observes that, 
More religiously committed Moroccan men build their Islamic ethical selves in 
homosocial settings of dojos and bodybuilding gyms, much as other upper-class 
Moroccans develop secular aesthetics alongside their visible bodily form in 
mixed-sex urban fitness centers. In both of the latter cases, athletic facilities are 
not just body factories but advanced technologies for self-making (2019:484). 
 Modern Middle Eastern states have excelled at nation-building through sport. 
Murat Yildiz argues that the creation of a popular sports culture was “central to the 
formation of the modern” in the Ottoman era (2019”468). Thereafter, the early Turkish 
state promoted programs of gymnastics for both men and women to “modernize” the 
nation and to promote Kemalist values (Özyürek 2006). The Pan-Arab games were 
organized to advance Arab cultural and political unity (Henry, Amara, and Al-Tauqi 
2003) and were modeled after the ultimate spectacle of nationalist sentiment amid 
international cooperation, the Olympic games (MacAloon 2013). National and 
international competitions reify national or state boundaries and essentialize the 
discursive national character of states and athletes within those states. Even nations 
without states advance their cause in international sporting events: For example, Kurdish 
nationalism and aspirational statehood are promoted by the Kurdish soccer team depicted 
in the documentary Desert Fire (Losh and Rabas 2016). Likewise, Kurdish bodybuilders 
and mixed martial arts (MMA) practitioners who live in Europe or the United States 
drape themselves with the Kurdistani flag at competitions (Kurdistan24 n.d.). 
 Among sports, bodybuilding exemplifies the cultivation of individual strength and 
symbolic national strength. Bodybuilding has been a popular sport in Iraq for decades, 
second only to soccer. In 1972, when bodybuilding in the U.S. was still a nascent, “freak” 
hobby, Iraq hosted the International Bodybuilding Federation’s World Congress. It was 
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the same year that Iraq nationalized its petroleum industry. Around 3,000 spectators 
attended the week-long championships in Baghdad, which were broadcast to millions 
inside and outside Iraq. The President of the International Federation of Bodybuilders, 
Ben Weider, memorized and recited an Arabic translation of his opening ceremony 
speech. Every sentence was met with “overwhelming applause,” and Weider cheered 
“long live the Iraqi Sportsman!” (Weider). 
Recently, re-injections of bodybuilding culture have come to Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region through U.S. military presence and international actors working in the 
humanitarian and private sectors (Dennehy 2017). Many of my interlocutors worked as 
translators or security personnel with the U.S. military or with NGOs, where they had 
access to gyms and trainers. Some of my interviewees drew connections between U.S. 
global power, the strength of its military, and the perceived high-quality of its gym 
equipment and knowledge of exercise science.  
Kenneth Saltman (2006) analyzes military and fitness industry connections in his 
article “The Strong Arm of the Law.” While “the built body promises safety, security, 
and freedom,” Saltman argues, the built body also “[contributes] to the militarization of 
society– a process at odds with democratization” (50). In conditions of war and 
instability, strength sports offer an appealing “fantasy of security” (53). English language 
news media perpetuate this fantasy by reporting their surprise at finding bodybuilding in 
wartime Iraq (Londono 2008). The Western “discovery” of Iraqi bodybuilding is similar 
to Western media fascination with female Kurdish resistance fighters, and reflects a 
broader fascination with gender stereotypes of the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 2013) . 
Perhaps interest in these gender stereotype-reversal stories also stems from a desire to 
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believe that Iraqis will survive the destruction of wars which Westerners, particularly 
Americans, brought to the region. In a 2017 Washington Post photo essay on Sadr City’s 
female weightlifters, Emilienne Malfatto (2017) writes,  
For me, this story is a way to show how different Iraq can be from what we 
imagine. Yes, it is Sadr City. Yes, it is violent and conservative. But you also 
have life — in a very strong and simple way. And you also have girls — young 
women — challenging stereotypes.  
Many of my interlocutors also expressed hopefulness at seeing women exercising in 
gyms and challenging stereotypes. Some, like the journalist, expressed a desire to show 
how strength can be cultivated despite the enervating effects of war. But bodybuilding 
itself exerts violence upon the body through grueling training and steroid use. Many of 
my interlocutors described bodybuilding as backward and outdated. Strength sports like 
CrossFit and global fitness culture, on the other hand, appealed to those hoping to build a 
more “modern” society. 
 
Fit for statehood 
In recent years, the fitness industry has grown rapidly in the Kurdistan Region. 
The KRI has become a new regional destination for bodybuilding training and 
competitions, and several new fitness centers have opened in the city of Erbil. These 
developments are said to evidence the Kurdistan Region’s development and “fitness” for 
statehood. On the other hand, some of my Kurdistani interlocutors expressed concerns 
that mixed-gender gyms might foster illicit relationships, distract young people from their 
family obligations, and thus destabilize the social order. People who are critical of the 
social order, that is, critical of the status quo, were frustrated by the “moral panic” 
surrounding mixed-gender gyms. These critics pointed to moral panic as evidence that 
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the Kurdistan Region is not “modern” or “progressive” enough, and thus not yet “fit” to 
become an independent country. Similarly, many of my interlocutors criticized the 
deepening ethnoreligious, class, and political divides in the Kurdistani body politic. 
Bodybuilding and gym-going can make visible these divides; or, as some hoped, they can 
help heal the personal and political wounds of war.  
 In Iraqi Kurdistan, global fitness culture and bodybuilding emerged from the 
intersections of war, economic sanctions, displacement, and humanitarian interventions. 
After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France imposed a 
no-fly zone (NFZ) over the Kurdistan Region to protect the ethnic Kurdish population 
there. The NFZ effectively opened the Kurdistan Region to international commerce and 
enabled the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to expand its autonomy and 
governance of the KRI. The same destruction of the 2003-2011 war that crippled much of 
Iraq boosted construction in the Kurdistan Region. Umut Kuruüzüm (2018) has shown 
how the war’s wreckage produced scrap material that was transported north to the 
Kurdistan Region, along with a growing labor force of internally displaced Iraqis, 
refugees from Syria, and migrant laborers from Turkey.  
Many Kurdish people who had been living in diaspora in Europe and the United 
States returned to the Kurdistan Region during a period of relative stability and economic 
growth (2011-2014). Additionally, with the war and subsequent humanitarian relief came 
employees of international companies, humanitarian agencies, and military personnel, 
many of whom brought their knowledge of global fitness culture and bodybuilding to the 
Kurdistan Region.  During my fieldwork (September 2015 – July 2017), the Kurdistan 
Region was experiencing an important, transitional moment:  The end of the war against 
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the Islamic State, or Daesh, was in sight. Many people were looking forward to 
September 2017, when they could vote in an independence referendum that would gauge 
support for a Kurdistani state. But for many other Iraqi people, the declaration of an 
independent Kurdish state would crush any hope of a unified Iraq. Most examinations of 
sport in nation-building and modernity demonstrate how sports serve as a unifying, 
productive force in constituting the community or nation. Conversely, what can sports 
and the sporting body reveal about a state that is said to be disintegrating?      
Bodybuilding, of course, has a long history in the building of empire and nation in 
the Middle East. In twentieth century Iraq, bodybuilding enjoyed a widespread popularity 
second only to football (soccer). The recent introduction of “global fitness culture” 
(Andreasson and Johansson 2014) has brought with it criticism of traditional, male-
centric and spectacular bodybuilding. Instead of muscles for “show,” global fitness 
culture promotes “modern” and “functional” strength training for both men and women. 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, traditional bodybuilding and newer global fitness culture compete in 
the growing fitness industry. 
Three population flows specifically have contributed to the recent growth of the 
Kurdistani fitness industry: First, the return of many Kurds living in diaspora in Europe 
and the U.S., where they encountered global fitness culture. The relative stability of the 
2011-2014 period encouraged many Kurdish people to return to their homeland. Second, 
the steady stream of international employees of the humanitarian sector and U.S. military 
personnel into the Kurdistan Region also brought knowledge of global gym and fitness 
culture. Many Kurdistani residents have worked as translators or specialists alongside 
humanitarian and military personnel who had access to gyms and equipment. And third, 
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the Kurdistan Region has absorbed many people displaced from elsewhere in Iraq, such 
as Baghdad and Mosul, which were centers of bodybuilding culture. (Historically Erbil 
hosted small bodybuilding clubs and competitions, although nothing on the scale of the 
bodybuilding networks in Mosul and Baghdad.) Displaced bodybuilders and coaches 
brought their expertise and experience to the Kurdistan Region, where some found 
employment in Kurdish-owned gyms and others opened their own gyms. While the 
traditional, male-only bodybuilding gyms, like the one pictured below, continue 
operating in the Region, the growing Kurdistani fitness industry can be characterized by a 
“professionalization” of bodybuilding, as well as a shift from male-centric exercise 
culture to one increasingly including females. 
  
Figure 7: A bodybuilding gym near the Erbil Citadel. Copyright by the author. 
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The rapid growth of the global fitness industry in Erbil is apparent in “Doctors 
Street,” a commercial area specializing in medical and health products. Prior to the recent 
introduction of global fitness products, Doctors Street sold mainly standard medical 
supplies, such as pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses, and wheelchairs. Now Doctors Street 
contains several shops advertising bodybuilding equipment, supplements, consultations 
with coaches and nutritionists, and all manner of imported weight loss and muscle gain 
supplies. Doctors Street shops attract not only bodybuilding enthusiasts but also 
Kurdistani residents interested in weight loss, a common concern among my female 
friends at the gym where I worked part time during my fieldwork. For example, I 
regularly participated in group fitness classes with an overweight teenage girl “Muna,” 
who followed a nutrition regimen “prescribed” by a Doctors Street shop whose company 
was based in Dubai. 
  
Figure 8: Inside a bodybuilding shop in Doctors Street. Copyright by the author. 
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Figure 9: Products at a Doctors Street shop. Copyright by the author. 
 
While most of the available fitness industry supplies were concentrated in Doctors 
Street, gyms opened across the Erbil landscape. Even some of the oldest quarters of Erbil, 
such as near the citadel, have bodybuilding gyms. Traditional, male-only bodybuilding 
gyms were easy to spot by their larger-than-life photos of bodybuilders displayed in gym 
windows; mixed-gender gyms did not display these types of photos. As the city expanded 
outward, so did the gyms. During the last few months of my fieldwork in 2017, a 
CrossFit-style gym called “Lion’s Den” opened on the outskirts of Ainkawa, the 
Christian township of Erbil.  “Lion’s Den” is in an area that soon will no longer be the 
outskirts if the city continues to expand in that direction. In Spring 2019, another new, 
large fitness center opened along the recently constructed “120 Meter Road,” which is 




 Strength sports for a “modern” Kurdistan 
“That was when my Dad said I had to go out [and leave the gym], because they 
were always trying to give me hormones, steroids,” Nasir said as he perched on the edge 
of a boxing ring. I met Nasir while conducting research in secondary schools. He was a 
lanky teenager and a diligent student who wore glasses and spoke softly. I was surprised 
to run into him at “Lion’s Den,” a new gym offering CrossFit-style classes and mixed 
martial arts (MMA). A couple years prior to our interview at Lion’s Den, Nasir joined a 
bodybuilding gym in Erbil. Initially he was impressed by the spectacle of big muscles, 
but he grew weary of gym members constantly advising him to use steroids to bulk up his 
slender body. People did not hide their steroid use, injecting in front of other gym 
members, including Nasir. He jokingly claimed that some steroid users even injected 
their dogs to make them bigger. “The people that came there were the low-level people,” 
Nasir explained, “with bad smell, bad language, bad way of thinking.” He believed “low 
people” were attracted to that gym because it was small, located in a residential area, and 
relatively cheap at 40 dollars a month.  
  
Figure 10: MMA training at Lion’s Den gym. Copyright by the author. 
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Membership fees at “old-style” gyms were about one third of the cost of 
membership at new, elite fitness centers such as the “Lion’s Den.” Nasir’s father 
inspected Lion’s Den before agreeing to let his son join. Since joining, Nasir persuaded 
five of his schoolmates, including one girl, to train at Lion’s Den. “You feel you are 
strong and no one can touch you. You feel confident,” Nasir explained. “And these MMA 
sports actually are the only sport that you can feel strong. Not like taekwondo or anything 
else about feeling light. We concentrate on power and quickness. So you feel nobody can 
touch you. Not even bodybuilders can stand against them, no matter how big they are.”  
Nasir was proud to train with Coach Aashif, a popular MMA instructor and 
competitor. “I have seen many trainers, like at championships,” Nasir said, “And they 
were cursing and insulting their players when making any mistake. That’s the opposite of 
my coach. He encourages us and advises us. [Other MMA coaches] train like a dirty way, 
a street way. They think that’s the way, but it’s not.” Coach Aashif’s manner with 
trainees was gentle but firm. He seemed willing to coach anyone who was interested, 
including some very overweight people and some women, and he was patient with all. 
The coach’s wife worked as a personal trainer in a women’s gym, and sometimes she 
trained with her husband at Lion’s Den while their young son ran around the gym 
clambering over equipment and playing with gym members.  
“I don’t know why,” Nasir reflected, “but I’m like the most religious person [at 
the gym].” Nasir belonged to a well-known Christian family who had immigrated from 
another country to Erbil. Nasir’s coach also was from outside the Kurdistan Region and a 
pious Arab Muslim. Nasir explained, 
Coach Aashif fasts [during Ramadan] and prays every day. I guess it’s only me 
and him. It’s either religion or sport. One or the other. I don’t know why Iraq is 
190 
that way. They can’t combine them. They either leave their religion, or they leave 
their sport. They can’t mix them. 
Nasir was not sure why the religion versus sports opposition existed, but he knew about 
religious strife from his experiences in various private schools. School administrators 
typically did not allow students to discuss religion, “because you know in Iraq the most 
sensitive subject is religion,” Nasir explained. “It just starts fights everywhere, so they 
don’t [discuss it].” 
 Coach Aashif’s example as a pious person committed to his family, religious 
practice, and career was especially important to Nasir; the coach was a model for 
“modern” manhood. The Coach was not embarrassed to be seen spending lots of time 
with his wife and child, and he openly and seriously practiced Islamic piety, although 
traditional Kurdistani society considers such expressions of religious piety characteristic 
of women, not men. Coach Aashif and his followers were practicing a “new” kind of 
masculinity others have observed emerging in the Middle East (Inhorn 2012) and in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (King 2018) while upholding traditional ideals of male physical 
strength. The Lion’s Den and Coach Aashif represented a new model for physical 
education in Kurdistan: it was clean, well-equipped, had a “tolerant” atmosphere, and 
employed certified trainers who drew upon “modern” and “scientific” knowledge 
circulating through global networks of professional trainers and athletes. Some Lion’s 
Den members formerly participated in bodybuilding but quit. These ex-bodybuilders 
adopted a new “fitness” lifestyle that prioritized “natural” nutrition over supplements and 
rejected any substances or practices that harmed the body.  
People who exercised at “modern,” mixed-gender fitness centers often 
condemned traditional bodybuilding gyms and their practices, particularly for their 
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violence. Bodybuilding exerts violence upon the body through intensive dieting and 
grueling training to “shred” the body. Additionally, the prevalence of steroid use and 
other questionable “supplements” which may harm the body sullies the sport’s reputation. 
Many of my interlocutors spoke of the sport, its practitioners, and its gyms as backward 
and abnormal. Critical discourse also linked bodybuilding to a “lower” class 
characterized by low level of education and poor personal hygiene habits. Most of all, the 
self-inflicted violence on the body through training and steroid use disgusted many of my 
interlocutors. There was enough external violence in Iraq, so why inflict violence on your 
own body?  
 
Narrating violence and recovery 
Violence is central to many bodybuilders’ narratives. While grueling training 
looks like self-inflicted violence to the sport’s detractors, for bodybuilders it is a heroic, 
virtuous effort to overcome the effects of violence perpetrated by others. Georges’ story 
in the beginning of the paper is one of many tales of survival and recovery through 
physical exercise and sports. My interlocutors’ embodied experiences of the failing Iraqi 
state and the emerging Kurdistani state shape their stories about physical training. The 
periods before, during, and after the Second Gulf War bookend the various chapters of 
their lives. just as they generally do for the people of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan who 
suffered through those events.  
 Violence and displacement permeate “Zayn’s” story: In Erbil, Zayn was known as 
a friendly and popular bodybuilder and fitness coach for both male and female clients. In 
his former home in Baghdad, Zayn’s family was known by their prominent tribal identity 
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which put them at risk. His family lived in Baghdad until the 2003-2011 war, when they 
became the target of sectarian violence, as well as of US military personnel: In a case of 
mistaken identity, U.S. troops entered Zayn’s home and detained his father multiple 
times; eventually the family decided to move to the Kurdistan Region. At that time, Zayn 
traveled to Europe to study exercise science, earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees. In 
2012, he moved to Kurdistan to rejoin his family. There, as an Arab and an outsider, he 
felt almost constant tension with the majority Kurdish residents. He suffered many 
unpleasant encounters, which he attributed to his Arab ethnicity and known tribal 
affiliation. 
I visited Zayn and his wife, Hiba, in their home, where Zayn could speak more 
freely than in the gym. Not only had he suffered racial discrimination; he also was 
cheated out of medaling in bodybuilding competitions in the Kurdistan Region. Zayn and 
Hiba told me that they gave up on making a life in Erbil after one particularly 
disappointing bodybuilding competition: The winner was physically the least impressive, 
smallest competitor; everyone was shocked when the winner was announced. Later, they 
heard that the winner had political connections and had bribed the judges, making visible 
the corruption, discrimination, and failed state that Zayn knew from personal experience. 
Bodybuilding had been a passion for Zayn, one that allowed him to connect with people 
from different countries, ethnicities, and religions. The reverse was true in Erbil; corrupt 
bodybuilding competitions seemed to reinforce sectarian and political differences. 
Without bodybuilding, Zayn felt stifled. When I last heard from Zayn and Hiba, they 
were planning to emigrate to Canada.  
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Georges, the Christian bodybuilder who survived an assassination attempt in 
Baghdad, believed that bodybuilding had become a more important sport after the 2003-
2011 war. Before the war, there was less corruption, Georges explained. The war had 
exacerbated sectarian differences and weakened state and social institutions. Georges 
observed that the sport of bodybuilding also suffered because of the war. Judges chose 
their own trainees to win competitions. According to his award certificate, Georges 
placed first in a competition, but at the competition, another competitor paid a bribe to be 
announced as first place.  
         Other gym-goers shared similar stories of escaping violence elsewhere in Iraq and 
settling in Erbil, where many felt alienated and frustrated. Gyms and exercise routines 
offered safe space and “therapy” (one person even used this word in English). Gym 
therapy was said to remedy not only traumas of war or lingering effects of malnutrition 
during the sanctions era, but more generally the stresses unique to living in Iraq, one of 
the perennially lowest ranked countries for quality of living. People linked their 
bodybuilding and fitness practices with the conditions of their country. When I asked 
Hadid, the Turkomani bodybuilder, to explain the mentality of bodybuilding, he replied 
that, first, “people like to be big.” But, he continued, bodybuilding is also a response to 
“stress, electricity problems, salary problems, and water shortages.” These stressors were 
unique to bodybuilding in Kurdistan, Hadid argued.             
 
Modern fitness in the modern state 
 Some of my interlocutors, such as Zayn, discussed the growth, 
professionalization, and failures of Iraqi and Kurdistani bodybuilding as markers of the 
strengths or weaknesses of the Iraqi state and the aspirational Kurdistani state within it. 
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For example, Rashid, the bodybuilder from Mosul, drew connections between the growth 
of bodybuilding in Kurdistan and the struggling Iraqi state:  
I think the bodybuilders here are a bit more educated, especially in the last 5 
years. In the past it was much better in Mosul than in Kurdistan. But in the last 5 
years it got much better in Kurdistan. They are following the scientific ways for 
bodybuilding. Here they read more about bodybuilding. In Mosul they just follow 
the rumors, or something they heard. In Mosul it is like “bro science.” They don’t 
know who is the source, just by trial and error sometimes. Many guys do the site 
injections, for localized muscle growth, something really awful, just a swollen 
area, you can google it. Many guys do that unfortunately. But recently in the 
bodybuilding university [through the Iraqi bodybuilders association] they tried to 
stop these kinds of things. They try to prevent many guys from participating in the 
championships. And sometimes they also do the site injections with the steroids. 
Which does not work! I don’t know why they do that. 
 
Diana: It’s so bad for you. How old are most of the bodybuilders? 
  
Rashid: Uh huh. For the age, I think it’s from 16 to 30, 35 something in between 
that. Not all of them are working out to be professionals, but most of them are, 
like, you know, most of them are passionate about bodybuilding. They are not 
trying to go for professional [status], but they like to be big. I think it all started 
when the Iraq championship was held here for the first time in Kurdistan. 
  
Diana: When was that? 
  
Rashid: In 2011 or 2012 it was held in Sulaymanȋyah [a city also known as 
Slemanȋ], in 2013 and 2014 in Erbil. Three years in a row. They are not used to 
seeing those big muscular guys in Erbil or Suli. They became fascinated about it. 
Since then, all the Iraqi bodybuilders were here. When it was held here in Erbil, 
the stage was full. They were sitting on the floor. In Baghdad it is a very popular 
sport, very popular. So they all came to cheer for their champions, for their 
friends. The theater was full. Many bodybuilders were walking around the city 
and being noticed by the people. That was good marketing for them. Since then 
[bodybuilding] got a much better reputation in Kurdistan.   
 
In 2012, Rashid moved from Mosul to Erbil, where he witnessed the growth of the 
bodybuilding industry he describes above. Erbil offered not only more “professional” 
bodybuilding opportunities, but also more safety and freedoms than Rashid had 
experienced in Mosul: 
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I loved Erbil so much, because in Mosul we had to be at home at 8pm, not in the 
streets because it was dangerous. I remember going to the gym [in Erbil] at 8 or 
9pm, and I was smiling all the way because I was so happy that I could go out at 
night and see cars in the streets. I was always smiling. I loved the freedom of 
going out in the night, because I haven’t experienced that, never.  
 
Additionally, Rashid appreciated that many Erbil residents were interested in health and 
fitness, unlike Mosul, where “nobody works out for health.” Rashid complained that in 
Mosul, “I haven’t seen a single person who cares for this, just caring for being big.” For 
example, “many people would like to go for a morning run, and everybody would stare at 
them, like, what the hell are you doing?” Rashid attributed Erbil residents’ interest in 
health to the city’s recent prosperity and expansion of the private sector, which brought 
people and gym culture from all over the world. Rashid also pointed out that 
globalization proliferated sedentary and stressful desk jobs, which necessitated exercise 
and increased interest in health and fitness.  
Erbil society, though it had progressed much, was not without flaws in Rashid’s 
estimation. Rashid admitted he sometimes encountered “racist” people in the bazaar, for 
example, because they were “uneducated.” But this did not happen in the gym, he 
stressed to me; he felt accepted there. Not long after the Islamic State invaded Mosul and 
surrounding areas, a time during which some of my ethnic-Arab interlocutors 
experienced anti-Arab sentiments, Rashid had a warm exchange with two Kurdish young 
men at the gym. One man asked Rashid where he was from, and Rashid replied, “Mosul.” 
In reply, the Kurdish guy said, “Inshallah it will get better and we can visit you at your 
home [in Mosul].” To Rashid’s surprise, the other Kurdish man corrected his friend and 
said to Rashid, “No, kaka [sir], this is your home.” Rashid was touched by the exchange 
and said he often reflects on it.  
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Rashid and Zayn, as non-Kurdish “others,” sometimes experienced racism, but 
their knowledge of English and expertise in bodybuilding and fitness gave them an 
advantage in the growing bodybuilding and fitness industries in Erbil. Rashid observed 
that the majority of resources about bodybuilding and fitness were in English, and many 
were in Arabic, whereas very little was written in Kurdish. Many coaches and gym-
owners displaced from elsewhere in Iraq brought their expertise to Erbil. Although the 
Kurdistani bodybuilders association exam for personal trainer or coaching certification 
was written in Kurdish, Arabic speakers like Rashid and Zayn were permitted to write 
their answers in Arabic.  
 “Outsider” bodybuilders like Rashid openly critiqued Kurdish “culture” for its 
sedentism, restricted mobility for women, and fattening, “traditional” oil and rice heavy 
dishes like dolma. They observed that urbanization and war increased sedentary jobs and 
stress levels. War and a stagnated economy depressed their clients, and personal trainers 
struggled to motivate people to set goals and work hard toward them. Rashid and other 
personal trainers saw themselves waging a difficult war against these forces, against 
apathy, and against the lingering interest in “outdated” and “backward” traditional 
bodybuilding cultures. While traditional male-only bodybuilding gyms in Erbil still 
attract clients, my interlocutors generally described the newer mixed-gender gyms as 
professional and modern in their preference for “fitness” and not “bodybuilding.”  
For my interlocutors, “fitness” was all about living a “modern” healthy lifestyle, 
characterized by a commitment to gym-going and to proper nutrition. Global fitness 
culture brought not only health benefits, but also a space for people who felt marginalized 
in Kurdistan – non-Kurdish residents, youth, and women. Through gym-going, people 
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enjoyed more mobility and could pursue self-actualization. Gym-going facilitated 
friendships, significantly across ethnosectarian lines. A pair of female friends, one 
Christian and the other Muslim, emphasized to me that, although their families pressured 
them not to associate with people from other ethnoreligious groups, at the gym the 
women felt comfortable socializing. They regularly spent hours hanging out there, as I 
observed many young people, particularly women, enjoying the relative freedom of the 
gym. Fitness centers also facilitated some romantic relationships: One gym owner-
manager was proud that his mixed-gender gym had produced some “good marriages” 
between clients. Gyms offered a space in which mainly young people, who otherwise 
typically kept their opinions private around older relatives and acquaintances, could 
criticize social, economic, and political issues.  
Furthermore, gyms provided an experimental zone in which people challenged 
deeply rooted social organization, such as power and status based on tribal affiliation. In 
one memorable episode, a woman belonging to a well-known tribe and political party 
was banned from the gym. For some time, she had been antagonizing a foreign worker 
employed to clean the women’s locker room and exercise area, making demands and 
ridiculing the employee. When the foreign worker finally informed the gym manager, 
Amir, he publicly confronted the accused woman in the gym lobby and told her that such 
behavior was unacceptable in his gym. Furious, the woman loudly threatened that she 
was from an important family, to which Amir replied that he also had tribal and political 
connections who would back him. But that was not his point; he did not accept 
“backward” behaviors, such as using one’s tribal affiliation to flout the rules of his 
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modern gym. My gym co-workers agreed with the manager’s assessment of the situation, 
and we never saw the angry woman in the gym again.  
 
Modern gyms make modern subjects 
When Hadid the Turkomani bodybuilder first opened his gym in Erbil, he 
permitted both women and men to become members and to use the space simultaneously. 
Hadid’s gym was in an older, residential-style building, upstairs from a sweets shop. 
Hadid managed to cram an impressive amount of weightlifting equipment and some 
cardio machines into one room, with a small office enclosed in a transparent plastic 
cubicle. At present, the gym served only men. “Why no women?” I asked, uncomfortable 
at being the only female in a crowded male-only gym. I was sitting with Hadid and his 
friend in their tiny office visible to everyone in the gym. Men exercising glanced toward 
us. Hadid and his friend chuckled at my question. It was “annoying” (  مزعج), Hadid said, 
having to monitor his clients’ behavior. He explained that the “large and expensive” gym 
where I taught indoor cycling charged high membership fees so that it would attract 
“rich” people who knew how to behave in a mixed-gender space. A gym should 
correspond to its intended clientele; it should have the appropriate “type” (Ar. نوع also 
can mean gender). His type of people were the “old” type, men who will “stare if a 
woman comes to the gym. They will not exercise.”  
Gyms dealt with the “problem” of gender in two ways: Some gyms operated in 
shifts, with women (people whose social position is “female” or “female-presenting”) 
using the gym in the morning and early afternoon and men using the gym in the late 
afternoon and evening. Gyms with separate shifts for men and women were not 
considered “mixed-gender” or “mixed” (people used the English word “mixed” or 
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Kurdish “tȇkala”). Mixed gyms typically featured a large hall in which men and women 
exercised together, as well as a smaller hall designated for women only. During my 
fieldwork, there were at least five “mixed-gender” gyms operating. Newer, “modern” 
gyms, particularly mixed-gender gyms where men and women exercised in the same 
space, offered a template for a modern Kurdistan that values women’s experiences and 
contributions: Gym-going was said to remedy stressors unique to women, such as 
childbirth; one woman cited her botched cesarean surgery as evidence of the collapsing 
state healthcare system (Dewachi 2017) and her primary reason for gym-going. More 
generally, gym-going provided an outlet for women frustrated by cultural practices that 
restricted their mobility. Gendered experiences also were linked to “modernity”: Women, 
and men, typically contextualized gendered aspects of bodybuilding and gym-going 
within a larger discourse about modernity in the Kurdistan Region.  
A “modern” healthy lifestyle was characterized by a commitment to gym-going 
and to proper nutrition. Global fitness culture brought not only health benefits, but also a 
space in which youth and women enjoyed more mobility and could pursue self-
actualization. Gym-going facilitated friendships, significantly across sects. A pair of 
female friends, one Christian and the other Muslim, emphasized to me that, although their 
families pressured them not to associate with people from other ethnoreligious groups, at 
the gym the women felt comfortable socializing. They regularly spent hours hanging out 
there, as I observed many young people, particularly women, enjoying the relative 
freedom of the gym. Fitness centers also facilitated some romantic relationships: One 
gym owner-manager was proud that his mixed-gender gym had produced some “good 
marriages” between clients. Gyms offered a space in which mainly young people, who 
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otherwise typically kept their opinions private around older relatives and acquaintances, 
could criticize social, economic, and political issues.  
Furthermore, gyms provided an experimental zone in which people challenged 
deeply-rooted social organization, such as power and status based on tribal affiliation. In 
one memorable episode, a woman belonging to a well-known tribe and political party 
was banned from the gym. For some time, she had been antagonizing a foreign worker 
employed to clean the women’s locker room and exercise area, making demands and 
ridiculing the employee. When the foreign worker finally informed the gym manager, 
Amir, he publicly confronted the accused woman in the gym lobby and told her that such 
behavior was unacceptable in his gym. Furious, the woman loudly threatened that she 
was from an important family, to which Amir replied that he also had tribal and political 
connections who would back him. But that was not his point; he did not accept 
“backward” behaviors, such as using one’s tribal affiliation to flout the rules of his 
modern gym. My gym co-workers agreed with the manager’s assessment of the situation, 
and we never saw the angry woman in the gym again. 
Amir presented his mixed-gender gym as a “clean” and “healthy” space, unlike 
the male-only bodybuilding gyms marred by steroid use, weightlifters’ loud grunting, and 
Eastern-style toilets that smelled bad. The first attempts at opening mixed-gender gyms in 
Erbil, Amir explained, lacked “good hygiene” because they continued using Eastern-style 
toilets and lacked professionalization because steroid use was rampant. Conversely, the 
intentional design of Amir’s fitness center instructs clients in navigating a modern space. 
For example, Amir said that people will see that the gym “invested a lot of money 
installing Western style bathrooms” and would understand that gym members likewise 
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should practice good hygiene. Gym members would complain to me sometimes if a new 
member did not practice what they considered good hygiene, particularly if a person’s 
body odor indicated she did not use deodorant or wash her gym clothes frequently 
enough. Especially during the blisteringly hot summer months with infrequent air 
conditioning, body odor was a problem. Often, the deliberate non-use of deodorants was 
said to be a habit of pious Muslims who did not believe in using them or was said to be a 
result of poor education. I frequently overheard gym members evaluating the correctness 
of others’ grooming and behavior. 
 The mixed-gender design of the space also suggested where and how men and 
women could interact: A common entrance, reception desk, and shared lobby was open to 
all. The sleek layout included cushioned chairs for lounging and tables for men and 
women to sit together if they chose, with flat screen televisions broadcasting sporting 
events from Europe or the Middle East. This spatial arrangement was very unlike the 
typical restaurants and cafes which segregated customers into a male-only section and a 
“family section” intended for males with females accompanying them. Young people 
often hung about the lobby in mixed-gender groups, talking, enjoying a beverage, 
casually observing other gym-goers, or taking a rest before or after exercising. From the 
lobby, separate entrances discreetly led to women’s and men’s locker rooms and 
bathrooms.  
Adjacent to the lobby was an expansive exercise area enclosed in glass and 
available for both men and women to use for cardio, weightlifting, and personal training 
sessions. Passing through the lobby and into the female-only section, women had access 
to lockers, toilets, showers, a steam room, and an area to apply makeup or style hair. For 
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a time, a couple women offered nail salon services and hair styling there. Beyond the 
locker room was the “women’s gym,” a female only exercise room shielded by walls and 
hallways from the rest of the gym and the unwanted male gaze. On rare occasions and 
during the off-peak hours, the women’s area would be “closed” and empty of females, so 
that a man could service a piece of equipment or clean (if the female cleaner was absent). 
Some women pointed to the smaller space and older equipment as evidence that less 
importance was placed on the female-only area and female clients. Others suggested that 
this was because the gym management expected more women to use the mixed space. 
Amir explained to me that, although government regulations mandated that the gym be 
gender segregated, and that technically the “mixed area” was a male-only space, in 
practice Amir and the staff encouraged female clients to use that space.  
 
 
Figure 11: Weights in the women’s section. Photo by the author. 
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Figure 12: Defunct stationary bicycles moved from the mixed-section to the women’s 
section. Photo by the author. 
 Before fitness centers opened in Erbil, the only public access to gyms was in 
hotels. Women-only gym spaces had become necessary, Amir explained, because female 
clients could not use the fitness rooms in hotels:  
Girls can’t go to hotels, you know. You can’t train in a gym in a hotel because 
people might say she is going in the hotel for sex, so you have these little 
restrictions all over. How are you going to meet [potential romantic partners]? At 
university? It’s a closed-off society. Maybe here they are trying to open up a bit. 
It’s like push and pull. On the one hand, alcohol shops are opening up, and clubs, 
and still they make the gyms segregated. I just think religion shouldn’t have 
anything to do with business and politics. It should be completely separated. 
Amir refers to government regulations which stipulate that gyms must be gender 
segregated, although at the time of my fieldwork there were, in practice, multiple gyms 
with mixed-gender exercise spaces.  
Amir also complained about the official  “bodybuilders’ association,” which 
licensed and inspected all gyms. He said this association was unused to dealing with the 
new, modern fitness centers and knew only how to deal with the traditional male 
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bodybuilding gyms. The stereotypical view of male bodybuilding gyms, Amir explained, 
was that they were unprofitable enterprises and fronts for steroid use; one member of the 
bodybuilders’ association even asked Amir for kickbacks in the form of steroids for 
issuing a license. Recently the association had been pressuring Amir to install two 
separate entrances for two separate gym lobbies for men and women, and to enforce 
complete gender segregation. Outraged, Amir said there are “whorehouses operating on 
this same street” and the government was doing nothing about them while his mixed-
gender gym had facilitated some good marriages.  (Indeed, not long after my interview 
with Amir there was a police raid on some of the nearby businesses which employed 
foreign women, allegedly for prostitution.) Gender segregation was “abnormal” and 
“culturally forced,” Amir argued, and inane government regulations and corruption 
demonstrated a backward mentality.  
My sense is that having a functional, mixed-gender exercise hall was very 
important to Amir, and perhaps to other mixed-gender gym owner-managers in Erbil, 
because it validated his vision of a modern gym and a modern society. The gym served as 
a template for a modernized Kurdistani society, while at the same time relying on 
“traditional” social structures and cultural practices to maintain order. For example, the 
mixed-gender space was visible and easy to surveil because it was one large open space 
enclosed in glass. At any given time, at least one personal trainer was working in the 
mixed-section, and they reported any undesirable behavior to gym management. One of 
the employees told me that any time a male gym-goer appeared to focus on watching 
female gym members exercise rather than focusing his own exercise, a staff member 
quietly asked the man to stop watching female gym-goers or leave. The mixed-section 
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space, designed to be “modern” and intended for “modern” clients, was not for 
“checking-out” other gym members.  
Gym management told me they tried to prevent inappropriate behavior by 
“screening” gym membership applicants. Membership application forms collected 
information such as education level and employment status. Management also could 
evaluate potential gym members based on their name and tribal or political affiliation, as 
these kinds of categories and relationships “are strongly relevant in people’s everyday 
experience in the region” (King 2018: 305). Often, this information was common 
knowledge, or it could be obtained quickly and discreetly by asking around.  
 
The women’s gym 
During peak evening hours, as many as 30 or 40 people, men and women, 
exercised together in the mixed hall, with each person usually focused intently on his or 
her individual training. Conversely, in the women’s only sections of gyms I visited, the 
atmosphere was relatively quiet, even lethargic: Women hung about the fitness 
equipment in groups, sitting on weight benches and chatting. Maybe one or two women 
would be exercising. It seemed to me that in the gym where I worked, the female 
personal trainers and some members discouraged socializing if it interfered with others’ 
ability to use space and equipment.  
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Figure 13: Women socializing in a very small female-only room inside a mixed-gender 
gym. A camp for IDPs can be seen through the gym windows. Photo by the author. 
 
In my gym, when the women’s area was crowded in the evenings, women who might be 
there primarily to socialize were displaced by women who came primarily to exercise. 
Some of the more “serious” members complained to me about “lazy” women who were 
not trying hard enough and taking up space.  
I learned that many allegedly “lazy women” came to the gym to socialize and to 
take a break from social obligations related to family, neighbors, or guests. The gym (and 
women’s area especially) was one of the few spaces where young people were allowed 
(by their family) to hang out for hours, albeit in the confined and monitored space of the 
women’s section. Some women I met were attempting to lose weight, control their diet, 
and sometimes make changes to their lifestyle. Many of these women were discouraged, 
often because of the central role traditional, “unhealthy” foods played in bonding with 
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family and friends. It was difficult to avoid eating these foods without offending others. I 
learned from conversations with these women that they sometimes compensated for their 
unwanted caloric intake by regularly participating in two or three group fitness classes in 
a row, or by using cardio machines for long periods. (Some of my most insightful 
exchanges at the gym happened when I hopped on a cardio machine beside a woman who 
was exercising for an hour or more and was interested in talking.)  
Some of the more ambitious women who regularly frequented the gym used the 
mixed-hall and hung out in the mixed-gender lobby; they seemed to enjoy more mobility 
in general than their peers who used only the female exercise room. Ambitious women 
typically were university graduates, from wealthy and well-connected families, pursuing 
careers and delaying marriage. Often their gym-going stemmed from what I consider a 
“modern” disposition in which self-actualization was championed, sometimes at the 
expense of other areas of one’s life.  
Many women (and some men I talked with) found it difficult if not impossible to 
reconcile their personal health goals with cultural practices that restricted their mobility 
and promoted an undesirable diet; in some cases they were straining relationships with 
others to a breaking point. From my conversations with these “ambitious” women, an 
ideal type of “good” person emerged: The ideal, modern Kurdistani female takes charge 
of her life in whatever ways she can, such as pursuing a “healthier” diet and exercise 
routine. Higher education, sometimes for the express purpose of delaying marriage, was 
more accessible and feasible than making changes in other areas, such as moving out of 
her family of origin’s household and renting her own place. Other potentially contentious 
individualized acts included wearing Western-style clothing, driving, riding a bicycle, 
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and pursuing a career. Young women engaged in these kinds of self-actualization 
activities often found like minded people at the gym, where they formed moral 
communities to support each other.  
 
Exercising for self, society, and nation 
Self-actualization is central to the “ideal” or “modern” Kurdistani young person, 
though the means of self-actualization vary based on gender as well as class. Becoming a 
modern person did not necessarily mean abandoning all aspects of cultural or religious 
identity and practices. Although some people avoided certain traditional foods deemed 
unhealthy or challenged cultural norms, they nevertheless accepted, and in some cases 
celebrated, their ethnoreligious or ethnonationalist identities. One of the more radical 
young women I knew, Tablo, explained to me that she undertook both higher education 
and physical fitness training “for her country.” When Tablo earned her Masters degree in 
2019, she posted on social media that she “did it all for Kurdistan.” Like many Kurdish 
people of her generation, her family was displaced and she spent the majority of her 
childhood in refugee camps or communities in other countries. Aware of the high 
possibility of renewed conflict, Tablo trained at the gym so that she would be physically 
fit and prepared to “defend” herself and her country. Although Tablo may have been 
exceptionally positioned and patriotic, I heard many young Kurdistani residents express 
similarly assertive attitudes toward self-actualization. Many young men and women 
considered their participation in mixed-gender spaces like the gym as their contribution to 




Figure 14: “Women-only” section within a “mixed-gender” gym. Photo by the author. 
Gyms provided an experimental space for women, and men, to push boundaries 
and sometimes to flout them altogether. Most female gym members arrived quietly, only 
pausing in the lobby to greet acquaintances, and immediately proceeded to the women’s 
locker room to change into their exercise clothes. For some women, the gym lobby and 
the mixed-section were their catwalk. (The same could be said of many men who seemed 
to make a show of their weightlifting and muscle-flexing.) Sometimes a woman arrived 
wearing a flowing, sequined abaya and gold jewelry. Less frequently, a woman might 
enter the lobby wearing tight Western-style clothing, stilettos, and sport heavy makeup, 
manicured nails, and coiffed hair like she had just gotten a blow-out at one of the many 
salons in the affluent neighborhoods near the gym. After changing into tight leggings and 
tops, these heavily-made up women might proceed to the mixed-section. There they 
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selected a cardio machine facing away from the rest of the room. Their ears were 
enveloped by the large, colorful Beats-style headphones so popular at the time, 
suggesting that they were not at the gym to interact with anyone (but probably there to be 
seen). Kurdistani women who worked out in the mixed-section provided fodder for 
gossip over in the women’s section, where many women were nevertheless just as 
carefully or elaborately groomed.  
As I regularly spent hours in the lobby typing-up fieldnotes, I observed the 
rhythms of the gym. Early afternoon very few people visited; staff paced around, chatted, 
or played on their phones. A couple women might use the women’s section during this 
time. The gym traffic gradually picked up, peaking between 6 to 8pm. Because men often 
traveled to and from the gym wearing their exercise clothes, it was difficult for me to 
ascertain whether or not those men were employed. I also had the impression that 
employment didn’t matter for these well-connected, wealthy youth who parked their 
luxury vehicles in the best spaces outside the gym. But career-women who entered the 
gym wearing Western-style professional clothing were easier to identify. Bahoz, for 
example, often arrived impeccably dressed in pantsuits and heels. She worked as a 
personal assistant to a high-ranking government official whose staff included several 
women. Bahoz gushed about how kind and respectful her Kurdish boss was with his 
female staff; she was proud that he held progressive views.  
Despite being ethnically Kurdish, Bahoz once held a very low view of Kurdish 
culture and Erbil society. She arrived in Erbil in the mid 2000s, after her brother was 
killed during a wave of sectarian violence and the family fled to the Kurdistan Region. 
Bahoz was shocked by her new home, a “small village” compared to cosmopolitan 
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Baghdad, where she was accustomed to going out and mingling with a diverse group of 
friends and acquaintances. Baghdad was so “free” for Bahoz and her family that her 
father drank alcohol with his friends in public. However,  Erbil at that time had no public 
places for unchaperoned women to socialize, and public alcohol consumption was 
shameful. Bahoz spoke only Arabic because all her family had been educated in Arabic 
and living in Baghdad for generations; she spoke Arabic with her parents, not Kurdish. 
Erbil residents gawked at her blue jeans and shorter skirts. “They thought I was an Arab,” 
she laughed.  
Bahoz adapted to life in Erbil, dressing more conservatively and learning not only 
Kurdish language, but also cultural appreciation and political views. Her experience of 
growing up Kurdish in Baghdad was positive overall, so when her Erbil colleagues and 
friends criticized former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, Bahoz was quick to 
defend it. She soon realized that politicking, such as expressing empathy and 
participating in criticism, was crucial for her career advancement. She smiled wryly, 
saying to me, “Sometimes you have to go the way of people. Sometimes you have to 
change.” In Kurdistani society, especially in her government job, Bahoz carefully 
moderated her speech, dress, and behavior. Bahoz was 30, unmarried, ambitious, and 
seemed content with how her life in Erbil had unfolded, largely because of how much 
Erbil had developed in the decade she had been living there. 
 Development brought restaurants, cafes, and gyms, public spaces where women 
with means could express themselves more freely. “I think [the gym] is the only place 
where I really feel free,” Bahoz reflected. Gym members created what Bahoz called a 
“different society,” in which men did not stare at women, and people belonging to 
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various ethnoreligious groups and competing political parties exercised politely, if not 
amicably, together. Bahoz was excited to see similar progress in Sami Abdulrahman 
Park, a large green space in the center of Erbil with running and walking paths, a rock 
climbing wall, gardens, fountains, and ample space for picnicking. In the cool evenings, 
Sami Park offered a fresh, green retreat from the otherwise dusty, polluted, and hot city. 
Increasingly, women used the park’s walking and running paths for exercise and 
socializing.  
The mixed-gender gym represented a possible future for Kurdistan, one in which 
women might increasingly be accepted in other public spaces and roles. Although Bahoz 
enjoyed her political job, she was considering shifting to another career. For years Bahoz 
had struggled to find acceptable Western-style professional clothes, such as pantsuits, to 
wear in her high-status government job. She dreamed of opening a store specializing in 
outfitting Kurdistani career-women. Several shops for men had opened in the past couple 
years.  “Mr. Erbil,” for example, offered the latest European fashions for dapper young 
Kurdistani men, as well as a barber shop and luxury cafe. Nothing like this existed 
exclusively for women, who would need such services if their roles in Kurdistani society 
continued to expand.    
 
Romancing and cloistering at the gym 
 My friend Viyan, Kurdish and in her mid-20s, also expressed an interest in 
opening more female-centered businesses. She had the necessary social and political 
connections to obtain a business license and attract investors easily, she told me. From 
the way she dressed and carried herself, I suspected Viyan was important from the first 
time I saw her sashay into the gym lobby. She belonged to a respected and prominent 
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tribe. A recent university graduate, Viyan worked for a Kurdish non-governmental 
organization dedicated to helping young people find employment. She drove herself to 
and from work, the gym, and mixed-gender cafes where she liked to socialize with 
friends. Although women increasingly drove cars in Erbil, it was still considered new and 
still attracted unwanted male attention. Many times, when a female friend was driving 
and I sat in the passenger seat, men would stare at us at intersections or as they passed us 
in their vehicle. My friends would apologize, saying it happens to them all the time and 
they hate it.  
Like many young women I encountered at gyms, Viyan described her family as 
both progressive and protective. Working at an NGO with political connections was 
commensurate with her status, which also seemed to protect her reputation while driving, 
gym-going, and cafe-hopping. She dressed tastefully but conservatively. She seemed 
equally comfortable wearing suits in modern, urban public spaces; wearing slinky outfits 
at house parties; or wearing a glittering, traditional Kurdish dress in the lush countryside 
surrounding her ancestral village, which she visited on holidays and weekends. Wherever 
she was, she acted like she owned the place and played the role of gracious host or 
patron. Her family trusted her greatly in permitting so much independence, though she 
sometimes tried to bend the rules.  
  Viyan was in a secret relationship with Rebwar, a Kurdish guy who also worked 
out at the gym. If they were at the gym at the same time, they interacted very little, giving 
the impression they were only acquaintances. They communicated mainly by phone, text, 
and private social media messages. About halfway through my fieldwork, Rebwar went 
abroad to continue his education and began acting evasive toward Viyan. He admitted to 
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her that he was going clubbing and “dating” women, but that nothing was “serious.” He 
repeatedly asked Viyan to promise that she would only use the women’s section of the 
gym, so that men would not look at her or talk with her. Outraged and hurt by Rebwar’s 
behavior, Viyan did the opposite: She ensured that she was seen hanging around the 
mixed-section and gym lobby, knowing that Rebwar’s friends would report this to him. 
Antagonizing her long-distance boyfriend was the only power she had in the relationship. 
She considered visiting Rebwar abroad; her older sister offered to cover for Viyan and 
travel with her, but not to allow her to stay overnight with Rebwar.  
One evening Viyan and I were smoking sheesha (flavored tobacco in a water-
pipe) at an expensive, mixed-gender cafe near the gym. We sat in the outdoor area, 
visible to the main road crowded with Land Rovers. With its expensive restaurants, cafes, 
and shops, the area was very much a “see and be seen” place. Viyan puffed serenely on 
her sheesha, talking about her upcoming work projects and her ideas for developing 
Kurdistan. I mostly listened. Then she mentioned Rebwar; it had been weeks since she 
said anything about him to me. She had agonized, cried, and confided in me about her 
woes. Now, in a dispassionate tone, she declared her relationship with him over; her 
family never would allow her to marry him anyway, preferring a more prestigious match. 
Before I could formulate a sympathetic response, Viyan gestured to a cafe that had just 
opened across the street. “We should go there next time,” she said, taking another drag of 
the sheesha. I recognized that this meant Viyan was finished being vulnerable with me, 
even if her experimental relationship with Rebwar may not have been severed 
completely. This was the kind of interaction I learned to expect with my young and 
wealthy interlocutors: One day they might express something radical to me, and the next 
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act as if they never said anything out of the ordinary. The mixed-gender gyms and 
burgeoning mixed-gender entertainment sector were places for experimentation, but 
perhaps not for implementation. 
The gym, rather than being a revolutionary space, reproduced cloistering practices 
typical of Kurdistan and more broadly the Middle East (citations). Cloistering was 
achieved through using gender segregated schedules and spaces. Gym management 
promised hyper-vigilance and removed male members who apparently wanted to “look at 
women.”  Although a group fitness classroom was shared by men and women, during 
women-only classes the room was locked to keep males out, allowing women to remove 
their hijab and wear less conservative exercise clothes. I learned how important these 
practices were to female clients when I once taught a female-only cycling class and 
forgot to lock the group fitness room door. To my and my female clients’ horror, a male 
staff member entered with a group of men interested in the gym. The women quickly 
averted their faces and reached for jackets. I rushed to the door to wave the men out, who 
were slow to leave. All the spaces in the mixed-gender gym ultimately were under 
constant male supervision; there was always a risk that something untoward might 
happen.  
Cloistering practices extended to social media. Most young women I met were 
careful with their social media accounts. Many posted no self-identifying information, 
using a pseudonym and a stock photo like a rose for their profile picture. Women who 
posted images of themselves often obscured their faces and those of their friends. Some 
feared having their images circulated without their knowledge or digitally altered. I heard 
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cautionary tales about women whose images were digitally-altered by superimposing one 
woman’s face on another woman’s scantily-clad or naked body.  
A few women I knew at the gym were bold, posting selfies wearing tight leggings 
and showing their faces, likely to a carefully curated social media audience. Those who 
could afford the exorbitant shipping rates ordered trendy activewear from Europe or the 
United States. Fitness instructors and personal trainers featured the latest activewear 
brands and trends on their social media. Social media increasingly circulates global 
fitness culture. Many of the gym-going women I knew carefully crafted a modern, stylish 
persona, constantly remaking themselves with every new opportunity that the city of 
Erbil presented. Their experimentation remained nonetheless limited and protected 
through cloistering practices in physical places as well as in social media. Attempts to 
push back against cloistering practices were risky, as in the Zumbathon story below. 
The Zumbathon  
Ziyan shares a lot on social media: her latest fitness apparel, haircut, cafe-outing, 
or social or political cause. Most recently she has shared several clips of her appearances 
on Kurdish-language talk shows. As with many people, social media is the main platform 
for sharing her self-actualization efforts. Advertising herself as the “first Kurdish Zumba 
instructor” and the “first female Kurdish bodybuilder,” Ziyan attracts a strong following, 
including some detractors. Ziyan’s followers loved to tell me about Ziyan’s success story: 
while living in diaspora in Europe she became very overweight and unhappy with her 
life. She began attending Zumba group fitness classes, lost a tremendous amount of 
weight, and decided to become a Zumba instructor. Like many Kurds, she returned to 
Iraqi Kurdistan during the stable 2011-2014 period to make a new life for herself there.  
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When I first met Ziyan in Erbil, she had been leading female-only group fitness 
classes, primarily Zumba, at different gyms for a few years. Her classes were popular, 
and some of her clients followed her from gym to gym. I also began attending her 
classes; her enthusiasm was infectious. She joked, shouted, called out half-hearted 
participants, and praised women who were visibly working hard. During class she moved 
among the women, acting silly to make someone laugh or correcting someone’s form. 
She deftly code-switched between Kurdish, Arabic, Farsi, and English for her diverse 
clients. Exercising alongside the class participants, she seemed to work harder than 
anyone, drenched in sweat by the end of every class. She also offered personal training, 
both at the gym and in private sessions, usually for women who wanted to train in the 
privacy of their homes. The location tags on her social media posts indicate that most of 
her personal training sessions are with women living in wealthy residential areas.   
I had known Ziyan for a little over a year when her relative, a peshmerga soldier, 
was killed in the conflict with the Islamic State. Soon after this tragedy, Ziyan organized 
a “Zumbathon for Peshmerga” charity event. She produced a three-foot tall banner 
advertising a “female only” 2-hour event, and displayed the banner in the gym lobby. In 
the days leading up to the event, several women posted supportive comments on the 
Facebook event page. “My thoughts and peaceful wishes for all and most importantly for 
the brave lions and lioness[es], the Peshmerga,” wrote one woman.   
A local, English language radio station promoted the Zumbathon and hosted it in 
a large parking lot adjacent to the radio station. It was, much to my surprise, an outdoor 
event: In the parking lot, the organizers assembled a stage with lights. Crew members 
paced around with audiovisual equipment. To the side of the stage, a couple tables were 
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arranged for collecting donations and distributing water and snacks. The event banner 
and donation box flyer requested that people give “with their heart,” suggesting a 
minimum 5,000 dinar (about 4 US dollars) donation. Judging by the dozens of plates with 
bananas and oranges, the organizers expected a crowd. 
 The turnout was hardly a crowd: By 4pm, the event start time, only a handful of 
women had arrived and stood quietly chatting with their arms clasped across their chests. 
Beside me, Maha suddenly said, “This country will never change. This is all the people 
who come to this event? There should be more.” Maha, an Arabic speaker displaced from 
Baghdad, worked for a large humanitarian relief organization and attended group fitness 
classes almost every night. “Why do you think more people didn’t come?” I asked. 
Maha: Because these things are still new, and many are too embarrassed.  
Diana: Because it is outside? 
Maha: Yes. Look, there are men around! [Pointing to a large delivery truck now 
parked at the edge of the parking lot, blocking the view of the event from a busy street] I 
asked them to put that lorry there so we could have some privacy. [Some of the women 
chuckle] 
Indeed, several men were watching us from the grassy area across from the radio 
station. The station stood near the intersection of two busy roads. By Western standards, 
most of the women were dressed modestly in long-sleeve, tunic-length, loose-fitting 
shirts with loose pants or leggings; however, they felt exposed. Radio station staff asked 
the unwanted spectators to leave, but the men did not move. Throughout the event, they 
were joined by a few more male spectators. Ziyan mounted the stage wearing 
camouflage-print leggings and a highlighter-yellow sleeveless top that showed off her 
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powerful biceps. She beckoned the participants, now totaling 18 women, most of them 
Zumba class regulars, closer to the stage. Three women joined Ziyan on stage to lead 
choreography. Ziyan, in a quieter voice than usual, thanked everyone for coming to the 
event.  
We began marching in place to a drumbeat, imitating Ziyan. The first song had a 
distinctly militaristic sound. The remainder of the tracklist I recognized from previous 
Zumba classes. We exercised/danced for two hours with a very short break halfway. As 
the sun set, the temperature dropped and the stage lights were glaring. A radio station 
drone buzzed overhead, recording the event. (I never learned whether the footage was 
made public in any form other than a couple short clips of the stage dancers on Ziyan’s 
social media accounts.) Ziyan led most of the songs, sometimes trading her spot at the 
front of the stage with another dancer. English and Spanish pop songs included overt 
references to sexuality, per Zumba’s “Latin dance” ethos. “I’m sexy and I know it - I 
work out!” blasted from the speakers. Another trainer at the gym led us in a dance with 
an embarrassing amount of hip-gyration, excessive even by Zumba standards. Ordinarily, 
in the privacy of the women’s-only group fitness room, I would not have minded and 
would have found it to be silly, fun even. With so many strange men around, however, it 
was uncomfortable and cringeworthy; this spectacle might contribute to the “bad” 
reputation of Kurdistani females who behaved in any way deemed too Western or 
inappropriate. Several of the women took a break during this dance.  
By the end of the event, we were sweaty and shivering in the cool evening air. 
The transparent donations container was conspicuously under-filled. We posed for a 
group photo on the stage. Several women rallied around a disheartened Ziyan, reassuring 
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her that the event went well and that more people would participate next time. The group 
quietly dispersed, and one of the ladies offered to drive me home. She agreed that it was a 
disappointing turnout and shrugged. I suggested that it was too different from the regular 
Zumba classes, which were held in a female-only, protected space consistent with other 
cloistering practices I observed. Despite being advertised as a “female only event,” the 
Zumbathon was held outside, inexplicably, in a public space, exposing women to 
unwanted attention. Overt female sexuality was on display: Women, a few wearing tight-
fitting exercise clothes, dancing to provocative Western pop songs, and shaking their hips 
for the peshmerga, the Kurdish nation, and potentially the internet, not to mention the 
unwelcome males watching from the sidelines.  
 Although it was a “female only” event, the Zumbathon seemed to be performed 
for a general Kurdish male gaze during a time of crisis for the nation: On the event 
banner (depicted above), Ziyan’s active pose mirrors the image of the male soldier 
bearing a Kurdish flag. The militaristic aesthetic of the event’s opening song and Ziyan’s 
camo-leggings suggested that the female participants marched in solidarity with the 
Kurdish nation. While many of the participants were ethnic Kurds, several of the women 
were Arabs displaced from Baghdad, or Iranians living in Erbil. I had the feeling that 
everyone was there primarily to support, not the Kurdish nation, but their role model and 
friend Ziyan.    
 
Embodying the nation and gender anxieties 
The Zumbathon drew upon heavily circulated and popular imagery of Kurdish 
female militia fighting the Islamic State, images popular during my fieldwork. For 
example, in 2015 Kurdish performer Helly Luv released her English language 
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“Revolution” music video, which opens with a dramatization of ISIS attacking a village 
and Kurdish peshmerga fighting back. Female militia members feature prominently in the 
video. Helly, in a full face of makeup and acrylic nails, alternately marches in official 
military uniforms and dances in sexy camouflage attire with golden bullet-shaped jewelry 
and golden pistol-shaped heels. Western media outlets touted her as a “Kurdish warrior-
diva” (Fordham 2015) “fighting the Islamic State with songs” (Austin 2015), noting her 
intentionally provocative displays of female sexuality, such as gyrating on top of a 
burned-out car amid shelling and machine gun fire.  
Western media outlets and audiences, characteristically fascinated with images 
and stories of females defying stereotypical Middle Eastern patriarchy (Abu-Lughod 
2002), played a large role in circulating Kurdish female fighter imagery.  It is difficult to 
say how much of this originated in Kurdistan and how much was (re)circulation of an 
idea initially presented to a receptive Western audience. Nevertheless, the female fighter 
image resonated with many Kurdish people: Some of my first Kurdish acquaintances 
joked that I was in Kurdistan to learn the language so I could join a female Kurdish 
militia. They went so far as to organize an outing for me and my husband to practice 
firing weapons and dine with a couple of peshmerga soldiers. Sometimes I heard people 
speak about female Kurdish combatants with admiration. In the bazaar in the city of 
Slemanȋ, I noticed a couple shops selling memorabilia of Syrian Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). One seller displayed a 
large photograph of a rifle-bearing Asia Ramazan (Viyan) Antar, a famous female fighter 
killed in action, and, for many people, a symbol of the Kurdish cause and women’s 
rights.   
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It is well-known that nationalist discourses commission women as mothers, 
laborers or fighters in nation-building. Women are called upon to bear and to educate 
future citizens, to ensure the reproduction of an interiorized, sacred “culture” (Chatterjee 
1993), and to perform modernity and signal the nation’s progress (Kanaaneh 2002; 
Özyürek 2006). Ziyan’s Zumbathon linked Kurdistani women’s participation in the 
emerging fitness industry to the cause of the Kurdish nation and more subtly to women’s 
emancipation: Women not only contribute to the national cause, but also could and 
should do so in very public ways which defy traditional cloistering practices. Female 
participants, such as Maha, commented on the public nature of the event and how the low 
turnout reflected the conservative public order and failures of state-led modernization.  
Although the Zumbathon event did not generate as much buzz and participation as 
its organizers hoped, social media offers an efficient platform to link a person’s 
individual cause(s) the national cause. During the time that I was getting to know Ziyan, 
she was getting more involved in the bodybuilding scene. She was training with a coach 
specializing in the sport and planned to compete in an international bodybuilding contest. 
Ziyan already promoted her Zumba classes and personal training sessions on social 
media. She also began posting frequently about her bodybuilding training: She 
demonstrated exercise methods; shared videos of herself working with her coach; posted 
professional photos of her flexed muscles; linked articles and video clips in which she 
was interviewed about her training; explained her strict diet; and promoted the 
supplements she took. In many of her posts, she reminded her audience that she was “the 
first female Kurdish bodybuilder.” The “Kurdish” aspect of that identity came to the fore 
in the months leading up to the Kurdistani independence referendum.  
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During the last months of my fieldwork, many people were talking about the 
upcoming referendum for Kurdistani independence scheduled for September 2017. The 
referendum would demonstrate how many Kurdistani residents would support declaring 
independence from the Iraqi federal state. In August, Ziyan updated her facebook profile 
picture: It was one of her professionally-shot bodybuilding photos in which she faced a 
gym mirror wearing a sleeveless shirt that showed off her muscles. Like many Kurdistani 
people at the time, she applied a popular pro-Kurdistani independence filter to her profile 
picture. At the base of the filter were stripes in the colors of the Kurdistani flag red and 
an outline of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq with a sunburst. The caption reads “Yes for 
Kurdistan independence.” Ziyan also wrote a message in Sorani Kurdish for her 
followers:  
As a sportswoman I say yes for independence, yes for the referendum, because 
success requires freedom and independence. I also want the time that I participate 
in a sports competition [bodybuilding] outside the country to say in a loud voice 
‘as Kurdistan I participate.’ I will say ‘I am Kurd and Kurdistani.’ Not by the 
name of Iraq will I participate.”  (Author’s translation from Sorani Kurdish)  
Ziyan’s posts are, of course, consistent with countless examples of the sporting 
body’s emblematic portrayal as a competitor as fighting for the nation. Kurdish athletes 
living in Europe and the U.S. drape themselves with the Kurdistani flag and are admired 
back in Kurdistan. When I interviewed Hadid, the Turkomani bodybuilder and gym 
owner, I asked if there were patriotic sentiments at competitions or in the gym. “There is 
iHtram (respect),” he replied. “They respect the peshmerga by doing one minute silence 
for the martyrs before competitions. Sometimes they show the Kurdistan flag at 
international competitions.”  
Ziyan’s participation in the national cause, however, was met with ambivalence. 
Loyal followers like Bahoz praised Ziyan’s strength and determination:  
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You see even more women are getting involved. They are paying attention to their 
muscles. They want to tone their body and be in shape. I see people visiting the 
protein shops, to get proteins, supplements, and vitamins. I think it’s good. And in 
Kurdistan we have many athletes, and they are participating in the league, in 
bodybuilding championships abroad. And you know Ziyan, [smiles] she is a very 
good example for women. She’s interested in bodybuilding, and her ambition is to 
be a champion.  
 
Diana: That’s really cool. Is she a model, an inspiration for you? 
Bahoz: She inspires me. You feel there is a power inside her. It’s not like she just 
wants to show off her body to people, like “I am a woman and want to show my 
muscles.” There is something, an energy, a power. She really inspires me. 
 
Others criticized how much attention Ziyan drew to her less-conservatively-clothed body. 
People posted negative comments on social media. Some people gossiped about her 
private life, speculating about how her bodybuilding and career might affect her marital 
status (she was not married).   
Ambivalence about Ziyan often resulted from anxieties over her muscled body 
appearing “too masculine.” Some women did not participate in her classes or want to 
train with her for fear of gaining too much muscle. They preferred another female 
personal trainer, Fairouza, who was not a bodybuilder. Although Fairouza did strength 
training in addition to cardio, she worked to maintain her curvy figure rather than to 
“shred” and build muscle mass. Presenting traditionally feminine was a shared concern 
among female clients and instructors: Both Ziyan and Fairouza regularly visited salons to 
maintain their blown-out and highlighted hair, substantial makeup, and 100-dollar acrylic 
nails. Both posted professionally shot photographs of themselves modeling sexy clothes, 
again to a curated social media audience.  
For Kurdistani females, the culturally ideal gendered body is cultivated through 
traditional expressions of femininity, domestic roles, and a particular aesthetic. Whereas 
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some of my female interlocutors aspired to the svelte body popularized by global fitness 
culture, others desired the hyper-curvy figure popularized by reality television and social 
media influences (e.g., the American celebrity Kardashian family). Slight muscle-gains 
were acceptable for women but becoming too muscular was deemed unattractive. 
Likewise, the ideal Kurdistani female body must be protected. Long-standing cultural 
practices of cloistering restrict women’s mobility in an effort to protect sexual “purity”. 
Cloistering practices greatly hinder achieving the kind of body and individuality 
valorized by global fitness culture and by Western culture more generally.  Global fitness 
culture promotes an ideal type of person produced through self-actualization that 
prioritizes an individual’s physical health and resulting self-image. Self-image hinges 
upon health markers, such as weight or muscle-to-fat ratio, as well as upon a cultivated 
aesthetic according to one’s gender and diet and exercise program (e.g., weight loss or 
bodybuilding). Messaging about health and fitness are also heavily individualized, 
placing the responsibility of achieving this lifestyle squarely on the shoulders of 
individuals.  
Cultural practices like cloistering and homemaking, however, restrict women’s 
ability to pursue self-actualization through going to gyms for exercise and socialization, 
especially in mixed-gender gyms. Cultural norms for hospitality and etiquette require 
women to be available in the home for the majority of the day. Everyday women spend 
hours preparing meals for the family and for guests; meticulously cleaning the home, 
especially in anticipation of social visits; and receiving and entertaining guests. Insisting 
on eating a non-traditional diet, eating at different times, or being absent from the home 
in order to pursue physical fitness all conflict with appropriate (gendered) behavior. 
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Kurdistani women, especially unmarried women, said their families worried about their 
reputation if they were away from the home too much. How could the family ensure their 
daughter would be well-regarded in the community if she is away from home too often, 
or does not eat like the rest of the family, or avoids social visits in order to maintain her 
diet and exercise routines?  
Ziyan’s participation in the male-dominated realms of bodybuilding and Kurdish 
ethnonationalism generated anxieties. During the months leading up to the referendum, I 
observed women both in conversation and on social media linking their individual 
causes, such as pursuing a career or fitness regimen, to national causes, like independence 
or developing the society or country. In that liminal period, heightened female visibility 
and mobility were tolerated if not celebrated: An independent Kurdistan would be a 
pluralistic and progressive society (unlike Iraq, as some of my interlocutors emphasized) 
in which the “first female Kurdistani bodybuilder” could be a national hero (albeit, an 
ambivalent one).  
For a time, women like Ziyan increased their mobility by participating in the 
nationalist causes of independence and developing the nation. They did so by pursuing 
projects of self-actualization through education, careers, or hobbies, all of which 
increased their participation in the public sphere, decreased their time in the domestic 
sphere, and in many cases delayed marriage and children. The global fitness industry had 
arrived and evolved rapidly in Erbil, and a subset of Kurdistani women had played a big 
part in it: They convinced their relatives to permit them to join a gym, to travel to and 
from the gym, and to wear Western-style exercise clothing such as leggings. Of course, 
there were usually conditions. Some families permitted gym-going only if the gym had 
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women-only section; in some cases, families mandated that they only use the women’s 
section. A woman might be permitted to travel to the gym with other women or to be 
chauffeured by a male relative or hired driver. Many women arrived and left wearing 
conservative outfits, changing into and out of their Western-style exercise clothes in the 
women’s locker room. It seemed to me that even marginal freedoms led to greater 
expectations about women’s position in Kurdistani society. Women looked to the 
examples set by female personal trainers like Ziyan, although attaining a highly 
individualized and public lifestyle like Ziyan’s required sacrifices many people were not 
willing to make, especially after the transitional moment passed.   
With the national cause decoupled from personal projects of ethical self-
formation, the differences between competing ethical positions in contemporary 
Kurdistan became clearer. On the one hand, nationalist and Islamic ethical positioning 
typically cast women in more conservative roles as wives and mothers of the nation or 
religious community (Adely 2012; Hegland 2009; Joseph 1991; Kanaaneh 2002). During 
periods of social change or consolidation of power, states and institutions may elevate 
these “traditional” roles to national importance, and even expand them by including 
women in development. During such transitional moments, the values and goals of the 
state, civil society, and international actors overlap and can appear united in common 
cause, such as developing the nation and well-being of its citizens, and in common 
sentiment (a broadly humanist ethos).  
During the conflict with ISIS, Kurdish ethnonationalist sentiment skyrocketed, as 
did distaste for conversative Islam for its associations with ISIS. Kurdistani women 
became central to the narrative of the Kurdistan Region as a counterpublic more 
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progressive than its neighbors (the rest of Iraq, or the Islamic State). For example, at 
Erbil’s first bicycle marathon, officials gave speeches that noted how the Kurdistan 
Region was safe and progressive enough to include female cyclists (more about this 
marathon appears in the following chapter).  In this “progressive Kurdistan” narrative, the 
ideal gendered Kurdistani body and the ideal gendered modern citizen overlapped. But 
after the failed referendum and the collapse of Kurdistani territorial expansion, the ideal 
body and ideal citizen clashed. Women like Ziyan, who had thrived during the liminal, 
transitional period, found their experimentations with mobility less welcome.  
As scholars have noted (Das 1995), after the liminal, revolutionary moment 
passes, women in post-revolutionary societies often revert to their former roles as wives 
and mothers and in jobs traditionally performed by women. In the time since the failed 
independence referendum, I have noticed my female Kurdistani acquaintances gradually 
sharing less nationalistic and forward-looking content on social media. Instead, they have 
been posting more expressions of everyday, status quo femininity (new clothes, hair, 
makeup, etc.) in the usual social settings (home, salon, social gathering, etc.). Some seem 
to have decreased their gym-going or talking about their careers. A couple women, whom 
I have stayed in touch with since returning to the U.S., have told me that they have lost 
their motivation for self-improvement. Some have married. Of course, these behaviors 
are not attributable solely to the events following the referendum, which admittedly I 
have watched from a distance since concluding my fieldwork in July 2017. But if social 
media is any indicator of shifting attitudes, then it is significant that most of my 
interlocutors have fallen silent on these topics. 
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When the transitional moment passes (or fails), it becomes clear that these new, 
“modern” spaces like gyms and ethical practices like bodybuilding were not radically 
pluralistic spaces, but spaces in which people attempted to minimize the powers of 
family, sect, and state and to assert autonomy. I see the spaces and practices described in 
this chapter as something akin to a reform movement; in this comparison, the “modern” 
fitness center stands in for the “state”. In reform movements, people often continue to 
draw upon gender norms and social structures, which are, nevertheless, consciously or 
unconsciously incorporated into state power and effectively reproduce patriarchy. “While 
the state may seem to liberate women from private patriarchy, it may also cooperate with 
certain conservative constituencies to perpetuate this control,” Al-Rasheed argues in her 
work on the Saudi state (2013:4). The state may incorporate a “tribal ethos” into its 
framework, acting as national protector of feminine “honor” (Das 1995). Suad Joseph 
(1991; 1999; 2000) also has shown how state apparatuses, such as citizenship regimes, 
are predicated on notions of gender. Modern states in the Middle East conceptualize 
citizenship and govern family life with reference to patrilineal kinship (King 2018). Thus, 
both society and state have been mutually constitutive in reinforcing the boundedness of 




Ethical life in breakdown 
In this chapter, I have argued that bodybuilding and gym-going in Iraqi Kurdistan 
offer their practitioners two paradigms for thinking about ethical life, euphemized as 
“modern” and premised on radical autonomy, in Kurdistan: On the one hand, 
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bodybuilding and gym-going frame experiences of sectarian political cultures and the 
“failed” Iraqi state. In this narrative, the traditional male bodybuilder with muscles 
cultivated for “show” represents the old nation-building paradigm of Middle Eastern 
states. Kurdish bodybuilders are celebrated as heroes at home and abroad, where they 
carry the Kurdistani flag into international competitions. Hosting bodybuilding 
competitions in the Kurdistan Region has elevated its status, as it continues to behave like 
a state and aspires to statehood. So, the old bodybuilding as nation-building paradigm 
still carries weight. 
Conversely, the new Kurdistani body politic my interlocutors envisioned would 
be pluralistic, tolerant, and modern, just like global fitness culture. Global fitness culture 
offers “real” or “functional” strength training to both men and women who exercise 
together in “modern” fitness centers, which symbolizes the aspirational “modern” and 
“pluralistic” Kurdistani state. Mixed-gender gyms would replace the old nation-building 
paradigm of bodybuilding. That hyper muscular bodybuilding paradigm was dismissed as 
a site of dirty, smelly gyms, outdated methods, dangerous steroid use, and ethnic, 
religious, and gender discrimination. It was all about “show” and not about “real 
strength” or “functional fitness” like in CrossFit. In this narrative, bodybuilding was as 
fake and corrupt as the Iraqi state. 
“Modern” gyms offered a space where people “didn’t talk about religion and 
politics,” as many people said to me, because in the gym “they don’t matter.” But until 
that vision is realized (if ever), ethnic, religious, and political divides matter still. They 
matter in ways that foreign intervention and war have created or exacerbated, leading to a 
world that for many has “become unbearable,” as Jarrett Zigon (2018) has described 
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societies experiencing breakdown. Zigon argues that one way of dealing with breakdown 
is to cultivate “an ethics of dwelling,” which is “the response to an existential imperative 
emerging from a world that has become unbearable as a result of a particular situation 
that has led to the breakdown of this world.” In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 
bodybuilding and fitness (as they are understood and practiced there) result from 
breakdown and a subsequent struggle to recover. Bodybuilding and gym-going offer 
people and society a path to recovery. Many of my interlocutors described their 
participation in global fitness culture as their contribution to building a better society. 
Through training in mixed-gender, diverse, and “modern” gyms, people removed 
themselves from the pressures of sectarian political cultures and from gender and ethnic 
discrimination. They advanced a pluralistic vision for Kurdistan with the mixed gym as a 
template for a strong, equitable civil society and an inclusive future Kurdistani state.  
Bodybuilding and fitness cultures exemplify how state power is being remade in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. Although bodybuilding may seem backward or outdated to some, its 
performance of mastery and power appeals to the strong current of Kurdish 
ethnonationalism in the KRI. On the other hand, the expansion of fitness culture in Iraqi 
Kurdistan may seem like the mere encroachment of global capitalism, a new hobby for 
wealthy Kurdistani people. My sense is that, more deeply, global fitness culture and 
mixed-gender gyms tap into desires to “modernize” Iraqi Kurdistan and to create a more 
just and inclusive society.  
Writing about Israel and Palestine, Jasbir Puar (2017) has illuminated how state 
power is configured through a debility – disability – capacity complex. War and 
displacement have weakened the social and political bodies (and in some cases, 
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individual physical bodies) through the process of “debility.” These same conditions of 
war, however, enable the championing of recovery. In Iraqi Kurdistan, bodybuilding and 
mixed-gender gyms are “capacity” success symbols of the strong/modern citizen in the 
patriotic/aspirational Kurdistani state. In this way, bodybuilding and gym-going are used, 
on the one hand, to frame experiences of the “failed” Iraqi state and sectarian political 
cultures. On the other hand, bodybuilding and gym-going are used discursively to 
champion the aspirational “modern” and “pluralistic” Kurdistani state. People seek to 
work out the weaknesses of self and society through virtuous practices of bodybuilding 
and training in mixed gender gyms. And yet these very ethical practices are engendered 









Chapter 5: “There is no future” 
 
 
“‘Go and look at all the failures, disappointments, blood and suffering in this 
city…My dear brother, imagination is not a path, as you would have it. Rather, it 
is a secret door we run through when our houses are set alight.’” – Bakhtiyar Ali, 
I Stared at the Night of the City 
Field notes excerpts 
From my field notes, January 2016 
 
 In the cafeteria, 12-year-old Naza sat by herself with her head hung over her bowl 
and juice box. I pulled up a chair and sat beside her. We made small talk for a few 
minutes. Suddenly, Naza said, “Miss, do you think things will ever get better here in 
Kurdistan?" Her eyes were large and solemn. My heart ached to hear her question.  
I thought for a moment and said, “That’s a good question. Can I hear what you 
think first, and then I will tell you what I think?”  
Naza replied, “My parents think we should go to America. If my dad can get the 
iqama (residency permit) there, we will go. Maybe we won’t have much money there, but 
it is safe. Last year I heard a bomb and thought maybe my dad died. There was a bomb 
near these cafes. There was a car that drove up to the [U.S. Consulate] and when they saw 
it coming, they made the bomb go off. I was at home and heard the sound and felt the 
house move like this. [She made a shaking motion.] I was afraid to move in case the 
house fell. My dad was out of the house and I didn’t know where. Then I stood up and 
went outside and saw some smoke. I started crying and said maybe our dad was hurt. He 
was out of the house. I didn’t know where he was. My [older] sister saw me crying and 
said I should stop crying, that it was nothing. She has no feelings. So, I called my dad, 
and he was ok. But the street with all the nice cafes that my mom says are like Europe, 
they were all destroyed. We went to see them. Mom said that it was too bad because that 
was such a nice street and now all those cafes are gone.” 
I listened and waited for Naza to say more. When she didn’t, I said to her, “My 
wish, my prayer, is that Iraq would have peace.” Naza looked at me expectantly. I 
hesitated. After a moment, I continued, “I think Iraq is a wonderful country. I mean, most 
of the people here are so nice, so welcoming, so lovely. The land is rich with oil, but the 
people are poor. There are so many problems, fighting over the oil, over the money, over 
the land…”  
Naza interjected, “Yes, we watched a documentary about Mesopotamia, and this 
girl in the documentary said, ‘This land is cursed.’” 
  I waited. Naza’s eyes were so large, so sad. “I don’t want to go,” she said in a 
small voice. “I don't want to leave this school or my friends.” 
 
 
Field note, February 2016 
 
I went to the school cafeteria and ordered a pizza. I asked a group of three girls, seventh 
graders, if I could join them. They brought up the topic of diaspora. The most vocal of the 
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girls said, “This country isn’t good anymore. It was good, but they’re making it bad for 
us. It is expensive to live here. This country has no future. That’s why so many people 
are leaving.”  
 
Field note, March 2016  
 
 Rezan [ninth grade] saw us from a distance and walked over to join us. I told 
Rezan, “We were just talking about the komalayatȋ class.”  
Rezan said brightly, “Oh I love that class, Mr. Karza is so good to us. At first, I 
thought he was strange, but I really like how he teaches us.” Rezan does participate more 
than any other student in her komalayatȋ class; she asks many questions. “We learned 
about a man who pushed a rock up a mountain, but it kept falling back down,” Rezan 
explained. “Mr. Karza said to keep trying to push the rock back up, it is not hopeless. He 
said not to give up just because of the government and the problems in our country.”  
Then Rezan mentioned that she will be leaving the school, either for Ishik or one 
of the British schools.  
“Why?” I asked, surprised. 
Rezan said, “There is no future here for us.”  
“Do you want to leave Kurdistan?” I asked. 
“Yes, maybe to Canada because there is no future here. The political situation is 
hopeless here.”  
“What is the voting age here [in Kurdistan]? I asked. 
“18,” she replied. I asked her if she will vote when she is 18. “Probably not,” she 
said, “because it doesn’t matter.”  
 
 
Field note, April 2016: 
Chira, grade 8: If our country stays like this, we probably don’t have a future. Our 
country is kind of selfish and dirty.  
 
Ahmed, grade 8: Miss, all these bad situations happen from no teamwork. All of Iraq 
doesn’t help its people, its environment, its population, anything. They just work for 
themselves.  
 
Chira: Miss, when he said there is no teamwork: People have lost hope so much, if you 
tell them we can work together, [they say] no. People have no hope. The problem is we 
don’t have a future here. 
 
Ahmed: All the people will go to other places and leave this place. Miss, now the 
situation is very bad. There are peshmerga fighting, and people are leaving. I don’t think 






Field note, May 2016 
 
Gulistan, grade 10: Yeah, a lot of them are talking about moving, hoping to move, 
wishing to move. Because the things that are happening now, there is no hope that is 
gonna get better. Nobody knows what is gonna happen. It’s not safe. The politicians are 
all playing with each other. And the politics, no one is willing to help unless it is 
benefitting for their own selves. It's politics. It’s dirty. Nothing is clear about politics. 
You don’t know your own future, so many are trying to move. 
 
 
Field note, June 2017 
 
Diana: Yesterday, the government announced they are going to have an independence 
referendum in September. 
 
Abbas [male, 30s, security contractor]: This is to make people busy, for some reason only 
[the government] knows. This came out of nowhere. 
 
Diana: What about the future of the rest of the country? 
 
Abbas: Oh no, no future. No future. I think in the end, it will be a federal thing. Shia 
will take their side. Sunni will take their side. The central government will stay, at least in 
front of the world, as one government. I think it will be just federal areas like Kurdistan.  
 
 Throughout this dissertation, we have witnessed people grappling with various 
models for ethical life. Because ethical behavior in the present is typically premised on 
certain conceptualizations of the “future,” interlocutors deliberate over their present 
moral obligations regarding that future. Based on their view of the world, they debate the 
merits of action or inaction, with reference to a this-worldly, “immanent frame” (Taylor 
2007), or to a transcendent one. Competing or overlapping ethical regimes pressured and 
pulled people in different directions toward different conclusions. They wrestled with 
complexities, contradictions, and confusions. They spoke of doubt and hope. They said 
there is a future, or there is no future. More of them concluded the latter. In this chapter, 
the interlocutors do most of the talking. Much of their ethical deliberations involved 
“myths” about multiple pasts, presents, and futures.  
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 This chapter listens to interlocutors recount their experiences in three types of 
spaces – education, work, and fitness – and reflects on how the “failures” of state, 
society, and even “modernity” itself led to deep personal disappointments. The spaces 
interlocutors inhabit are said to be, or at least aspire to be, modern, inclusive, or 
pluralistic. The people who create and inhabit these “pluralistic” and “modern” spaces 
express hopes that their efforts contribute to the betterment of individuals, their 
communities, and their country. In Chapter 3, for example, Kurdistan Civilizational 
School (KCS) co-founder Yakub Boutros explained how KCS was intended to create a 
“shared ethic” that would help rectify “sectarian” practices that begin in childhood, like 
when the Iraqi government segregates schoolchildren according to perceived 
ethnoreligious identity but, in many cases, still subject all the students to Islamic 
majoritarian values.  
This was the nature of Deena’s K-12 education. Deena, an Assyrian Christian 
woman in her mid-30s, believed that a university education would help people become 
“open-minded.” Although Deena describes some positive experiences, her repeated 
encounters with “sectarianism” at university and in her workplace lead her to conclude 
that interfaith, cross-cultural, or political dialogue in Iraq is futile. Instead, she withdraws 
into a small circle of like-minded friends with whom share can share her opinions, and 
she finds another sphere in which to work on self-cultivation: the gym.  
 Ashti, introduced in this chapter, is a Kurdish woman in her 40s, who, despite her 
limited formal education, has read widely, learned multiple languages, and lived in 
Europe. She described feeling divinely “called” to return to Kurdistan, where she hopes 
that she can contribute to Kurdistan’s development. She expected that globalization and 
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development in the years that she has been away will have increased access to knowledge 
and opportunities to improve oneself, one’s community, and one’s country. In her job as 
a teacher in a government-run school, she finds instead youth who express resignation 
and lack motivation. She concludes that the deteriorating education system is partly the 
fault of the government, which seeks to make its citizens docile rather than empowered. 
Ashti wonders why she was “called” to return to a hopeless place, where she waits for a 
“future that is already here.” The field note excerpts, vignettes, and lengthy quotes in this 
chapter allow interlocutors, in their own words, to describe the sense of failure in society, 
state, and modernity itself. While some interlocutors summon the resources to generate 
hope for a future, others cannot or do not, resigning themselves to making do in a 
“stagnant” present and looking toward an uncertain future, or worse, no future.  
 
The myth of Sisyphus  
In one komalayatȋ (social studies) lesson, the teacher, Karza, told the class a story 
in which a poor man had three apples. He bit into the first apple; it had a worm, so he 
threw it aside. He bit into a second apple, and it also had a worm, so he threw it aside. 
Then he turned the light off and bit into his third apple. Why? Karza asked. A few 
students suggested answers.  A boy in the back of class said, “Because he is poor and 
hungry and has to eat, so he doesn't want to see the worm in the third apple.” Karza 
smiled and pointed to the boy in the back. “Is happiness inside you or from outside?” 
Karza asked. The students were unsure. He then asked the students what they wanted to 
be when they grew up. He also asked the students what they wanted to see in their 
country after ten years. Some students said they did not know, while others named high-
status jobs like doctor or engineer.  
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The teacher’s questions prompted many students to share frustrations about 
Kurdistan and Iraq; some insisted things would not improve. In response, Karza wrote 
“Albert Camus” on the board and related Camus’ essay on the myth of Sisyphus. Camus 
writes, 
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a 
mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought 
with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and 
hopeless labor… 
 
Karza asked the class what most people would do if they were Sisyphus; would they keep 
pushing the rock back up the mountain only to see it fall again? One girl insisted that no, 
most people would not keep trying. Karza disagreed, arguing that most people would 
keep trying rather than give up or self-destruct. He encouraged the class not to give up 
even though problems in their government or country seem impossible to solve. Karza’s 
philosophy is summed up in the conclusion to Camus’ essay: 
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where would his 
torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him? The 
workman of today works everyday in his life at the same tasks, and his fate is no 
less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. 
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole 
extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The 
lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. 
There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn… It makes of fate a human 
matter, which must be settled among men…All Sisyphus' silent joy is contained 
therein. His fate belongs to him… This universe henceforth without a master 
seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake 
of that night filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the 
heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy (1991: 
23-24). 
 
Life ultimately may be absurd or futile, Karza told the class, but the person who 
realizes this futility is freed to be the master of his personal fate. Karza’s lessons 
implicitly critiqued attitudes of resignation about Iraq’s problems, and instead offered 
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encouragement to confront those problems. He admonished students to reject ignorance, 
to turn on the light and look at the worm in the apple.  
For the students, Karza modeled how an intellectual approach, including reading 
widely and thinking critically, offered an alternative way of learning, and thus living an 
ethical life, that was not governed by religion, cultural rules and social expectations, or 
by ethnonationalism. His lessons were a radical departure from the traditional 
authoritarian culture of classrooms in government schools and in some private schools. 
At KCS, notably I observed this authoritarian style of teaching mostly among the ethnic 
Kurdish teachers who were trained in government teaching colleges. These teachers 
seemed very like the ones I observed in government schools. Far from a tyrant in the 
classroom, Karza modeled humility.  Saryan, a girl in grade 8, said, “[Karza] cares about 
history, and he cares about educating himself. He has a library full of books...And he 
cares about learning, teaching the students, and he’s trying to improve as a teacher. He 
tells us to let him know if he makes a mistake.” Although I do not know why Karza did 
not return to teach the following year, I suspect it may have something to do with his 
unconventional pedagogy. Choosing to turn on the light and see the worm has 
consequences. 
 
Facing a (non)sectarian future 
The myth of Sisyphus was not the only myth that appeared in lessons at Kurdistan 
Civilizational School. The Grade 10 English Literature students spent most of the 
semester studying C.S. Lewis’ Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold, a retelling of the 
Cupid and Psyche myth. The class typically read and discussed one or two chapters per 
week. (I found that students’ English comprehension levels varied, though most students 
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were able to understand the plot of the novel; students whose entire education had been 
taught in the English language at KCS demonstrated exceptional reading 
comprehension.) The novel is set in a primitive, pagan society in which the protagonist, 
Orual, and her sister Psyche live. In the first part of the novel, Orual gives an account of 
her life documenting the gods’ injustice toward her. The second part, narrated by an older 
Orual, is a reconsideration of her accusations against the gods and a realization about 
human self-deception and fallibility vis-a-vis the gods. Like most of Lewis’ work, the 
book contains Christian themes and is essentially a redemption narrative in which the 
main character experiences a conversion from a state of unbelief in the goodness and 
rightness of the gods’ actions to a state of belief.  I had read the book a few years prior to 
my fieldwork, and my sense is that these themes are likely evident to someone from a 
Christian background.  
Grade 10 Literature class was, however, taught by a Muslim teacher to a majority 
Muslim student body, which resulted in some unorthodox interpretations of Lewis’ book. 
Generally, elements of the book that seemed thematically Christian were interpreted 
broadly as moral lessons without any acknowledgement of or reference to the Christian 
content. Jamila’s approach to teaching Till We Have Faces primarily as a nonsectarian 
morality tale permitted her to approach any potentially sectarian religious content within 
a broader narrative, one which might be shared by “believers,” that is, theists in general. 
Perhaps her framing accords with an Islamic concept, “People of the Book,” which 
recognizes Islam’s kinship with other monothesistic religions with holy texts.  
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In one lesson, Jamila handed students a paper with an image of a sculpture of 
Psyche and Cupid. On the other side of the handout was a summary of the myth of Cupid 
and Psyche. Jamila directed her students to examine the statues’ faces. 
Jamila: It’s not always about how we look. If someone is gifted with beauty, but they are 
ugly inside, you will see the ugly. Our faces reflect who we are. You know how when 
you see someone, maybe another student and you tell your friend or your Mom, ‘oh she is 
so beautiful,’ but your mom says ‘no she is just ok.’ Why do you think she is beautiful? 
Because of how you feel about her. What about Orual? What does she want, in chapter 1? 
 
Zayn: To meet with the gods. 
Jamila: Yes, exactly. She wished the gods would answer her questions. She wanted a 
court, a judge higher than the gods themselves, because she thought she would win if she 
could present her case to them. Why? Because she felt her life was unfair. [A student said 
this was because her mother died when she was young and her father was hard, and 
because she was considered ugly.] Last time, we agreed that we cannot blame the God for 
the things that happen. So now tell me this: Why can’t we see our God? [The students 
hesitated. She raised the pitch of her voice.] We are analyzing the story. Try to 
understand it and enjoy it. That doesn’t mean we are feeling the same way as Orual or we 
are C.S. Lewis. 
 
Serbest: What makes us so special that we should see God?  
Jamila: Ok, that is one way to look at it.  
 
Serbest: He is everywhere, but He can’t show himself to everyone. He shows himself to 
special people only, like saints and prophets. 
 
Jamila: Why can’t I see the gods and have an argument with them? Why can’t I discuss 
my case with them? That is what this story is about. Do we blame or appreciate...? 
 
Hawar: You know what I believe? Each of us has a part of the soul from God, right? My 
theory is that when you talk to some good person, you see God in that person.  
 
Gulistan: Or if you have a friend who lives far from you, you can talk to them through 
praying, through thinking of them. 
 
Layla: It is impossible to see God when someone is running away from Him. 
 
Jamila, approvingly: Exactly. If I feel his presence, his being, I won’t care if I can see 
him or not. I already know him and see he is there. For Orual, she didn’t have faith. She 
has a lack of principles and such confusion in her life. That’s why she wants to see the 
gods. For me, I know he’s there listening to me.  
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Hawar: Miss, it’s always about faith and trust!  
Jamila: You won’t need to face him... 
Hawar: You can see him in any good thing, in your father, in your mother... 
Jamila: She [Orual] was confused, questioning the being of God. Now we know what the 
story is based on: faith versus reason. How is this related to the title?   
 
Rida: Face and faith are the same thing. If you have a faith, you have a face to meet God.  
 
Jamila: If we have a face, we are toward the light. But if we don’t have a face, we will 
run to the shadow. We can’t see God until we have faith in him. We’re not able to believe 
in him until we have faith, a face…Augustine said that ‘Running away from God is like 
running away from the sun. As you run from the light, you run into your own shadow.’ 
What does this mean? 
 
Layla: It’s like when Adam and Eve sinned and they hid, they were living in their own 
shadow.  
Jamila, hesitating: But that was because they had shame because they sinned, not because 
they didn’t have faith. 
 
Georges: You regret the sins at the end of your life, when you die. 
Hawar: You don’t see God in your mistakes until they become a disaster. Because after 
your whole lifetime you see the disaster. 
 
Jamila: What is the simile here? ‘God is like the sun.’ Why does it take a whole lifetime? 
 
Serbest: You create the shadow and go to the dark side by not following God in the light. 




Thomas: At the beginning of your life, you are an innocent child, like a blank slate. But 
gradually you go away from the light and you realize your mistakes. 
 
Belend: When your life ends you go back to the light. 
 
Jamila: All these answers are wonderful. You all get a bonus point. God is the light. 
When you go off his path and run away to your own shadow, away from his rules, it takes 
a long time to know your mistakes. That’s why the old people are the wisest. Have you 
ever noticed how the old people say, 'Please listen to me. Do not do this or that and these 
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consequences will happen. Avoid these bad things.' How do they know? Because they 
have lived their whole lives and know. 
 
Hawar: There are some people as well who never pray all their life until they are old. 
Jamila: Yes. Sometimes we are in the light, and sometimes we are in the shadow, as 
Thomas said.  
 
 Throughout the semester, Jamila presented the novel as a morality tale whose 
protagonist modeled both desirable and undesirable behaviors. Once she ascertained that 
her students had understood the plot, Jamila tended to focus episodically on characters’ 
moral behavior, rather than to consider the larger character arcs, particularly of the 
protagonist. The novel’s protagonist radically alters her interpretation of events; parts one 
and two of the book present nearly opposite interpretations of the protagonist’s life and 
her relationship to the gods. Rather than analyzing how the relationship between humans 
and the divine changes throughout the novel, Jamila portrayed this relationship as static. 
For example, when discussing the concept of fate, one of the key themes of the novel, 
Jamila led students in a discussion about the ethics of trying to know and alter one’s fate 
or destiny: 
 
Jamila: Do you want to know what is going to happen? 
Students: Yes! 
 
Jamila: How will you know? Do you use horoscope, Zodiac? 
 
Hawar: Yes, I read a lot of them. 
 
Yakub: Someone I know went to see a prophet... 
 
Jamila: Not a prophet, a seer... 
 
Yakub: ....a seer, and he told him what he ate, if the electricity would go out… 
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Jamila: You do not need a seer to know the electricity will go out in Iraq! [class laughs] 
 
Layla: No, no, it’s like this guy who went and learned who he is going to be friends with, 
what will happen in his life, like this! 
 
Jamila: No, I mean lucky numbers, reading horoscopes, like this... 
 
Zayn: There was one that said in 10 years I will be a millionaire...or go to prison [class 
laughs] 
 
Jamila: You will graduate university and go straight to prison! [more laughter] 
 
Serbest: Some people look at the coffee... 
 
Hawar: My uncle is obsessed with that! 
 
Jamila: [Pause] Why do you think God didn’t make us know our fate? 
 
Serbest: Miss, it’s a surprise! [laughter] 
 
Jamila: What will happen if you know? There has to be a reason.... 
 
Zayn: You will try to change it. 
 
Jamila: Yes, if I know I am going to be in a car accident, I will never go in a car again. Or 
a plane accident, I will never travel anywhere.  
 
Yakub: You will give up living. 
 
Jamila: So that’s why we cannot know. 
 
About one year after this lesson, a KCS student died tragically in a car accident. When I 




During the semester I spent in KCS, I joined Grade 10 for at least one of their 
lessons almost every day. I usually sat in an extra desk in the back of the classroom, often 
close to students Ashur and Rasim. Ashur and Rasim made an odd pair. They preferred to 
sit in the back of the room where they could whisper comments to each other throughout 
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their lessons. Ashur was a gangly kid who listened to his teachers with rapt attention, 
leaning forward in his desk and seemingly hanging on every word, though he did not 
speak aloud as often as his peers. His friend, Rasim, was even quieter; he did not like his 
classmates referring to him as “the next Einstein” or “nerdy.”  Rasim tended to recline in 
his desk chair and sometimes put his head on his desktop; whenever a teacher called him 
out, he would demonstrate that, much to the teacher’s surprise or consternation, he had 
been following the lesson all along. 
 Both boys were children of university-educated parents from Assyrian Christian 
families. Their families had lived in the Christian township of Ainkawa for multiple 
generations, and the boys shared intellectual and religious interests. During class and in 
conversation with their peers, Ashur and Rasim appeared reluctant to express their 
opinions. I was puzzled by their reluctance and silence, particularly when their courses 
included overtly Christian content. During the weeks Grade 10 studied the novel Till We 
Have Faces, I watched the boys closely. I expected that, as self-identifying Christian 
students, Ashur and Rasim would at least contribute to the discussion, especially when 
opportunities arose to “correct” their peers’ and teacher’s understanding of the book. 
Both boys usually remained silent.  
This was because Jamila, their teacher who identified as Muslim, did not solicit 
the boys’ opinions as “Christians” studying a “Christian” novel. Rather, Jamila framed 
the novel broadly as a morality tale. On one hand, Jamila’s broad ethical framing of the 
novel facilitated class discussions about morality: Fictional characters served as proxies 
through which students and their teacher could discuss morality, rather than directly 
discussing students’ actions, which were the subject of much gossip. For example, one 
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fictional character forcing another character to do something led to a broader discussion 
about obeying parents and individual choices. Although Jamila conceded that there were 
some appropriate contexts for students to make individual choices, she ultimately led the 
class to conclude that obeying one’s parents and having respect for social norms is the 
general rule. After all, teaching general morality and ethics, not just “the Christian ethic,” 
was one of the stated goals of the school, as one of the school’s co-founders said to me in 
an interview in 2012. 
On the other hand, discussing moral lessons from the novel also may have 
facilitated school authorities exercise of power over the students. Throughout the 
semester, I observed Jamila seeking information about students’ personal lives, such as 
romantic relationships. Students said it was obvious that Jamila had favorites, and they 
speculated about which students shared gossip with their teacher. Sometimes, I was told, 
Jamila intervened in students’ “private” affairs, such as by sharing the information she 
gleaned with other authorities in the school or with students’ parents.  Later in this 
chapter, I discuss Jamila’s “game” called “confession chair,” in which she prompted 
students to answer questions about (im)moral behavior (e.g., “Have you ever kissed 
anyone?”) in a “truth or dare” format. 
Toward the end of the semester, I interviewed Rasim and Ashur individually. 
When I mentioned Till We Have Faces, Rasim said, “It’s phenomenal. This book is 
maybe the one that most has impacted me, maybe because I’m a Christian. Most of the 
students don’t understand it. They don’t understand that Orual was a sinner and she 
repented and was put right with God.” I asked Rasim why he did not share his 
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interpretation of the book with his classmates; did students typically not discuss 
“controversial things” like religion among themselves?  
He replied, “If someone talks about religion in our school, there is gonna be a 
fight, ninety percent.” (Recalling my group interview with grade 9 students that resulted 
in a scuffle between students, which is described in Chapter 3, I had to agree with 
Rasim’s assessment.) Rasim continued, “Some of my friends do, but if people, like in 
grade 11, talked about it, for sure there would be hatred and eventually lead to a brawl 
between them.” When I asked Rasim if anyone in authority ever told him or other 
students not to discuss certain subjects, he replied no, that students had learned to avoid 
these topics from experience.  
 When I asked Rasim’s friend Ashur about controversial topics in the school, 
Ashur replied in a similar manner, saying, “I don’t talk much about religion with other 
students. I don’t want to get in trouble. If you are a Christian, especially.”  Considering 
that the private school acknowledges its foundation in “Christian classical education,” 
and that Ashur self-identifies as “Christian,” I found his answer surprising. When I 
pressed him to say more, Ashur explained that he “discussed religion with Rasim mostly, 
but if I talk with anyone else, I am afraid I’m hurting them. Because I would make them 
feel bad about things. So, I avoid it.” I had assumed, incorrectly, that students identifying 
as Christian might feel comfortable discussing Christianity in the school. I asked Ashur 
why he thought the school administrators included Christian content, such as Till We 
Have Faces, in the school’s curriculum: 
Ashur: I don’t think we should have read this book here. It is mostly about Christian 
faith, although Ms. Jamila was giving us other moral tips. I didn’t want to share what I 
was thinking when I was in class. The discussion...well, she skipped some big important 
stuff. She wasn’t talking about the hidden themes that C.S. Lewis wrote about. 
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Diana: What would have you said? 
 
Ashur: What I was thinking...the things in chapter 7. It was so emotional for me to talk 
about it. It presented something, like, bits of hope that nobody thought of. Like, you 
heard about Halabja and the chemicals [genocide]?  
 
Diana: Of course. 
 
Ashur: Many people sacrificed themselves to save their children. 
 
Diana: The theme of sacrifice is what you are talking about? 
 
Ashur: Yeah.  
 
Diana: What do you mean about the hidden themes that Lewis was writing about? 
 
Ashur: They showed more about how Orual’s thinking was, like, wrong. Although she is 
talking a lot, Orual is most likely wrong. She is trying to prove she is right. But what if 
you are doing the wrong thing in every step you are [taking]? She didn’t walk with what 
the gods gave her. She just thought she is right. Many of us do that and think we are 
doing the right thing and we’re not.  
 
 Both Rasim and Ashur emphasized that the novel’s protagonist, Orual, is a 
“sinner” and is “wrong.” Ashur explained that readers should see themselves in Orual and 
realize they also are sinful. In class discussions, however, I did not hear this language 
applied to the protagonist. Instead, their teacher, Ms. Jamila, seemed to interpret Orual as 
an admirable character, praising her as an example of a strong female leader, rather than 
as a foolish, misguided sinner as Ashur and Rasim understood the protagonist. Jamila 
instead presented the characters’ actions as generalized moral lessons. For example, she 
critiqued one character for his talking about “praying to the gods” despite the character’s 
avowed atheism. “Many disbelievers are still using these words,” Jamila told the class. 
“They don’t believe, even today, but they still say ‘inshallah’ and ‘Allah kareem.’ They 
don’t mean it but still say it.” Jamila often asked students to imagine themselves in 
ethical dilemmas like those of the novel’s characters, prompting the class to interpret 
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characters’ choices as “right” or “wrong.” While unbelief and hypocrisy were 
condemned, the teacher praised the protagonist for her individualism and perseverance.   
 I have discussed grade 10 students’ lessons about Till We Have Faces at length 
because these lessons exemplify how contests of values play out in a space that is said to 
be “pluralistic,” but which continues to be shaped by “sectarian” cultures. Religious 
beliefs and political opinions are negotiated in spaces portrayed as inclusive and secular, 
spaces such as a classroom containing a plurality of ethnoreligious identities. Although 
discussions may be intended to include and welcome all viewpoints, the way a teacher 
frames and guides the discussion can reinforce majoritarian views. In the examples 
above, the value of individual autonomous choice is superseded by the higher values of 
filial piety and respect for social and religious norms. Striving to ascertain or to alter 
one’s “fate” or “destiny” is interpreted as a sacrilegious challenge to God’s 
sovereignty.  In these and other lessons I observed in KCS, individual agency is 
celebrated so long as it does not threaten dominant social and religious norms. 
Conversely, students in classes taught by displaced Christian teachers were encouraged to 
exercise their individual agency to change the course of their lives and the future. My 
intention here is not to generalize about theological differences between Christians and 
Muslims, but rather to point out how students might be pulled in different directions as a 
result of competing values in the school. In this way, a fictional, Christian-themed story 
about an individual’s radical conversion is reframed as a non-sectarian morality tale in 
which characters’ identities are static and Islamic majoritarian views are reinforced. 
Andrew Bush, another anthropologist of Iraqi Kurdistan, has examined similar 
negotiations of religious differences within a Kurdish household comprised of a non-
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observant Muslim and his pious Muslim wife and daughters. Bush observes that the 
family members accommodate one another’s religious differences by creating a general 
“Islamic atmosphere” that does not make demands on the unbeliever. Bush describes a 
popular form of morality tale which praises the “virtue of not asking” about another 
person’s religion. Because the protagonists and audience of these morality tales are 
Muslim, Bush infers that the “virtue of not asking” is regarded as an “Islamic virtue.” He 
notes that not asking about another person’s religious identity is a “tendency widely 
available to Muslims and non-Muslims to affirm religious plurality in Ottoman societies.” 
Thus, practicing this (Islamic) “virtue of not asking” contributes to maintaining the 
“natural superiority” of Islam (2017:523). At societal and state levels in Egypt, Saba 
Mahmood (2015) also has explored negotiations of religious differences. She argues that 
secular practices of legal separation of public and private and of politics and religion can 
intensify and threaten religious identity rather than protect it. Mahmood suggests that 
secular state practices, not only in Egypt but in general, inadvertently “consecrate 
majoritarian religious values and norms within the laws of modern politics” to the 
detriment of religious minorities (197).  
 Grade 10 students Ashur and Rasim recognized their classroom was not as liberal 
and inclusive a space as it might appear to others. They recognized majoritarian views 
being reinforced in lessons and felt they could not offer alternative views which might be 
interpreted as a challenge to authority and a threat to the public order of the school and 
society. The “virtue of not asking” may have dissuaded Ashur or other students from 
saying anything that might suggest their peers or teachers were wrong, which could make 
people “feel bad,” as Ashur said. Although the school self-identified as “Christian,” 
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religious and political dialogues in the school often reflected (and suited) the 
ethnoreligious majority comprised of Muslim Kurdish administrators, teachers, and 
students. Not only Christian students, but also Arab, Bahai, Mandean, and Turkoman 
students told me that they generally kept their religious and political views to themselves 
while at school. 
  
Unmasking the self 
 Although KCS’ founders may have intended the school to be more overtly 
“Christian,” by the time of my fieldwork, the school seemed to offer a vaguely theistic 
approach to cultivating ethical life, one that emphasized autonomy, good character, and 
moral agency. KCS students have cultivated a generally liberal, romantic notion of the 
self as independent and enlightened. This “self” appeared in many lessons I observed, 
and often the self was the desired object/subject and site of intervention of classroom 
lessons. For example, sixth grade KCS students wrote and performed a theatrical sketch 
for their end of the school term ceremony before an audience of family members and 
school administrators. In the sketch, a boy walked around the stage announcing, “every 
kind of mask for sale.” He waved paper masks inscribed with words like “success,” 
“smart,” “confident,” and “classy.” Four students approached him and purchased masks. 
The fifth student to approach him criticized the buyers. “You don’t need these masks,” 
she told her fellow students. Another girl protested, “But you can’t just go around with 
your face uncovered.” Another student said, “Yeah, I got my mask from my parents.” 
The girl playing the role of conscientious objector continued, “Don't get me wrong,” she 
said. “I've worn a lot of masks in my life, but I got tired of my closet full of identities. A 
while back I threw them all out.” The students were silent and looked at one another. One 
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by one, they dropped their masks and walked off stage. A student stepped forward to 
narrate, saying, “As it is shown, the only character who was brave enough was the 
unmasked one. She had the right reasons…We don’t have to fake who we are.”  
The autonomous, “true” self, which appears throughout Jamila’s presentation of 
Till We Have Faces, and in the above “masks” sketch, is one site where ethical positions 
clash. The romanticized liberal “fiction” (Rose 1996) of the radically autonomous self is 
at odds with inherited identity categories. The sketch nods to inherited identity categories 
when one student commented that he had “got [his] mask from [his] parents.” In 
Kurdistan, like much of the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, the dominant 
form of kinship is patrilineal, a type of unilineal descent by which a person’s ancestry is 
traced through the father’s line; a person at birth inherits the religious and ethnic identity 
of his or her father. Patrilineal reckoning also is preserved in personal status codes (PSC) 
which govern family life, stipulating who can marry, divorce, inherit, and pass on 
citizenship to children (Efrati 2005; King 2010, 2015; Mahmood 2012; Makdishi 2014). 
The Iraqi state, and the Kurdistan Regional Government within it, uses this system of 
patrilineal reckoning to assign religious and ethnic identity categories to citizen-subjects. 
Citizens are expected, by the state and the community alike, to adhere to inherited 
identity categories for life. The Iraqi state recognizes a limited number of identity 
categories, all of which are ethnosectarian, such as Muslim Kurd, Chaldean Catholic, and 
several others. There is no official recognition of atheism or of religious categories other 
than those authorized.  
The trope of unmasking the true self also appeared in the truth or dare games 
students frequently played in the classroom and outside the school. I spent most of my 
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time with the tenth-grade class, who often played truth or dare, as well as a game called 
“confession chair.” Their literature teacher, Jamila, introduced grade 10 to this game, in 
which a student was selected to sit in the chair and answer four questions truthfully. Most 
questions concerned crushes or hypothetical romantic relationships. Sometimes students 
were asked to name favorites, to confess lies they had told, or to share personal regrets. 
Jamila presided over the confession chair, although she also played the role of co-
conspirator, gossiping about students and teachers. When I asked students in private how 
they felt about the confession chair and truth or dare, some dismissed the games as pure 
fun, a distraction from a stressful schedule of studying and examinations. Other students 
told me that they suspect their teacher used the game to inform the administration, going 
so far as to separate students alleged to be romantically involved.  
Nevertheless, students also played truth or dare games at private social events. On 
one occasion I went on a picnic with the ninth-grade class, an event unsanctioned by the 
school. I was the only adult present, though students often regarded me as something 
between an authority figure (an adult but not a teacher) and a student (technically I was a 
student, was young, and, according to my Kurdistani friends, appeared even younger). 
When the students decided to play truth or dare, they invited me to join. The questions 
they asked one another were about romantic relationships, real and hypothetical. The 
mood was rowdy, and the questions were more provocative than usual.  
When my turn came, I asked an Assyrian Christian girl named “Arbella,” truth or 
dare? She chose truth.  “Imagine you really loved someone,” I said to Arbella, “but that 
person was outside your religion. Would you still marry?” The students fell silent. A 
couple boys complained that it was not a good question. Arbella smiled gravely and 
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thought for a moment. Then she replied, “No, no I wouldn’t.” Some of the students 
gasped. A girl asked, “Really? Even if you really love him, you wouldn’t get married?” 
Arbella shook her head no. Later I apologized to Arbella, because I thought my question 
in front of her peers had made her uncomfortable. She smiled broadly and said, “No, I 
really liked your question. No one has ever asked me this before.”  I suspect this is 
because many women would not have much agency in a scenario like the hypothetical 
one I described.  
The students’ truth or dare questions about hypothetical, private relationships 
were only “fun” as long as they are ignored the ethnosectarian categories and other 
criteria that would make such relationships impossible for many people. “Dating,” 
generally understood to be private a relationship, is still largely a fantasy for young 
people in Kurdistan. When I posed a truth question about marriage and religion – and by 
extension ethnicity because religious and ethnic categories are linked – my question drew 
attention to the students’ limited agency regarding their own futures, as marriage is a 
public, collective process in which a young person may have little agency. My question 
seemed to frustrate the students, resulting in uncomfortable silence, some voiced 
complaints, and some students’ avoidance of me thereafter. I broke the rules of the game 
and shattered the illusion of their supposedly liberated selves.  
Marrying outside one’s religion or conversion are conceivable events, but 
unlikely. In one case, they were even the punch line of a prank. A Christian student 
named “James,” with the help of his friends convinced his teacher, Sara, that he had 
become an atheist, only to disclose that it was a prank after the teacher started crying and 
asked to contact his parents. When I asked James to tell me about the prank, he expressed 
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surprise that his teacher actually believed it. For the students, such a scenario was almost 
too ridiculous to believe; for their teacher, the alleged deconversion was too potentially 
disastrous to dismiss. Nevertheless, several students also told me in private that they had 
become agnostics or atheists, but that they could not openly identify as such. 
On the one hand “unmasking,” confessional games allowed students to 
experiment with social prohibitions. They also demonstrated the expressive creativity, the 
critical thinking, and the “open-mindedness” that KCS celebrated. In this way, the games 
represent the sense of expectancy for change in politics in the Kurdistan Region – they 
are participatory, democratic, transparent, and courageous. On the other hand, the games 
are also a means by which school administrators and teachers surveil students. In this 
way the games echo fears about governmental deception, corruption and social chaos. 
The school administration, under scrutiny from the Ministry of Education, parents, and 
the community, exerts pressure on the students to remain in their inherited identity 
categories, disciplining them through restrictions about romantic relationships and 
forbidding talk about beliefs using a discourse of “morality and religious neutrality.” At 
the same time, the liberal education after which the school is modeled contributes to an 
understanding of an autonomous self, able to make a break from inherited identity 
categories – maybe not bureaucratically by changing one’s government-issued identity 
card or by marrying outside one’s ethnosectarian group – but nonetheless a self which is 
able to carve out an interior life motivated by a personal creed of “to thine ownself be 
true.”   
I have discussed the conceptualization of the “self” present in many lessons at 
Kurdistan Civilizational School because the “self” is imagined in those lessons impacts 
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how people possible “futures.” The liberal education model of KCS produced students 
poised to challenge the current political system that restricts personal liberties. Youth 
coming of age in KCS speak and act as emerging independent, enlightened selves, largely 
due to the school’s liberal education that encourages students to form their own ideas 
through analytical discovery and what might be described as a “theistic,” verging on 
“secular” ethos. Shifting notions about self, society, and state in the Kurdistan Region 
converged on Kurdistan Civilizational School. KCS, through a combination of its 
“classical Christian” educational philosophy, its diverse teaching staff and student body, 
and government curricular requirements, became a venue for contesting values in a 
pluralistic society. But the kind of citizen-subjects KCS produced and the kind desired by 
the Kurdistani and/or Iraqi state were at cross-purposes. The Kurdistani government 
required that KCS, despite being a private Christian school, teach Kurdish nationalist and 
Islamic content to produce a particular citizen subject. KCS uses some Kurdistani 
Regional Government (KRG) curriculum, such as in their Mavi Mirov (Human Rights) 
and Komalayatȋ (Social Studies) courses, which included Kurdish ethnonationalist and 
pro-Islam content. 
Throughout my time in KCS, students criticized majoritarian views, such as 
Kurdish ethnonationalist or pro-Islam content in their courses. Rather than attributing 
flaws solely to failures of government, students attributed failures more often to society. 
“Society” was seen as more responsible for reproducing “backward” restrictions 
regarding gender, politics, and religion. Teachers also pushed back against 
ethnonationalism, political Islam, and the state of cynicism and resignation that resulted 
in emigration.  In the following chapter, Sara, a displaced Christian teacher at KCS, 
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appeals to shared humanity and brotherly love.  Students received these appeals 
unevenly, especially those resistant to the idea of a rehabilitated Iraqi state. Some 
students were quick to point out flaws in the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well, or 
more broadly in society, while other students denied these flaws. In Chapter 3, “They 
Don’t Love Iraq”, we observed a student arguing with his Civics teacher, Mariam, and 
refusing to accept Mariam’s political and social criticism because “no one has hurt 
[him]”. Further contributing to students’ doubts are the experiences of minority students 
like Muna, who also appears in Chapter 3. (She is the girl displaced from Baghdad and 
chosen by school administrators to perform the Kurdish national anthem in front of the 
school, who knew that Muna did not understand Kurdish.) 
The Kurdistani government faces a similar predicament to the cross-pressures 
upon Kurdistan Civilizational School: As the Kurdistan Region reaches toward statehood, 
it desires to demonstrate on the global stage that it can tolerate difference in a liberal, 
pluralistic society. The future Kurdistani state is discursively envisioned to be a 
multicultural, tolerant enclave in the Middle East, contrasted with the nearby Islamic state 
that is forcing people to convert. I believe this is why KCS students’ games and pranks – 
and the perhaps school itself - are permitted to be pluralistic, but nonetheless surveilled: 
The radically autonomous “self,” that might result in romantic couplings across sectarian 
lines, or the pranks about religious conversion are performative and provisional. These 
modes of role play and confession are low-stakes games, a way for students to 
experiment with subjects or practices ordinarily forbidden, such as student sexuality, 
beliefs, and politics.  The games allow students to experience an alternative or fantasy 
self, a person untethered from kinship units, confessional groups, and the state. They 
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point toward a possible future where such performances could become everyday realities. 
If then, and until then, KCS students are stuck in a country with a long history of conflict 
and uncertainties, and they are subject to kinship units, confessional groups, and a state 
which work to keep people within their inherited ethnosectarian identity categories.  
Considering the uncertainties and pressures youth face, it is not surprising that 
many concluded “there is no future” for them or for their country. In a group interview 
with Grade 10 students, I asked about their future plans, which led to a discussion of their 
country’s problems: 
 
Diana: Do you plan to stay here, in this country? 
 
Ishtar: I would say me, as a [Assyrian] Christian, I will be kicked out as soon as possible 




Ishtar: I don't believe that there will be any Christians by 2020 in this country. 
 
Serbest: It's impossible for the Christians left here. 
 
Layla: I don't want to start anything here. I just want to finish high school and leave. 
 
Serbest: [Christians] will stay. 
 
Ishtar: I'm not talking about [Christians] will leave on their own. They will get kicked 
out. 
 
Ashur: I believe the opposite of what they are saying. It's like [you all] are predicting the 
bad stuff, not predicting the positive side. Why would anyone leave this to go somewhere 
they are not even successful and don’t even know? For many people, they don't know it is 
better for them to live in a society where they trust people than to go and try and adapt [to 
life abroad]. Not many people know English as we talk now. They will have a lot of 
trouble communicating. Two of my friends in France, they have trouble communicating. 
Ishtar was predicting that we are going to have more miseries than now. But if the world 
is with us, against the bad people…?  
 
Ishtar: For me, I am wanting to leave this country before I [turn] 18. 
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Meena: I am going to stay. 
 
Ishtar: Why? If anything happens [Meena] has a Dutch passport, and she is gonna leave. 
She will die [if she stays] here. 
 
Meena: It's where I'm from. Why would I leave it? My heart is here.  
 
Ishtar: I love my house. I love this place, but there is no safety. And I don’t believe that 
there will be anyone like me, just like my grandparents were forced to leave their cities 
and towns by ISIS, just like they thought they would stay forever there, and they left, so I 
am leaving too. They are forced to come here [to Erbil] without a house, going between 
my aunt and our other aunt's house. And I don't know where we are going to go. Where is 
the furthest place, the safest place from here? 
 
 Many KCS students, especially ethnoreligious minority students such as Ishtar, 
had lost hope that the cycles of war and sectarian violence in Iraq would end. Their 
reflections on experiences in school mirrored their doubts about the country. The school’s 
founders and administrators envisioned the school to be an inclusive, pluralistic space 
that would be a first step in rectifying some of Iraq “sectarian” practices like segregating 
students according to their ethnoreligious identities. KCS would teach and model shared 
ethical values, which all people could and should strive to realize. Students’ experiences 
in the school, however, led them to doubt. There was persistent gossip that teachers were 
treating students unequally. Sometimes students told me their teachers were doing one 
thing in their private lives but telling students to do another; it was hard to accept 
morality lessons from someone behaving hypocritically.  
It also was difficult for students to believe that teachers’ or administrators’ 
avowed desire to include all perspectives was genuine or even possible, considering the 
majoritarian Islamic and Kurdish ethnonationalist aspects of KCS. If students could not 
express alternative views or share experiences that challenged others’ beliefs, then what 
was the point of discussion? If open discussion was not possible in the value pluralistic 
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space of KCS, then outside of KCS, they were unlikely to find or to create spaces and 
dialogues where shared values could be realized through debate. In their criticisms, 
students linked the failures of pluralism in the school to the failures of society and state. 
If value pluralism was not tenable in an ethnically and religiously diverse school based on 
liberal education, then perhaps not all values are tenable in society or state. Was it 
because the school had internalized the problems of society and state, or was it because 
the classroom experiments with liberal pluralism failed?  
 
Deena’s disappointment 
When I recall all the disappointed, weary young adults questioning whether they 
“had a future” in Iraq, I often think of Deena: A Chaldean Christian, in her mid-thirties 
yet unmarried, university-educated, and thoughtful, but bored at her desk job. In the 
evenings, she exercised at the gym where I taught indoor cycling, which is how we met. 
Little by little, Deena told me about disappointments she had suffered and about 
unfulfilled family expectations. Her dark brown, almost black eyes suited her melancholy 
nature; when she smiled, however, her expression could be warm and reassuring. Other 
women at the gym looked up to Deena. She was a success story, having lost a 
considerable amount of weight after changing her diet and working with a personal 
trainer. When women approached her for advice, she gave instructions and 
encouragement in her quiet, serious manner. On social media she shared photographs 
posing beside or hugging her young nieces and nephews, commenting that they “made 
her life better.”  
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 Deena was one of three siblings born in Ainkawa, the Christian township of Erbil. 
All three siblings have remained there well into their adult years. Deena described her 
family as valuing education, but never pressuring Deena or her brother and sister to 
succeed in school or toward any particular field of study. Her sister dropped out in her 
last year of secondary school. “Why?” I asked. Deena explained,  
She decided not to complete it, and she was very, very smart. You know, at that 
time we had, I don’t remember which war, it was the 1996 one [the civil conflict 
between Kurdish political parties KDP and PUK]. You know, they delayed the 
exams two or three times. And one time they did the exam, and later you should 
do it again. So, she was very sad, and she said I will not study anymore. She said 
in this country everything is bad. She never thinks positive about it. And our 
parents never pressured her or forced her to study, which is bad. You know, she 
was thinking everything is bad in this country, and we will do nothing in this 
country.  
 
Deena and her sister both worked clerical jobs; their brother worked as an 
engineer. I asked Deena to tell me more about her experiences in grade school:  
You know, in my school, you know I was not that happy in the school. I had 
friends, and I was happy with them. But the way of teaching, the teachers were 
very tough, using bad punishments, and they were always comparing between the 
students, and like stupid, in a stupid way. Instead of making us love each other, 
they were teaching us how to hate each other, how to get jealous of each other. 
Until university, I didn’t see any teacher respecting his students, or taking a good 
way with us. Except one teacher...She was very good. She was very nice. She was 
treating us like her kids.  
 
Deena’s description of her education does not romanticize her childhood or the quality of 
her education, unlike some members of her generation (e.g., Sara or Naila who appear in 
Chapter 3). She frames her relationships with her generational peers, particularly in 
educational settings, as a series of failures stemming from narrow religious views, 
political ideology, and social expectations. For example, Deena expressed annoyance at 
the pro-Baath party content of her primary and secondary school textbooks:  
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Ok, at that time, Saddam was there, so we didn’t have much freedom. And also, 
the books were all praising Saddam and history...When the teacher was coming 
[into the classroom], we would stand up and say something about Saddam. Then 
she would say good morning. Always the first ten minutes, they were saying how 
Saddam was good, and what he did for the country, and his party. But history - we 
had a different kind of history. We had [lessons] about Islam, about the different 
ages, the khalifa, about the Baath party, about everything.  
 
Deena’s pro-Baath and Islam lessons excluded Chaldean Christian history or culture, 
subsuming her heritage within a national Iraqi identity. Whereas I heard some Chaldean 
or Assyrian Iraqi Christians speaking nostalgically about a unified, Iraqi national identity, 
this identity was not commensurate with Deena’s thoroughly Christian heritage and 
experiences living in the Christian majority township of Ainkawa. She did not speak 
wistfully about a lost, unified Iraqi past. Her primary and secondary school population 
consisted of about 90% Christians and 10% Muslims, including a few Muslim teachers, 
as one might reasonably expect in Ainkawa:  
Diana: I guess because your school was in Ainkawa they had a class on 
Christianity? 
 
Deena: Yes, and also for the Muslims. But I learned about their [Islamic] history, 
nothing else. And they were talking about the good sides, and the battles, and how 
brave they were. This kind of thing. You will not learn anything if you just follow 
their books. If you need to know, you should search [for] yourself.  
 
Diana: Is that what you did?  
 
Deena: Yes.  
Diana: Where did you find information? What did you find? 
 
Deena: You know I found - I am friends with people who are not believing on 
Facebook and social media - so I am learning a lot of things from them.  
 
Diana: Not believing which religion?  
 
Deena: You know, I’m not sure if I believe or not. I haven’t decided yet. You 
know, I was born like a Christian, and they did the baptism and everything when I 
was three months or less than three months. So, we were used to - we were 
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Christians - Jesus, Mary, God, this kind of thing. What do you call it? Al-Ruh al-
Quds?  
 
Diana: Holy Spirit. 
 
Deena: Yes, and we were believing in that a long, long time. It’s not easy to leave. 
But when I see all the bad things, I am losing my belief. Even here [gestures, 
indicating the office building where she is employed] they are asking me, “What 
[religion] are you?” I am saying, “I am a human being like you.” They know I am 
a Christian from [her Christian surname]. And they say, “Oh, you are a 
Christian.” And they start. I don’t like these kinds of things. I don’t like to be 
treated like this. Religion is something personal between you and God. Why 
should you interfere in my life? Why should you come and tell me to convert? 
But if someone is telling [Muslims] to convert, they will get crazy, like, you are 
doing something very bad to them, and they will maybe kill you.  
 
Diana: What kind of things do they say? 
 
Deena: You know, my first day in university, a girl came to me and said, “Why 
don’t you convert to Islam? Otherwise, you will not be able to go to heaven.” And 
I said, “Why?” And she said, “Because Islam is the last religion. Because God 
gives you the mind to think and to know you should convert. Because Muhammed 
was the last prophet.” And I said, “Come with me, and let’s go to the jail and see 
how many Christians are there and how many Muslims are there.” And she said, 
“That is right, because Muslims are the majority. If you go to Europe you will see 
Christians doing crimes.” I said, “But you are talking about our country, religion 
in our country. Who is killing and taking our rights? I think they are Muslims, 
baby, not Christians. Then why should I come to join your religion?” Another guy 
came to me and said, “You know you are saying ‘Jesus is God,’ and this is a big 
sin.” So I told him, “If I say Jesus is God or the pen is god [holding up a pen on 
her office desk], I am affecting you? I’m forcing you to follow me? I’m saying 
bad things to you? But you are now, like, disturbing me when you are inviting me 
to your religion.” Then one of my friends came to me and said, “Let’s leave this 
subject, and come, let’s go and have fun.” After that, many [Muslim] people are 
like, “Ok Deena, you are going to church, so please pray for me.” They ask God 
to guide you. To guide you to their religion. They mean that, but they don’t say it. 
Now I say thank you. That’s it. I don’t go into deep conversation with them, 
because I know they will not understand. Diana, not only Muslims are like that. 
Also Christians, they think Muslims will hurt them. I have many good Muslim 
friends. But my Christian friends sometimes ask me, “How can you be friends 
with Muslims? How can you go out with Muslims?”  
 
Diana: What do you say? 
 
Deena: I say they are human beings like me.  
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Later in the interview we returned to the subject of Christian-Muslim relations. 
 
Deena: You know, when I went to university, I was even kind of worried to talk 
with Muslims or to mix with them. Because they were always saying Muslims are 
like something bad, don’t mix with them. But when I mixed with them they were 
not bad, they were human beings like us. You know, because Ankawa was a 
closed society, Diana, we didn’t mix that much with Muslims. We had one or two 
Muslim neighbors, but they were talking Chaldean [language] like us, and they 
were very mixed with us, and we didn’t feel anything bad about them. We had 
some girls in Ankawa, they left their families and married with Muslim guys. So 
this thing was like, these are bad women, and the woman who is selling her[self] 
is better than these women. So that is why they were always saying, “Don’t be 
close to Muslims, because they will cheat on you, steal from you, kill you, do 
something bad to you.”  
 
Diana: What does your family say exactly? 
Deena: The family just, you know, say, “Don’t talk to them (Muslims),” and 
that’s it.  
 
Diana: Nothing bad happens if you are friends with Muslims? 
Deena: Nothing bad. But you know, if a Muslim girl converts to Christianity, bad 
things will happen to her. Maybe she will be killed. But not a Christian who goes 
to (converts to) Islam.  
 
 Diana: Really? She will be killed? 
Deena: They have to, Diana, because we don’t have civil marriage here. If she 
married a Muslim guy, on her ID she will be Muslim. But she has the right to stay 
with her religion, with herself and with her God. But I think even in Christianity 
we don’t have civil marriage, so she is not able to stay in her religion and marry a 
Muslim guy, because she is not marrying him in church. Even if she stays, the 
society will look [at her] as a bad girl.  
 
Diana: I haven’t heard that women who marry a man from a different religion 
have to change their religion on their ID... 
 
Deena: Also a man. But now you know, now in Kurdistan I think many people are 
converting and nothing bad is happening to them, but they are still very worried. I 
have many friends, they converted to Christianity, but they don’t tell [others] 
about this. They are very worried. I have one friend who is a Kurd, and some 
Arabs who want to, and many Farsi, Persian people. 
 
 Diana: Can you tell me about how your friends converted? 
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Deena: One of my friends was studying about Islam, and he didn’t like the way - 
he said it is all about revenge and killing, so I need to have some love in my life, 
not like this. And the other one said she was fasting. It was Ramadan, and one day 
she was reading Quran. After that, she wanted to know what does [the classical 
Arabic text] mean, because she was Persian [and did not know Arabic]. And when 
she knew what it means, she said ok I am stupid. How am I a slave to this kind of 
God? They don’t respect me as a woman. So she said ok, the devil is coming to 
me (tempting her); I should keep him very far [waves hand]. So she said after 
that, again, I tried to pray, I couldn’t. Then again, I was thinking this is the devil; I 
should keep him away. She said I was watching the Jesus movie, and I thought, 
after, you know in the end it is written, “If you believe me, follow me.” She said 
when I closed my eyes, I just wanted to follow him. I started to follow him. But 
some people are using this kind of converting for getting residency abroad, in 
other countries, and some of them are using it for their personal issues. So I don’t 
know if they are honest or not.  
 




Diana: Would you say that is common here? 
 
Deena: No. Also they don’t say [they are atheist or agnostic]. They are worried. If 
they don’t believe - even you see, they are going to mosque, they are going to 
church, because they are worried if people know about [their beliefs] they [will] 
not [be] respected any more. I have a friend who is a doctor, a respected guy, 
good guy, helping everybody, but he doesn’t believe now. But you will see him 
every Friday in the mosque praying with people. Because he is worried, he cannot 
say.  
 
Diana: So you think people can change their religion here? 
 
Deena: Of course, but it depends on the religion. It depends. You know people 
don’t feel that secure, or they don’t feel they will be safe if they change it. 
Otherwise, many people will do. But it is happening. Many people are changing 
their religion. 
 
Diana: How do you know that? 
 
Deena: I know because I have friends in the [religious group that meets privately 
and through social media]. Ok from there I know many people are converting 
their religion. 
 
As Deena described examples of people “changing their religion,” her tone 
remained skeptical, such as when she pointed out that some conversions may be an effort 
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to secure refugee status abroad. Conversions were doubtful and difficult; they did not 
necessarily signal any positive changes in a person, much less in society. In Deena’s 
narrative, conversions and deconversions flowed from a critique of the insularity of 
Christian-majority Ainkawa and her primary and secondary education there. Likewise, 
she observed how Muslims, among other ethnoreligious groups, also were isolated, 
poorly educated about minorities, and thus ignorant about many of their fellow citizens. 
Misinformation was rampant. Failures in religious pluralism continued at the university 
level, when interfaith dialogues between students broke down over efforts to convert 
rather than to “understand,” as Deena concludes.  
And Deena was committed to understanding others. Over the years, but 
particularly at university, Kurdish people frequently asked Deena why she did not learn 
Kurdish, and why she seemed to “prefer” Arabic and Arabs. “Why do you Christians 
never learn Kurdish?” a fellow student asked her. When a Kurdish teacher at university 
offered to help Deena, she began assimilating more with Kurdish society: 
We had a Kurdish teacher, he was telling me that I was very bad in Kurdish. He 
promised me that if I start talking Kurdish, he will help me a lot. I started making 
friends with Kurds. So, I was very happy. They were good, good people. Not like 
they were saying before about them, that they are bad, that they are hurting me. 
[Kurdish people] helped me a lot, really. So, I started [speaking Kurdish]. For two 
years I didn’t dare to talk with people. I was just talking among friends. After that 
I could. It was like English. I will make mistakes, and they will make fun of me.  
 
Diana: But that’s the only way to learn, to make mistakes, a lot. 
Deena: Of course. 
 Diana: What do you think about Kurdish society here?  
Deena: I think I will let the [individual] person to live and decide. I think there are 
many good and bad things. They are sociable, they are friendly, especially to 
foreigners. They are simple. In the same way, at the same time, I think they have 
two personalities. The other one is they are hating, especially Arabs. They also 
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hate, sometimes, foreigners. [Lowering her voice] This is something stupid about 
Kurdish society: Most of the people hate Arabs.  
 
Diana: I’ve heard that a lot. 
Deena: And they are crazy about Islam.  
Diana: What do you mean? 
Deena: I mean they are Muslims, very Muslim [clenches fist]. How? This religion 
came from Arabs! If you hate Arabs, and you are talking badly about Arabs, why 
are you following this religion? If you ask them, they will say, “No, it didn’t come 
only for Arabs, but for all the world, to save them from sin, to show them heaven 
is good.”  
 
To demonstrate her point about foreigners, Deena told me how a former Kurdish 
employer mistreated an Ethiopian woman employed to clean the office and serve tea or 
coffee to guests. Deena said the woman was harassed and deprived of a place to sleep and 
adequate food. Like other foreign domestic workers Deena saw when visiting friends’ 
houses, the Ethiopian woman was made to clean multiple locations, rather than the one 
location stipulated in her contract (if there was a contract). When Deena protested such 
mistreatments, people responded by asking, “Why? She is a low-level person.” Such 
comments disheartened Deena greatly; she said she cried often during that period of 
employment. She eventually left this job, disgusted and disappointed.  
Throughout our conversations, Deena leveled criticisms both at Muslims and 
Christians. Repeatedly, she pointed to a deep current of hate and misunderstanding: 
You know from deep inside, both societies hate each other. Christian society hates 
Muslim, and Muslim hates Christian. But the people who are afraid in Christian 
society and the people are trying to be nice in Muslim....They don't respect the 
religion of the other. The Christians are not showing that they are afraid, and the 
Muslims are not showing that they are nice, gentle.  
 
The narrative that emerged from my conversations with Deena linked educational 
shortcomings, failed interfaith dialogues, and deep-seated fear and mistrust with a failing 
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state. With many anecdotes about disappointing experiences, she explained her loss of 
faith in her religion, her society, and her country. Additionally, doctors had diagnosed 
Deena with an autoimmune disorder.  
You know, I was always eating, eating, eating, oily food with sugar, with a lot of 
chocolates with a lot of sweets. I was saying, “Ok who cares? I will die.” I lost 
hope. “Ok I will die. Who cares? Let me enjoy life.” This is very wrong. Very 
wrong.  
 
During this low period in Deena’s life, a coworker introduced her to a nutritionist 
located in “Doctors Street,” the Erbil commercial district specializing in medical services 
and products. The nutritionist offered Deena a free health assessment, noting her age, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, diet, measurements, and body composition. “They had good 
advertising,” Deena noted, smiling wryly. After the health assessment, Deena began 
eliminating oily and sugary foods from her diet. She also joined one of the newly opened 
gyms in Erbil, the one where I coached indoor cycling. This gym appealed to her because 
it employed “knowledgeable” personal trainers, and the facilities were clean and modern, 
with a mixed-gender exercise hall; Deena, nevertheless, preferred to exercise in the 
women-only section of the gym.  
Now I’m eating healthy and exercising. I made a very big change. I lost about 21 
kilos. So everybody can do it. You just need to make a decision and start. You 
know, I was always saying I will start tomorrow, after a month, after I don't know 
how much, but I didn't. 
 
Deena became a health enthusiast, encouraging several of her friends to join the gym and 
begin a fitness and diet program. As she moved out of one ethical position in which she 
felt ambivalent about family and religious obligations, she entered another, in the 
company of her diverse friends at university and at work. As Deena spent more time 
away from the domestic sphere, where she had little choice about her diet and daily 
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routine and could not talk about her personal beliefs, she found another sphere in which 
she could order her ethical life. Her daily routine at the gym and the relationships she 
formed there formed an important part of her social, and ethical, life. Her new ethical 
positioning made a difference to some extent, though it has more likely “reshuffled” her 
ethical life, rather than “transformed” it (Gibson 2019:578). 
 
 
Ashti’s great expectations 
Ashti was one of my Kurdish language tutors and key interlocutors. She was in 
her early 40s when I met her in 2016. Ashti grew up in a small town near Kirkuk. Her 
father and mother worked together to run a small, successful business. When Ashti’s 
father died, his brother pressured Ashti’s mother to marry him so he could inherit the 
business. Ashti’s mother refused the marriage proposal to her late husband’s brother. 
(She later married a different man.) When Ashti’s mother refused her brother-in-law’s 
marriage proposal, Ashti’s paternal uncle took her to live with his family. Ashti said that 
he was a harsh man, and he forbade her to continue with her formal education. She 
completed only four years of school, from age 7 to 11.  
But Ashti was smart and motivated, and she had a kind relative who brought her 
books from Baghdad every time he visited. She taught herself Arabic, Kurdish, and 
English through a combination of dictionaries, books in various genres, and exposure to 
language through television. She especially enjoyed reading philosophy. By the time she 
was a teenager, she realized she did not believe Islam. Around age 20 she married and 
gave birth to a daughter. For a time, the family lived in Europe. There Ashti became a 
Christian and felt what she described to me as a sense that the Holy Spirit was calling her 
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to return to Kurdistan. She separated from her husband and returned with her teenage 
daughter to the Kurdistan Region. Although Ashti was a convert to Christianity, she 
maintained her identity as a Muslim around her family and coworkers, such as by 
celebrating Islamic holidays and wearing hijab. She told me that she did this both for her 
safety as well as out of respect for the “Kurdish cultural” practice (as opposed to a 
“religious” practice) of loosely covering the hair with a scarf. 
Back in Kurdistan, Ashti worked for many years as a teacher in a government 
school, and she developed a successful side business tutoring students and teaching 
Kurdish and Arabic to foreign NGO employees. Her reputation as a skilled teacher 
spread, and she was hired to tutor some members of a rich and powerful family. This 
family gave Ashti the opportunity to start a private school with their financial backing. 
Ashti politely declined because she did not want to become implicated in what she 
perceived to be a corrupt system of patronage. She remarked to me that she thought she 
did the right thing, but she wondered what her life would have been like if she had 
accepted the offer. Sometimes she thought about returning to Europe, she said, because 
things had become so bad in Kurdistan. She was depressed to see the continuing decline 
of the education system. She felt the youth had no hope. 
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Figure 15: A history lesson for a girls’ class in a Kurdish language (government) 
secondary school, February 2017. Photo by the author. 
 
During the economic crisis, when people were not receiving their salaries, some 
government teachers refused to teach their lessons. Ashti, however, continued teaching at 
a government high school for girls in a poor community, where she had worked for 
several years. She could have obtained a lucrative position at a private school, but Ashti 
said she felt loyal to the government school and her students. I often accompanied her as 
she drove to and from her school in “Betala.” It was in a rural area, located along a dusty 
highway crowded with oil tankers lumbering to and from Turkey. The town began some 
30 years before as a camp for Kurds displaced during the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
Eventually the camp residents built permanent structures. By the time of my field work, 
the town had expanded to include Arabic speaking IDPs and a school for their children. A 
sprawling, gated camp for Syrian Kurdish refugees bordered the town, but reportedly 
there was little mixing between the town residents and the camp residents. The area was a 
far cry from the nearby, densely populated Erbil, with its modern shopping malls, 
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restaurants, and businesses. Betala was, as a Kurdish university professor described it to 
me, one of many “empty places” created by a history of displacement and poverty.  
In the rainy season, dust turned to mud, and dark clouds hung low over the flat 
earth. Sometimes we sat in gloomy silence as Ashti drove us to and from school. Other 
times, we conversed. As my language tutor, Ashti often maintained a formal manner with 
me, but sometimes, after a dispiriting morning at the school, she would drop her formal 
demeanor and ask me, “Diana, what should I do?” It surprised me to see these shifts in 
Ashti’s demeanor. In the classroom she was a vigorous, demanding, inspiring teacher. I 
watched as she taught the 11th grade girls’ class English literature. Their textbook, which 
appeared to have been adapted from a British school text, offered summaries of “Great 
Books” written in simple English. They had been reading a summary of Great 
Expectations. Ashti encouraged the girls to learn from Pip’s example, that they did not 
need a rich benefactor or high status to improve themselves. The parallels between the 
fictional story and Ashti’s life were remarkable, but she rarely, if ever, disclosed any 
personal information to her students. Instead, she exhorted them to do their best in 
school, because if they could read, especially if they could read Arabic or English, so 
much more of the world would be open to them.  
While teaching about Great Expectations, Ashti often looked in the direction of 
Sahȋn, one of her best students. Sahȋn excelled at English, unlike most of the girls in the 
class. She was the only girl who ventured to ask me simple sentences in English; the 
others said they knew only greetings, despite their five years of English classes. None of 
their teachers, except Ashti, were conversant in English. Ashti asked Sahȋn to explain to 
her classmates how she had improved her English skills; Sahȋn meekly said that she 
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studied a lot and watched English language movies, paying careful attention to the 
pronunciation. In private, Ashti told me that she was especially concerned to bolster 
Sahȋn’s confidence. Sahȋn’s mother was a cleaner for the school, which was a very low-
status job and a source of embarrassment for Sahȋn. Sometimes Sahȋn stayed behind after 
the school shift ended to help her mother clean. Together, they swept the dusty 
classrooms and wiped down the old UN-donated desks with their chipped, bright blue 
paint, covered in students’ pencil-carved graffiti. Like most girls in her community, Sahȋn 
finished her morning shift at school and returned home for a second shift helping her 
mother with household chores.  
One afternoon, after the morning school shift ended, I walked past Daiki Sahȋn 
(mother of Sahȋn) tending a vegetable garden beside the school. Daiki Sahȋn stood up to 
greet me, wiping her dirty hands on her loose dress. It was early May, but the noon sun 
was already intolerable. She invited me to walk with her to her home, which was very 
near the school. Like other homes in this community, the sturdy house was built of cinder 
blocks on a dirt lot. We passed through the front gate into the small courtyard where we 
greeted her mother, Sahȋn’s grandmother, reclining on a cot in the shade of a tree. Daiki 
Sahȋn led me into the jurȋ mȋwan (guestroom) and instructed me to sit on the dǒshak 
(cushion) nearest the freestanding AC unit blasting cold air.  
Through the open door leading to the kitchen, I saw Sahȋn and her elder sister 
mopping the tile floor. They put their mops down to come greet me in the guest room. 
Her elder, married sister rested one hand on her pregnant belly as she sat on the dǒshak, 
and Sahȋn managed a quiet smile. Sahȋn’s sister eagerly asked a series of questions, 
which Sahȋn answered for me. I smiled, realizing that Sahȋn had been listening carefully 
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to everything I had said in the prior weeks. I invited them to sit with me, but Sahȋn said 
they should return to their chores.  
Their brother Ardelan, about ten years old, came into the guest room and flopped 
onto one of the cushions to watch the flat screen tv. With sprawled limbs and listless 
expression, he watched an American movie, The Edge of Tomorrow, a violent dystopian 
film with the tagline “Live. Die. Repeat.” From the cushion, Ardelan used a remote to 
decrease the volume and instead read the Arabic subtitles. Daiki Sahȋn entered the room 
with a plate of salted cucumbers and scolded the boy for turning the volume too low. He 
complained that he did not understand the English. Daiki Sahȋn replied, “But our guest 
understands English, right?” As I sat in the guest room, Sahȋn mopped the same section 
of floor more than once as she glanced through the open door toward the television, 
listening to the film. Sahȋn’s sister beckoned for her help as she crouched over the 
chicken kebab roasting on a low grill. Sahȋn’s days were filled with housework, but she 
found time to study for her exams - and to watch English movies when she could.  
 Ashti was acquainted with the kind of life Sahȋn led outside of school; Ashti’s 
own childhood was even more restricted. I could see that Ashti became discouraged with 
her apathetic female students who had more resources than Ashti ever had, such as their 
formal secondary education and access to the internet. When, during a break in between 
classes, I asked a cluster of girls about their dreams, some expressed a serious interest in 
journalism or teaching. Others joked about becoming movie stars and the like. Sahȋn 
listened to her classmates. She exhibited interest in English and in religion class (Islam), 
but she was otherwise quiet, obedient with her chores, and diligent with her exam 
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preparation. Most of the girls told me they expected to marry soon after graduating high 
school, and that there was nothing else for them in their future. Why study?  
On our return trip, I shared this information with Ashti. She seemed deflated. Yes, 
she agreed that most of the girls would marry soon after graduation. Many would fail 
their exams. She complained that the weak government curriculum and religion had made 
people stupid and docile. Ashti could not understand why she had been “called” to return 
to Kurdistan, where she saw so little opportunity for transformation.  She was waiting for 
her daughter, Kani, to graduate from university before they emigrated, but perhaps they 
should leave now? she asked me. Would they be accepted in the United States or 
Canada? What if Donald Trump was elected president? Many times, we discussed how 
she and her daughter might emigrate. Inevitably these conversations would end with 
Ashti saying she could not shake the feeling that she was supposed to stay. So she 
stayed.  
Ashti diligently taught her government school lessons without a salary for 
months. Although she stayed busy teaching private lessons in the evenings and on 
weekends, she never declined to help me with language tutoring, translation, or to meet at 
my home or a cafe to talk. With her savings, she had bought a two-story, recently 
constructed house halfway between Erbil and the school in Betala. It was a pleasant, 
peaceful neighborhood. They tried to live a healthy life, Ashti said. They exercised and 
ate fresh food, hoping to alleviate Ashti’s recurring stomach ulcers. In the evenings, they 
watched Arabic or Turkish language series or movies. Kani was a polyglot like her 
mother. She was a third-year dental student in the best dental program in Erbil. Two 
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years remained in her dental training, so she and Ashti resigned themselves to at least two 
more years in Erbil. When I left the field in July 2017, Ashti and Kani were still waiting. 
 
Brave New Kurdistan 
 Each year the Erbil International Book Fair is held in the event hall at Sami 
Abdulrahman Park. One afternoon, not having any interviews to do or places to go, I 
dropped by the fair. Dozens of booksellers set up booths, and hundreds of people were 
milling about. The view inside the hall was strikingly different from the view outside: In 
any given street or shop in Erbil, it was uncommon to see very conservative Islamic 
fashions such as those associated with Salafi Islamists. Every now and then, I passed by a 
woman in all-black niqab (veiled except for her eyes) rather than in colorful Kurdish 
clothes, hair peeking out from a loosely-wrapped headscarf. Typically, women wearing 
niqab were accompanied by a man with a long beard and wearing ankle-length robes, 
rather than the traditional loose shirt and baggy sharwal pants Kurdish men usually wear. 
More Westernized styles like blue jeans and t shirts also are popular, especially with 
youth. Inside the book fair, the street scene was reversed; while the majority of 
pedestrians wore traditional Kurdish clothing or Western-style clothes, the majority of the 
book fair attendees wore conservative Islamic dress. Booth after booth was stacked with 
publications about Islam: Beautiful editions of the Qur’an, books on Islamic 
jurisprudence (fȋqh), writings by popular teachers, guides to living a proper Islamic 
lifestyle, and children’s morality tales. Almost all were in Arabic.  
To my surprise, it was difficult for me to locate booksellers offering anything 
about Kurdish history or culture. Specifically, I was looking for books by Kurdish 
novelist and intellectual Bakhtiyar Ali, whose quotes appear at the beginning of each 
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chapter of this dissertation. A few sellers offered books in English, mostly for learning 
English. Amused, I stopped to photograph a display featuring a book in Kurdish about 
revolutionary leader Mullah Mustafa Barzanȋ placed beside a book about newly elected 
American President Donald Trump. A journalist and some curious male attendees asked 
to photograph me or take a selfie with me beside said books. I politely declined.  
I paused at a booth with books advocating the views of controversial Turkish 
Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. As I crouched to see the titles at the base of the shelf, 
from behind me a timid, polite voice asked in English, “Miss, do you want to know more 
about Islam?” Two boys around 8 or 9 years old stood behind me, grinning. They had 
attended the local Gülen school for boys and were pleased to see a foreigner interested in 
their school subjects. After a friendly chat and exchange of emails, I gathered my 
purchases (I finally had found the lone bookseller with Ali’s works), eager to remove 
myself from the stuffy, crowded hall and return to the version of Hewlêr I felt I knew 
better. 
 Over the next few days, I casually described my book fair experience to various 
Kurdistani acquaintances to observe their reactions. Many seemed to know what I was 
going to say before I said it, sighing or waving their hands dismissively as soon as I 
mentioned Arabic or Islamic books. Private school students complained that the fair 
offered so few books in English. But the complaint most adults held in common was that 
the fair evidenced a worrying, growing interest in more conservative forms of Islam.  
Deena, who appears earlier in this chapter, was one of those worried adults. I saw 
her almost every evening in the women’s section of the gym where I taught indoor 
cycling. As I told her about the book fair, she stopped her hand weight exercises and 
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dropped the weights on a nearby bench. “You know it scares me, all those strict, very 
hard Islamic books, the thinking, what it is doing to the people,” Denna said, making a 
clenched fist and shaking her head. “You should pray for us, Diana, really. You will get 
to leave this place, but we have to live here. Sometimes I think we should all just leave.”  
I replied, “I hope you can make a life here, because if you all leave, what will 
happen to this place? To this country?”  She looked at me with a resigned expression and 
repeated, “You know, you get to leave this place, but we have to live here.” After a pause 
she added, “At least there is somebody [meaning me, the anthropologist] who knows 
what our life is…” she trailed off and went back to her hand weights. I left the gym that 
evening with a heavy, guilty weight in the pit of my stomach.  
A couple days later I met up with Ashti, my Kurdish teacher and key interlocutor, 
at a cafe inside a Western-style shopping mall. As I described the book fair to her, I 
mentioned that most of the books were written in Arabic or about Islam. She smiled 
knowingly. Many times, Ashti had shared with me how she feared the growing influence 
of conservative Islam in Kurdistan. I also mentioned that the fair had very few books in 
English for sale. She asked which ones, and for some reason, George Orwell’s 1984 was 
the first one that came to my mind. Ashti was familiar with 1984, which did not surprise 
me considering how widely she read and how she was concerned with governance and 
freedoms. She asked could I recommend any other books like 1984.  
“Well, there’s Brave New World,” I replied. “It is about a future state in which 
people only care about being happy, about their comfort. They don’t read books or talk 
about ideas.”  
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“Like Kurdistan!” she exclaimed, smiling with recognition at the similarity 
between the novel and her life. Her smile slowly faded. For a moment, she watched the 
traffic passing outside the café, then turned to me and said, “But the future is already 
here.”  
Field notes excerpt 
Field note, 3 Feb 2016  
 
Suddenly Naza said to me, “Do you remember when I asked you if this country 
has a future, and you told me you wanted to hear what I thought first. You didn’t tell me 
what you really think.” 
 
I admit I hesitated. Then I said, “This country doesn’t have a future as long as it is 
influenced, or controlled, by more powerful countries.” I used the metaphor of a pawn on 
a chessboard and said that throughout history the people of this region have been used by 
their more powerful neighbors. Naza seemed to be agreeing with me. Her friend, Rewan, 
was frowning and shook her head. 
 
“I don’t think so,” Rewan said. “I think this country has a future.”  
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Chapter 6: “Bits of hope” 
 
“My dear Ghazalnus, I am neither a philosopher nor a poet. I am a hunter of 
masterpieces. I know what kind of city I can build, but I need your powers on my side 
from the outset. The realm I am dreaming of cannot be built without the poets, the ghazal 
writers and the great singers of this city. What do you want? Tell me which mansion you 
covet in this city - which field, which farm, which woman, which impossible thing, tell me. 
Together, you and I shall build a city drawn by your imagination and my power.”  
“I can’t,” Ghazalnus said. “Forgive me brother, I feel that you want us to create 
something that would conceal the filth and beauty of this city. If you want my imagination 
to come to your aid, don’t try to stop us from seeing all that is ugly. The imagination is a 
beautiful journey, but it should not make humans forget about disaster.” - Bakhtiyar Ali, 
I Stared at the Night of the City 
 
Philosopher kings 
In the above excerpt from Bakhtiyar Ali’s magical realist novel, Ghazalnus in the 
Gardens of Imagination, a Kurdish politician called the “Baron of the Imagination” 
pleads with the protagonist, Ghazalnus. The Baron desires to harness Ghazalnus’ 
imaginative abilities to build a more powerful and beautiful city. Ghazalnus refuses to 
help the politician because such a dream city would mask the “ugly,” cruel reality of life 
in contemporary Kurdistan; there is beauty and truth too precious to entrust to politicians 
(called “barons” in the novel). The barons have created terrible things, such as a “book of 
death” that the Baron of the Imagination has hidden in the luxury district “Nwemiran” 
(“new royalty”). Nwemiran fittingly is the home of the political elite who have become 
wealthy through graft, and, as I mentioned in the dissertation’s introduction, it is likely 
that the fictional neighborhood is modeled after an actual luxury residential development 
in Erbil called “Dream City.” 
 Throughout the novel, Ghazalnus’ followers investigate the barons’ corruption, 
documenting in a book what they have learned about evil, as well as about the power of 
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the imagination. In the novel’s conclusion, one of the characters reveals that this book is 
the one the reader holds. Breaking the “fourth wall,” he addresses the reader directly,   
And you, too, who have entered the garden, it does not matter how you came by 
this book, but please do us one small favor: don’t let it fall into the hands of the 
barons…Please don’t let it fall into their hands. The peace of us all depends on it 
(542). 
I see in Ghazalnus’ refusal and the novel’s conclusion a condemnation of the Platonic 
“philosopher-king.” In Book 5 of The Republic, Socrates suggests that the utopian city 
requires a ruler who is both philosopher and king: “Until philosophers rule as kings in 
their cities…so that political power and philosophy become thoroughly blended 
together…cities will have no rest from evils…nor, I think, will the human race” (Reeve 
2004:166). The Baron of the Imagination, who is, by his own admission, “neither a 
philosopher or poet,” seeks to unite his brute political power with Ghazalnus’ wisdom 
and creative powers, together ruling as philosopher-king. But to do this, Ghazalnus 
argues, would create a city that hides ugliness, and more importantly, suppresses dissent. 
 It is this aspect of the philosopher-king, a tendency toward totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism, that political and social philosopher Karl Popper condemned in his 
critique of “historicism.” (To be clear: I am not situating my dissertation in political or 
philosophical literatures or debates; throughout I make brief references as I have found a 
handful of theorists outside anthropology useful to think with about my ethnography.) 
Popper argued that, if the main function of the social sciences (or in the novel’s case, the 
imagination) is to comprehend the social and political “laws” guiding human 
development, then this view of knowledge and politics eventually leads to centralized 
government control of individuals and large-scale social engineering with potentially 
disastrous results: 
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Social revolutions are not brought about by rational plans, but by social forces, for 
instance, by conflicts of interests. The old idea of a powerful philosopher-king 
who would put into practice some carefully thought-out plans was a fairy-tale 
invented in the interest of a land-owning aristocracy. The democratic equivalent 
of this fairy-tale is the superstition that enough people of good will may be 
persuaded by rational argument to take planned action…The real outcome will 
always be very different from the rational construction. It will always be the 
resultant of the momentary constellation of contesting forces…All social 
engineering, no matter how much it prides itself on its realism and on its scientific 
character, is doomed to remain a Utopian dream” (2002:42) 
Popper’s observations also recall Jacques Derrida’s critique of the “engineer” 
versus the “bricoleur,” as I discussed in Chapter 1. The bricoleur combines and creates 
with whatever is at hand, which is why the French bricoleur sometimes is translated 
“handyman.” Levi-Strauss contrasts the bricoleur with the engineer, who has the training 
and resources to construct a new cultural whole rather than to repurpose materials and 
tools. The engineer, however, is a “myth,” as all discourse is bricolage (Derrida 1978).  
People “make do” in their everyday lives as they “make innumerable and infinitesimal 
transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their 
own interests and their own rules” (De Certeau 1984). Throughout this dissertation, 
conflicts of values often appear as struggles between would-be “philosopher-kings” or 
“engineers,” such as politicians or administrators, and the “bricoleurs” who comprise the 
majority of Kurdistani society.  
In this last chapter, I tentatively draw together magical realism, some (brief) 
political philosophy, and my interlocutors’ narratives for the ways in which they can help 
us understand a society grappling with sectarianism and value pluralism. By “sectarian” I 
do not refer to the mere fact of diversity, or of the politicization of identities, but rather 
how diversity and identity politics have created the conditions in which the people who 
appear throughout this ethnography experience contests of values. How the Ottoman 
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empire and contemporary Middle Eastern states have regulated and “tolerated” religious 
difference continues to shape how people understand identity in contemporary Kurdistan. 
Recall that the Ottoman Empire permitted religious communities some self-governance 
through the millet system (Baer et al. 2009; Makdisi 2017). As anthropologist Andrew 
Shryock (2009) observes in his conversation with historians Marc Baer and Ussama 
Makdisi, scholars often have treated “Ottoman tolerance as a virtue” and have 
disregarded how the Ottoman state was “a violent, hegemonic imperial formation in its 
own right” (936).  Makdisi (2017) notes that the significance of the Ottoman millet 
system was not about “tolerance” or “intolerance,” but that different communities lived 
side by side through imperial and state formations (53).  
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the states that emerged were built largely 
on the same system of regulating difference via the patrilineal conferral of ethnoreligious 
identity (King 2018). The Iraqi state employs the logic of patriliny to assign 
ethnoreligious identities to its citizens and governs them accordingly. The education 
sector, for example, is organized according to ethnoreligious identity, assigning students 
to schools based on their perceived identity and first language. Cultivating a “shared 
ethic” across segregated communities with segregated schools proves difficult, as we saw 
in the case of Kurdistan Civilizational School. In my interview with Yakub Boutros, a co-
founder of KCS, Boutros argued that creating a shared ethic, and what I would call a 
“pluralistic” space, is necessary to counteract practices of “separation” based on ethnicity 
and religion that reproduce “sectarian” political cultures.  
I must acknowledge, again, that the concept of “sectarianism” is problematic: 
Scholars of Iraq and the Middle East have tended to focus on the politicization of 
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collective identity categories, sometimes inadvertently reproducing the illusion of clearly 
bounded religious and ethnic identities. As Ussama Makdisi observes, “the idea of 
sectarianism, and the sectarian, has come to haunt the modern imaginary of the Arab 
world in much the same way that the idea of racism has haunted the modern imaginary of 
the USA” (2017:25). Makdisi and other contributors to the edited volume 
Sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017) locate the emergence of sectarianism in the 
form which we recognize it today in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire. Scholars 
like Suad Joseph (2008) and Ussama Makdisi (2008) have demonstrated 
how sectarianism is a historically specific form of social differentiation, practiced for 
political purposes within state level organizations. When I speak of “sectarian political 
cultures,” I am not referring to a thin and reductive concept of “sectarianism” as 
something ancient and intractable plaguing contemporary Iraq, although power struggles 
between sects are as old as empires. In the past couple centuries, the Ottoman Empire, 
British Mandate governance, the Iraqi state, and foreign interventions have 
instrumentalized sectarian difference in enduring ways.  
In this dissertation, interlocutors have described the ways in which 
“sectarianism,” as an enduring form of social differentiation instrumentalized by the 
modern state, negatively impacts their lives, such as by limiting whom they can befriend 
or marry, or the spaces in which they can participate or feel welcome. Sectarian 
categories are inherently unstable. People experience pressures to stabilize these 
categories and commit to them as a dominant, or hegemonic, form of identity. My 
interlocutors described pressures from family members, from neighbors, or other 
authority figures to identify only with their inherited ethnoreligious identity categories 
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(i.e., not to convert) and not to associate with people belonging to other groups. Of 
course, many people I knew came from families which were critical of such “sectarian” 
practices, but their association with some people and participation in some spaces was 
constrained, nonetheless.    
 
Generating hope 
In the past couple decades, political and developmental discourses that portray the 
Kurdistan Region as a progressive haven characterized by “tolerance” and 
“multilculturalism” have proliferated. One the one hand, “tolerance” discourse, or 
“radical affirmation” of religious difference is nothing new for the region, as it seems to 
be an enduring feature of post-Ottoman societies (Bush 2020). Undoubtedly, the war with 
the Islamic State and the ongoing political conflict with the federal Iraqi government in 
Baghdad intensified tolerance discourse that portrays the Kurdistan Region as a 
counterpublic, a positive other to Iraq or to the Islamic State. However, the experiences 
of many people I knew, especially members of ethnoreligious minorities, demonstrated 
the limits of “tolerance.” In many cases, what people at the margins of Kurdistani society 
experienced might be considered a thin form of tolerance – providing refuge but 
withholding rights.  
In Kurdistan, just as in Iraq, people are citizens because first and foremost they 
belong to a group that is a state-recognized ethnoreligious identity category, whose 
membership they inherit through patrilineal kinship. For this reason, Kurdistani 
“citizenship” (were there an independent Kurdistani state) would not be offered to the 
many refugees and internally displaced people residing in the Kurdistan Region, 
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thousands of whom probably will remain there the rest of their lives. The Kurdistan 
Regional Government is not likely to recognize these long-term residents as citizens, or 
to extend them to benefits afforded citizens, but will continue to consider them as 
displaced citizens of the Syrian or Iraqi states. While the Kurdistan Region has absorbed 
hundreds of thousands of people and supported them at great expense, this conception of 
citizenship has helped the KRG to deflect some of the financial burden by referring 
displaced Iraqis to the federal government in Baghdad to which they are still citizen-
subjects. I witnessed such deflection firsthand when I attended regular “Education 
Cluster” meetings. In these meetings, members of the Kurdistani government, the Erbil 
Governorate, and numerous local and international organizations frequently debated 
jurisdiction and responsibility for various populations of refugee or displaced 
schoolchildren. Generally, people who fled areas outside the Kurdistan Region’s borders, 
such as Christians, Muslims, Arabs, and Yezidis, and who now lived in the Kurdistan 
Region, were considered to fall under the Iraqi federal government’s jurisdiction. When 
relief organizations who worked in education approached Kurdistani government for 
permissions or funds, often they were referred to the central government in Baghdad, or 
vice versa. It seemed some relief organizations were engaged in a constant back and forth 
between the two governments. Being “tolerant” of multiculturalism can be very 
expensive. 
About tolerance, and more generally about the limits of freedoms in Kurdistan, 
my interlocutors frequently criticized the Iraqi and Kurdistani governments, their society, 
their communities, even their own family and friends. As my interlocutors have 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, there is no consensus on the nature and extent 
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of “tolerance,” either as it is experienced or as it “should be” in contemporary Kurdistani 
society. Why, then, do conceptualizations of tolerance feature so often in political and 
modernization discourse, and in interlocutors’ assessments of the state? Tolerance, and 
the quality of life it protects, is central to how effectively a society or state can generate 
“hope” for the “future.” Ghassan Hage (2003) suggests that we conceptualize societies as 
“mechanisms for the distribution of hope.” “The kind of affective attachment (worrying 
or caring) that a society creates among its citizens is intimately connected to its capacity 
to distribute hope,” but capitalist and neoliberal regimes “have contributed to the 
‘shrinking’ of this capacity” (Hage 2003:3, cited in Miyazaki 2004).  
In his book, The Method of Hope, Hirokazu Miyazaki examines how hope is 
produced through various kinds of knowledge and is “predicated on the inheritance of a 
past hope and its performative replication in the present” (2004:139).  For much of the 
twentieth century, Iraqi leaders effectively drew upon the territory’s history of many, 
great civilizations, from the emergence of the state in ancient Mesopotamia, to the 
Assyrian and Babylonian empires, to the modern Iraqi state. Generations of Iraqi children 
learned in school that their country inherited the achievements and pride of these 
civilizations. They were told that their ethnic and religious identities are part of this 
collective heritage, and that the diverse communities residing in the country comprised a 
unified, national Iraqi identity.  
Minority interlocutors who came of age before the 2003 invasion sometimes 
spoke nostalgically about the vision of Iraq they were presented with in school, or the 
Iraq that they experienced in childhood. In Chapter 3, Sara and Naila lament the loss of 
Iraqi identity, good citizenship, and neighborliness. Others, like Deena in Chapter 5, 
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remain critical of the Baathist ideology they encountered in childhood. Iraqi nationalist 
ideology also effectively focused citizens not on ethnic or religious difference but on 
developing Iraq’s natural resources to the benefit of all. “There is only one future in the 
nationalist developmental imagination,” Sara Pursley notes, and that is toward becoming 
a “developed country” (2019:217-218).  
 When Iraq’s unified “nationalist developmental” future was dismantled by the 
2003 invasion, the “future” became multiple and uncertain. Throughout the dissertation, I 
have used the heuristic “ethical positions” to describe ethical regimes that frame human 
experience within their narrative grasp. Ethical positions operate according to different 
temporalities – different pasts, presents, and futures. In thinking about how people were 
cross-pressured, pulled in different directions toward different frames, I have found it 
useful to make a two-by-two matrix to illustrate. My intention is not to reduce 
complexities or render people as if they only live according to one “position”, but to offer 
points of reference or the boundaries of ethical positions. In Chapter 1, I described how 
interlocutors position themselves vis-à-vis various collectivities, ideas, and the state. 
Below, I have made a simple diagram to represent a spectrum of possible ethical 
positions based on what I heard interlocutors say and what I observed them do. I use this 
diagram as a way of thinking about how people negotiate various ethical positions, and 
not as a set of rigid categories in which to “type” people. Along this matrix, one measure 





Table 1. Ethical positioning 
 
 “Immanence” refers to a view of the human condition in the natural world, 
unaided by anything supernatural. “Transcendence” refers to a view of the human 
condition in a world both natural and supernatural. “Action” refers to the degree to which 
any ethical position directs a person to “do so something” in the present. Conversely, 
“inaction” refers to how an ethical position is said to minimize or to absolve the human 
necessity of “doing something” in the present. Along these axes about immanence and 
transcendence, and action and inaction, are different conceptualizations of the “future,” or 
of “no future.”   
 “Immanent action” is present in Karza’s pedagogy in Chapters 2 and 3. In his 
social studies lessons, he presents students with an ethical life premised somewhat on 
existentialism, exemplified by the myth of Sisyphus: The act of applying oneself in the 
endless present, action which is itself a source of meaning that is also agnostic about any 
future. Karza presents his philosophy as a noble, ethical response to the difficulties of life 
in Iraq, and he encourages his students to find meaning in the act of not giving up. It is 
also present in the relief work I observed among some Kurdistani young people. In April 
2017, I joined the first meeting of a new relief organization created by Kurdistani youth. 
“We are a secret group,” Rizgar, the lead organizer, explained at the organization’s first 
Immanent action 








meeting. “No one needs to know who we are. We don’t want to be in the news. We don’t 
need the government. We don’t need to be an NGO. A group of people who are 
committed can do a lot. That’s our purpose.” Rizgar addressed the small group gathered 
around an outdoor café table, 
If people can just see what is happening - there are 1.8 million refugees and IDPs 
here, and there is a lot of shit - excuse my language - but there is a lot of shit. It is 
not pretty. It is difficult to see, the kind of poverty, the suffering. And some of it 
really fucked me up. It did. But then when you see you can actually help people, 
that you can make a difference, then you don’t feel hopeless.  
Rizgar told the group about how he met the family of a girl with a hole in her heart. He 
asked the mother if he could take a photo with the girl to post, because he wanted people 
to “see her, to see that this isn’t something out there, this problem is here, and we have to 
do something. The government, the NGOs, they won't do it,” he said. “We can’t just wait 
around for them to…If people could just see this, touch it, feel it, they would believe it. 
They would understand that they can do something,” he said. “Am I crazy? Do you 
believe?” he asked us, looking from one to another.  
With “immanent action,” belief is generated through empirical evidence, “seeing, 
feeling, and touching” as Rizgar said, or, as in the metaphor that Karza used, turning on 
the light to see the worm in the apple. It is an ethical positioning that can inspire action 
while remaining agnostic about any “future,” because meaning and hope are generated in 
the present, where they sustain daily life, essentially pushing the rock back up the 
mountain in the eternal present. This ethical positioning can be very effective in difficult 
conditions, like war or a “failing” state, because, unlike nationalism and modernization 
narratives, it is not dependent on any “future” in any teleological sense.  
Proponents of immanent action reject what I refer to as “immanent inaction,” 
characterized, perhaps unfairly, as “giving up” and “doing nothing.” In Ethnographies of 
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Waiting: Doubt, Hope, and Uncertainty, Andreas Bandak and Manpreet K. Janeja write 
about how “waiting” is an “unstable object.” They argue that, “Waiting is not to be found 
merely in the absence of action but in an uncertain terrain where what is hoped for may 
or may not occur. Periods of waiting release diverse affects ranging from hope, 
enthusiasm, and urgency to apathy, paralysis and lethargy” (2020:16). Immanent inaction 
may manifest as epicurean “eat, drink, and be merry,” but I think it is more likely a sense 
of helplessness or hopelessness resulting from harsh conditions and with conscious 
reference to an uncertain or absent future that has been displaced by disaster.  
If “immanent inaction” is an ethical position, it is subject to the same criticisms of 
the anthropologies of “virtue ethics” and “the good,” which I discussed in Chapter 2. If 
people are focused on survival and have limited agency, a model of ethical life that is 
premised on conscious, moral deliberation and action does not leave people living in 
“immanent inaction” any “ethics” to speak of. Rather, as critics of virtue ethics point out, 
there are moral opportunities in the mundane, “ordinary ethics” of daily life. Very few of 
my interlocutors might be said to inhabit the “immanent inaction” ethical position, 
largely because I spent time around people who not merely surviving and had resources 
at their disposal to “do something.” 
 “Transcendent action” in this dissertation is most obvious in the “missional” 
behavior of the founders of the Kurdistan Civilizational School. Motivated by religious 
faith, the present is inflected with the supernatural as people work toward a “known” 
future. Transcendent action also is present among interlocutors like Deena, who found a 
way to survive through their participation in some sphere, such as the gym, and who 
sometimes encouraged other people to take up the same set of practices for their benefit. 
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Additionally, nationalism and modernization discourses also resemble transcendent 
action. These discourses conceptualize the present as the site of continuous intervention, 
so that a desirable future will one day be realized, whether that is a “developed” or 
“modern” country, or an independent state.   
 Finally, “transcendent inaction” conceptualizes the present as the site of moral 
obligations, such as adhering to religious or cultural practices that make a person “good,” 
with reference to a telos, such as paradise. For this reason, “transcendent inaction” is 
often characterized, perhaps unfairly, as “fatalistic,” as it seems to ignore potential this-
worldly action, in the political realm for example, because it is focused on a preordained 
future. Transcendent inaction is present in tenth grade literature teacher Jamila’s 
presentation of the novel Till We Have Faces, as described in Chapter 5. She interprets 
the protagonist’s demand to have an answer from the gods as arrogant and blasphemous. 
In this context, she leads her students in a discussion about why humans should not “try 
to know their future,” which is to demand an answer from God. Instead, humans are 
instructed to live upstanding moral lives in the present, without attempting to interfere 
with “fate.”  
 Of course, “ethical positions” are heuristic devices I use to think about how 
people conceptualize the world and their place in it. Ethical positioning is about how 
people position their own roles and responsibilities in relation to family, community, 
nation, or state. In my analysis, I have tried to be careful to not to place interlocutors 
squarely into any of these types of “positions.” First, people rarely, if ever, participate in 
only one type of ethical behavior, such as religion, although they may aspire to do so. 
Second, I have tried to center interlocutors’ interpretations of their ethical lives as they 
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articulated them to me. This stylistic and analytical decision, while I believe it more 
accurately renders the people I met in all their complexity, does return us to a long 
standing concern in anthropology: To take care not mistake “obligations,” or “oughts,” or 
“the good.” I referenced this debate in my discussion of ethics in Chapter 2.  
Like “the good,” concepts of “hope” present a similar problem for 
anthropologists. Cheryl Mattingly and Uffe Juul Jensen (2015) write that, 
Hope has long been regarded with great suspicion in social theory. And perhaps 
nowhere has the skepticism been more clearly directed than to people’s 
moralities, their beliefs about the good and the right, about individual 
responsibility and the cultivation of a self. Actors may have their hopes and 
dreams but these are not to be taken at face value (41).  
By now, it should be clear that ethical positions may operate according to different 
conceptions of time and have different ways of reconciling pasts, presents, and futures. In 
Anthropology and Philosophy: Dialogues on Trust and Hope, the editors reflect on the 
temporalities of hope, 
Trusting and hoping alike are conjectural modes of understanding. They relate to 
the practical identity of human beings as persons. Who can I trust? What may I 
hope? Although both trust and hope are related to factual understandings of past 
experiences, they equally imply a move toward the future that depends on the 
imaginary anticipation of the imminent. They concern future states that exceed the 
immediate control of the person trusting or hoping. But whereas trust typically 
concerns near and probably futures that mostly meet our expectations, hope may 
very well paint a scenario of a possible and radically different future (Liisberg, 
Pedersen, and Dalsgård 2015:1). 
Ethical positioning is impacted, of course, by emplacement in space and time. In Iraq, 
cyclical violence, corruption, and foreign interventions have, no doubt limited the kinds 
of ethical positions people can take. At the same time, however, the potential advantages 
of relative political and economic stability, and interest in creating a more “tolerant” and 
equitable society and state, have amplified and intensified ethical mobility. Some people, 
positioned by wealth and status, were more mobile, and perhaps more anxious, than 
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others. For some interlocutors, the ability to move between different kinds of spaces with 
different sets of values increased the feeling of being pulled and pushed in different 
directions. I concede that these conditions may not constitute “value pluralism” in the 
strictest sense of the concept, as offering “an account of the actual structure of the moral 
universe” (Galston 2002:30). Rather, the contests of values I observed were more like the 
moral pluralism of Isaiah Berlin. Galston writes of Berlin, “He depicts a world in which 
fundamental values are plural, conflicting, incommensurable in theory, and 
uncombineable in practice – a world in which there is no single, univocal summum 
bonum that can be defined philosophically, much less politically” (ibid.).  
Of course, conflicting values in the form of religious difference have long 
coexisted in Kurdistan, regulated by empire or by state and not without violence. 
However, ethnic and religious identity categories have effectively bounded sets of values, 
committing people to adherence, or at least the appearance of adherence, to those values 
and attendant practices ascribed to their community, and only their community. In the 
modern state, bounded identity categories have limited many forms of action or 
belonging, including religious (de)conversion, intermarriage, inheritance, and citizenship. 
What made contests of values in Kurdistan relevant to many of my interlocutors was not 
just that values are multiple, conflicting, and incommensurable, but that they also were 
available and possible for some people to adopt, but not others. Moving between ethical 
positions presented and multiplied choices and obligations, which seemed to me to be a 
source of anxiety for many of my interlocutors. How effectively people moved between 
or took different ethical positions, and how effectively they realized the values attending 
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those positions, has enormous consequences for generating hope. About conceptualizing 
“hope,” Mattingly and Jensen write, 
We will speak of hope not as simple optimism or faith in some ‘happy ending,’ 
but as something darker and morally demanding. Paradoxically, hope is on 
intimate terms with despair. It asks for more than life promises. It is poised for 
disappointment.”  “For these families, hope emerges as a strenuous moral 
project...Thus, cultivating a hopeful stance intimately involves an ongoing 
conversation with embittered despair. To hope is to be reminded of what is not, 
and what might never be. (2015:38-39). 
Hope is made possible, or impossible, by governance, tolerance, and access to resources.  
Value pluralism, and contexts that approximate it, offer the possibility of an 
“otherwise” in contemporary Kurdistan. The ability to rank-order values in new ways has 
been made more possible by a unique set of conditions in Kurdistan: On the one hand, 
there are stabilizing conditions of “modernity,” “modernization” discourse, and 
nationalism, such as the conceptualization of historical-linear time and the 
recontextualization of women in “revolutionary time” and “reproductive time,” and 
children as the “eternal future” (Pursley 2019).  On the other hand, there are the 
destabilizing conditions of foreign interventions, the spread of global capitalism and 
neoliberalism, cycles of violence, and the perceived “failures” of the Iraqi and Kurdistani 
states. The convergence of these conditions has had tremendous effects on ethical life, on 
how people conceptualize time and space in the nation and in the state, their relation to 
“modernity,” and their resulting moral obligations. The chief of these obligations for 
many people, it seems, is the moral obligation to hope, which Mattingly and Jensen argue 
is bound up with “views of what it means to live a good life, to be a good person” 
(2015:39). 
Based on one’s ethical positioning, moral obligations and the ability to cultivate 
hope vary. Immanent action encourages moral striving in the present that is agnostic 
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about the “future” and not predicated on any telos. Immanent inaction’s “displaced” or 
“lost” national or state futures makes the cultivation of hope difficult. Both transcendent 
action and transcendent inaction direct people toward a telos, although one’s moral 
obligations regarding the future vary according to conceptions of “providence” or “fate.” 
One sense of “fate” was the “judgment day” some of my interlocutors occasionally 
evoked. Perhaps because my field work occurred during the conflict with the Islamic 
State, apocalypse and judgment seemed experientially nearer. Mariam, the civics teacher, 
used the concept as a way of critiquing bad governance and of creating a sense of 
urgency to persuade her students and their generation to take action, either to prevent or 
to forestall the coming “judgment.” Mariam said,  
Since 1991, when I was 7 or 8 years old, I kept hearing about the “judgment day.” 
People were saying what was happening was the judgment day. This is always the 
case when something bad is happening. For example, the Armenians after World 
War I said that it was the judgment. One day it will be judgment day for you. You 
don’t know and I don’t know when. So, I just live my life and try to know what is 
going on. 
She admonished her students to keep up with news reporting, especially about the rest of 
Iraq, despite many students’ claims that Iraq was “not their country.” In the day of 
judgment, however, they would be held accountable for their moral choices, for what 
they did, or did not do, for their families, communities, and country. No one knew when 
that day would arrive, so everyone should “try to know what is going on” and to do their 
best. In her lessons on the Iraqi Constitution and the contemporary political situation, 
Mariam often spoke of the uncertainties and urgencies of time: 
This is the difference between people who learned from the past and those who 
did not. If we go back to ancient times, we were more developed then than now. 
Imagine it: We are blessed in this country because we are part of this land, but we 
are cursed, too. For example, I am 33 years old. My mom keeps worrying about 
me, about my grandchildren. If we stay here there will be no future, she says. 
Shall we go or shall we stay? Shall we act or shall we be like a people just 
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watching, waiting? But we have this faith in each one of us. It will make us have 
hope.  
  
Yakub [sneering]: Inshallah (God-willing)… 
 




In this dissertation, I have endeavored to describe a view of ethical life in 
Kurdistan in a way that does not reduce it to “grand schemes” (Schielke 2010b) like 
religion, or nationalism, modernization, or secularization. These “grand schemes” appear 
throughout my dissertation and haunt my analysis whenever my interlocutors evoked 
them, often presented as binaries, in their critiques of society and state. Although people 
challenged conceptualizations of the “sectarian,” the “modern,” the “nation,” and the 
“state,” their interpretations nevertheless tended to reproduce elements of the same 
problematic discourses. By relying heavily on ethnography, such as extended vignettes, 
transcripts of conversations, and lengthy quotes, I hope I have preserved many of the 
complexities, the contradictions, the uncertainties, the failures, and the triumphs of 
people who respond to a “moral obligation to hope” in the face of extraordinary 
circumstances. My use of the heuristics “ethical positions” or “ethical positioning” has 
not been to type people or to reduce expressions of moral life to neat categories, but 
rather to provide the reader with some points of reference that are present in 
interlocutors’ ethical lives as they narrated their lives to me and as I observed them.  
I especially have attended to ethical life with a focus on Kurdistani young people, 
whom I have grouped into two cohorts: teenagers and young adults. Children and youth 
(0-24 years) comprise nearly half the population of the Middle East North Africa Region 
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(“MENA Generation 2030” 2019). In Iraq, almost half the population is under 19 years 
old, and about one third is between 15 and 29 years old (World Bank 2020). The 
anthropology of children and youth studies in the MENA region is a relatively new and 
growing subfield and one that offers many unexplored areas for research. For example, in 
spending time with a variety of young people, including “emerging” adults, my research 
sites expanded beyond the familiar domains of nationalism like schools, and considered 
spaces in which youth have formed communities of ethical practice such as bodybuilding, 
various forms of fitness and sports, and humanitarian work.  
Moral and nationalist discourses, in portraying youth as the “future of the nation” 
also unduly burden young people, who by virtue of their youth, lack social and political 
agency and have limited resources for exercising the little agency they do have. The 
enormous youth presence at recent protests across Iraq is not just a sign of their lack of 
jobs or political frustrations; it is an exercise of their agency to fullest by putting all they 
have on the line – their lives. I hope that, by attending to how young people narrate their 
experiences, they can be appreciated as moral agents now and not as becoming or future 
agents. They are moral agents acting in the present and represented in the ethnographic 
present in this dissertation. They offer so much more than merely signifying a yet 
unrealized and uncertain future. I hope they know that their thoughts, opinions, questions, 
actions, disappointments, and hopes all matter to me, and to many people appearing in 
this dissertation, not just because they are “the future.” We care for them and want the 
best for them, and in caring, we may generate some hope for the future. Listening to the 
narratives of people in search of not just “liveable lives,” but in search of “the good,” is 
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crucial for cultivating hope. Generating hope is crucial, not only for our interlocutors, but 
also for our discipline of anthropology, with its own troubled past and uncertain futures.   
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